|
Spain Military
Military intervention in politics has been a recurring
theme
in Spain since the end of the Napoleonic wars. From 1814
to 1936,
Spain experienced no fewer than fifty-four attempts by the
army
or by groups of officers to intervene against the civilian
authority. Twelve of these succeeded in overthrowing the
existing
regime or in abrogating its constitution. The form each of
these
interventions took was that of a pronunciamiento
(pl.,
pronunciamientos), whereby a group of rebelling
officers
would "pronounce" what it wanted the civilian leaders to
do
(see Rule by Pronunciamiento
, ch. 1;
Historical Role of the Armed Forces
, ch. 5).
The support of the armed forces was an essential factor
in
maintaining Franco's forty-year dictatorship. Franco was
always
aware of the importance of this support, and he managed to
foster
the belief that the army's interests would be served best
by the
continuation of his rule. Franco restored to the army its
role of
guarantor of the nation's values. At the same time, Franco
was
aware of the dangers of a politicized army. He retained
firm
control of the military establishment and prevented any
individual officer from gaining a power base. If a
military
leader became too popular or began to question Franco's
policies,
he was quickly removed from any position of influence.
Following the death of Franco, King Juan Carlos and
Prime
Minister Suarez were able to achieve a peaceful transition
to
democracy by proceeding with extreme caution and
consulting with
the military leadership throughout the process. Thus, the
military leaders retained the belief that they had the
right to
be consulted on matters of national importance. The
democratic
leftists were also aware of the ever-present possibility
that
reformist measures could alienate the military and could
provoke
a coup attempt, which led them to accept many compromises
throughout the transition period.
The role of King Juan Carlos was vital in gaining the
army's
acceptance of the new democratic regime. He had been
trained in
military academies, and he understood the viewpoint of the
officer corps. He made a point of establishing close ties
with
the armed forces after Franco's death in order to gain
their
loyalty to him as Franco's chosen successor. At the same
time, he
was able to keep the government informed as to how far it
could
go in the reform process without provoking a military
reaction.
Although many officers did not care for the political
reform
program set forth by Suarez, the military leaders did not
express
open opposition to the democratization process until the
legalization of the PCE in the spring of 1977
(see Transition to Democracy
, ch. 1). They felt betrayed by Suarez, who had
promised
not to take such a step, and although there was no coup,
they
protested vehemently.
The independence with which the army leaders had
expressed
their revulsion at the government's decision highlighted
the
possibility that a powerful military organization could
limit
popular sovereignty. Subsequently, measures were taken to
affirm
the supremacy of civilian control. At the same time, the
government took steps to assuage military opinion by
allocating
funds for the modernization of military equipment and for
raising
military salaries. Efforts also were made to rationalize
the
military career structure and to eliminate bottlenecks in
the
promotion process.
In succeeding months, the armed forces and the civilian
government coexisted uneasily. Intermittent rumblings were
heard
from reactionary army leaders, who retained an
antidemocratic
mentality and who could not come to terms with their new
position
in society. The armed forces seethed with plots for
military
takeovers, and the government's leniency toward
conspirators,
rather than mollifying the military leaders, encouraged
the
plotters to more daring acts. This unstable situation was
exacerbated by the escalation of terrorist violence. Army
dissidents perceived the government as allowing the
country to
descend into anarchy, and military unrest culminated in
the
dramatic coup attempt of February 23, 1981. This attempted
takeover was thwarted by the decisive intervention of King
Juan
Carlos, but conspiracies continued to be uncovered.
When the Socialists came to power in 1982, the
deterrent
power of the armed forces was still a factor to be
considered.
The PSOE government continued to be cautious in dealing
with
issues affecting the military, although it took a firmer
stance
than did its predecessors. As rumors of impending coups
quieted,
and as extreme right-wing parties failed to gain popular
support,
the government undertook stronger legal measures to bring
the
armed forces under the political control of the prime
minister as
well as to modernize and to streamline the military
organization
(see The Military in National Life;
Jurisdiction Over National Defense
, ch. 5).
A significant aspect of the military reorganization was
the
emphasis on the armed forces' role in defending the state
from
external, not internal, enemies. This was reinforced by
Spain's
entrance into NATO
(see Spain and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
, this ch.). This new outward focus, combined
with
the general stability and conservatism of the government,
helped
to make military intervention in the political realm both
impractical and unlikely.
Data as of December 1988
|
