Zaire INTRODUCTION
Figure 1. Administrative Divisions of Zaire, 1993
ZAIRE HAS LONG BEEN CONSIDERED SIGNIFICANT because of
its
location, its resources, its potential, and (perhaps
paradoxically)
because of its weakness. The country has been at the
center of a
number of crises over the years, most notably following
independence, during the Congo crisis of the 1960s, when
there was
a threat of the Cold War spilling over and heating up in
Central
Africa. Again in the 1990s, Zaire is threatening to become
a source
of international instability.
Zaire's importance is to some extent geopolitical. It
borders
on no fewer than nine other states. These countries range
from
Arab-dominated Sudan in the north, to Angola in the south.
Hence,
in defending its borders Zaire can--and has--become
entangled in
political rivalries extending all the way from Libya and
Egypt to
South Africa, i.e., the length of the continent. During
the 1990s,
Zaire's borders with Angola and especially Rwanda have
been
international flash points.
Zaire's minerals add to the country's importance.
Although the
value attached to them by outsiders has varied over the
years, the
country's resources remain impressive. In recent years,
Zaire has
been the world's largest producer of cobalt, second or
third
largest producer of industrial diamonds, and fifth largest
producer
of copper. Zinc, tin, manganese, gold, tungsten-bearing
wolframite,
niobium, and tantalum also are found in Zaire. In
addition, the
Atlantic coast contains important oil reserves, and the
country
also has some coal deposits. Also intriguing, in terms of
Zaire's
development prospects, is the country's immense
agricultural and
hydroelectric potential, believed to be sufficient to feed
and
power the entire continent. Obviously, however, the
potential
represented by these resources has yet to result in any
significant
benefit for the vast majority of Zaire's impoverished
population.
For example, failure to reinvest in the mining sector,
since the
mid-1980s at least, has diminished Zaire's ability to
profit from
its mineral resources. By 1994 it appeared that copper and
cobalt
production had declined to the point that diamonds were
Zaire's
most import export.
Indigenous developments laid the groundwork for what
has become
Zaire. Well before Europeans arrived in the fifteenth
century, the
indigenous peoples had developed iron-working and
long-distance
trade. Large states had emerged, notably among the Kongo
and Luba
peoples of the southern savannas. Artistic traditions that
have
become world renowned had begun, particularly in the areas
of
sculpture, weaving, and music.
For the last five centuries, the area of present-day
Zaire has
also been influenced by the outside world. The Portuguese
navigator
Diogo Cão reached the estuary of the Congo River in 1483.
Shortly
thereafter commercial and diplomatic relations were
established
between Portugal and the coastal Kongo Kingdom; the slave
trade
soon came to dominate the relationship, however. Over the
centuries, a larger and larger portion of the Congo Basin
was drawn
into trade networks connected to the Atlantic Coast. By
the
founding of the Congo Free State in 1885, most of its
territory was
linked to one of these Atlantic networks or to two newer
ones that
tied the country to the Nile Valley and the Indian Ocean.
"Traditional" culture in Zaire has been substantially
modified
by these precolonial contacts with the outside world. The
so-called
traditional diet of many Zairian communities, for example,
includes
crops from the Western Hemisphere introduced by the
Portuguese
(notably cassava, or manioc as it is called in Zaire) and
rice,
introduced from the East coast of Africa by the Afro-Arabs
in the
nineteenth century.
The colonization of what became Zaire took place in an
atmosphere of intense international competition. The
Scottish
missionary, David Livingstone, first brought the Congo to
the
attention of the Western world through his explorations of
the
Congo River basin, beginning in the mid-nineteenth
century. Then,
in 1878 journalist Henry Morton Stanley was commissioned
by Léopold
II, King of Belgium, to undertake additional explorations
and to
establish Belgian sovereignty along the Congo. In 1884-85,
Léopold's claims to the Congo River basin were recognized
by the
major powers at the Conference of Berlin, and the Congo
Free State
was established under his personal rule. In 1908,
following
international criticism of the brutalities tolerated by
Léopold,
Belgium assumed direct control of the colony, which
henceforth was
called the Belgian Congo.
Once Léopold's personal fiefdom had been replaced by a
more
orthodox arrangement, the Belgian Congo largely
disappeared from
international view. However, Belgium remained very nervous
regarding the intentions of the major powers toward the
colony and
with good reason. Germany planned to link its colonies in
West and
East Africa by annexing the Belgian Congo, had it won
World War I.
Adolf Hitler had similar notions during World War II.
Moreover, in
the late 1930s, the British apparently considered trying
to buy
Hitler's good will by giving him the Belgian Congo. In
both cases,
the colony's strategic position as well as its minerals
made the
acquisition appealing.
France had only recognized Léopold's sovereignty over
the
lion's share of the Congo Basin with a reservation, namely
a right
of first refusal should Léopold give up the territory. The
French
raised this supposed right when Belgium took over the
Congo Free
State and again in 1960 when Belgium proposed to grant
independence
to the colony.
The legacy of nervousness regarding the threat to its
colony
helps to explain the ambiguity of Belgium's response to
the Katanga
(now Shaba) secession of 1960--i.e., supporting the
secessionist
regime while denying it the official recognition that
might have
enabled it to consolidate its independence. Had the
Katangan
leaders achieved full independence, they might have opened
the door
to non-Belgian investors in Katangan minerals, as indeed
occurred
during the 1970s.
Bula matari ("he who breaks rocks" in Kikongo,
the
language of the Kongo people) became the name of the
Léopoldian
state at its very beginning and is still used to refer to
the
state, for example in radio broadcasts in indigenous
languages. The
name graphically symbolizes the brutal form of extortion--
extracting ivory and wild rubber from the Congolese--by
which
Léopold attempted to pay the cost of penetration of the
territory
and development of infrastructure.
The Belgian Congo was run on a somewhat different
basis.
Philosophically, "paternalism" served to guide and justify
the
actions of the administration. But coercion or the threat
of
coercion never was far from the surface. The brutality of
colonial
rule, particularly in its early years, left a double
legacy. On the
one hand, it created strong resentments on which
nationalist
movements could draw. At the same time, it generated a
mood of fear
and hopelessness that deterred the appearance of
nationalist
movements.
The state shared responsibility for administration and
development with the Roman Catholic Church and business
interests
involved in mining and plantations. State, church, and
business
thus constituted what was called, even by Belgian
officials, the
"colonial trinity." It was not simply a question of the
state's
taking care of administration, the church of
evangelization, and
the business community of economic development. Rather,
the tasks
of the three overlapped and reinforced one another. In the
postcolonial era, particularly after 1965 under Mobutu,
finding a
new equilibrium among the members of the "trinity" and
sorting out
the areas of responsibility of each would pose major
problems,
particularly with regard to education and management of
the
economy.
The troubled role of the military in Zairian politics
also has
its roots in the colonial era. Since the days of the Congo
Free
State, the Zairian state has had a strong military
dimension. The
Force Publique, or colonial army, was essentially used to
subdue
and control the indigenous population, although it served
outside
the colony during the two world wars. Many of the Free
State's
administrative personnel were military officers, drawn not
only
from Belgium but also from the United States, Canada, and
European
countries ranging from Norway to Turkey. Although courses
were set
up to train civilian administrators, the Force Publique
remained
the backbone of the Congo Free State and the Belgian
Congo.
The first rank-and-file troops were foreigners from the
coasts
of East Africa and West Africa, but as the Free State
began to
recruit Congolese, it tended to rely on what were seen as
"martial
races," first people of the middle reaches of the Congo
River (the
so-called Ngala or Bangala) and then the Tetela from
southeastern
Zaire. Although later quotas spread recruitment more
evenly across
the colony, there is some reason to think that the early
imbalances
were perpetuated by differential re-enlistment and
promotion.
During decolonization, military men of Ngala and
Luba-Kasai
backgrounds, in particular, played major roles in the fall
and
murder of the first prime minister, Patrice Lumumba.
After a series of revolts had demonstrated the danger
of
ethnically defined units, the Belgians made sure that all
units
down to the lowest levels were ethnically mixed. The Force
Publique
supposedly was the most "national" institution of the
Belgian
Congo, as well as the guarantor of the Pax Belgica. But
with the
benefit of hindsight, it is evident that both the Pax
Belgica and
the national quality of the Force Publique were somewhat
mythical.
The unity of the Force Publique was also mythical, or
at least
exaggerated. Certainly, by the time independence arrived
in 1960,
various politicians had established contact with adjutants
from
their respective ethnic groups. These contacts laid the
groundwork
for division of the army into warring camps in the tense
atmosphere
surrounding accession to independence and for the Force
Publique
mutiny of July 1960. The mutiny obviously was directed at
the
Belgian officers; less obviously, it was directed at Prime
Minister
Lumumba, instigated in particular by soldiers whose ethnic
affinities led them to sympathize with Lumumba's rivals
such as
President Joseph Kasavubu, Albert Kalonji, and Jean
Bolikango.
Failed decolonization was to a large extent responsible
for the
Congo crisis of the early 1960s. Considerable economic
development
took place under Belgian rule, but within a highly
paternalistic
framework in which Africans were confined to the lowest
ranks of
the administration and the economic enterprises. Although
opposition to Belgian rule became manifest in the late
1950s,
Belgium made no preparations for decolonization. Rioting
in
Léopoldville (now Kinshasa) in January 1959, however,
forced
Belgium's hand and led to an agreement whereby the colony
gained
independence as the Republic of the Congo on June 30,
1960, and the
First Republic was established.
Independence was followed immediately by crisis,
dramatized by
the mutiny of the Force Publique on July 5 and the
secession of the
country's richest province, Katanga, on July 11, soon
followed by
a similar move in southeastern Kasai Province (now
Kasai-Oriental
Region and Kasai-Occidental Region). The crisis was
further
compounded by the power struggle between Prime Minister
Lumumba and
President Kasavubu, ultimately culminating in Lumumba's
assassination in January 1961 at the hands of Katangan
secessionists, and also, according to most accounts, with
the
connivance of Mobutu and others in Kinshasa as well as the
United
States and Belgian governments.
From its inception, the Congo crisis had an
international
dimension. The chaos that followed on the heels of
independence was
caused not only by conflict among Congolese but also by
foreign
interference. Politics in the First Republic involved
numerous
rivalries among political leaders on behalf of various
Congolese
constituencies, ethnic or otherwise. At the same time,
however,
outside forces clearly intervened in Congolese politics
and
decisively determined outcomes. The Force Publique
mutinied in
large part because Belgium had presistently refused to
Africanize
the officer corps, even following independence. In
response to the
mutiny, Belgium sent in troops, ostensibly to protect
Belgian
lives, but the intervention was seen by many Congolese as
an act of
unwarranted aggression, perhaps even an attempt by Belgium
to
reoccupy the Congo. Belgium also played a role in the
secession of
Katanga. Moïse Tshombe was backed by Belgian settlers and
financial
interests when he declared the independence of Katanga.
The crisis acquired a broader international dimension
when a
multinational United Nations (UN) force was sent in, at
the
invitation of President Kasavubu and Prime Minister
Lumumba, to
restore peace and bring Katanga back into the fold.
Lumumba's own
actions then inexorably drew the fledgling nation into the
Cold War
and, ultimately, sealed Lumumba's own fate.
The conflict between President Kasavubu and Prime
Minister
Lumumba had several dimensions, including a personality
clash,
different bases of support, and diametrically opposed
conceptions
of the ultimate character of the Congolese polity. But
international factors helped precipitate the crisis
between the
two--specifically, Lumumba's policies toward Belgium, the
UN, and
the secessionists, including his insistence on converting
the newly
arrived UN forces into a military instrument for bringing
Katanga
and Kasai back under the control of the central
government.
Lumumba's greatest mistake, however, was his decision to
accept
substantial Soviet aid in order to attack secessionist
areas. This
move brought to a climax the issue of communist influence,
which
had been a source of growing concern to the West and to
more
moderate Africans alike.
Indeed, historical accounts of the Congo crisis almost
uniformly place it in a Cold War context. In particular,
United
States policy toward the Congo is seen as a response to a
perceived
threat of Soviet involvement in the region. (More recently
scholars
have also demonstrated the involvement of American mining
interests
in the shaping of United States policy toward the Congo.)
Certainly
United States opposition to Lumumba and consistent support
over the
years for his eventual successor, Mobutu Sese Seko, were
dictated
by Cold War concerns.
The secession of Katanga was finally suppressed in
January 1963
by UN forces, but the next year the nation's viability was
threatened by "Lumumbist" rural insurgencies in Kwilu and
in the
east that soon controlled about half of the national
territory.
Once again, international assistance proved pivotal in the
survival
of the nation. The rebellion was defeated by the national
government only because of support from Belgium and the
United
States.
In 1965, when the tide had turned against the Lumumbist
rebellion but the threat was not over, and national
politics was
again paralyzed by a rivalry between the president and the
prime
minister, army commander General Joseph-Désiré Mobutu
(later Mobutu
Sese Seko) seized power. He abolished parties, then
established a
single party, the Popular Revolutionary Movement
(Mouvement
Populaire de la Révolution--MPR). The logic of
single-party rule
was pushed to its limits in the 1974 constitution, when
all public
institutions (including the army and the university)
became
subsidiaries of the MPR. Despite the rhetoric of party
rule,
however, most observers agree that what emerged was a
personalisitic dictatorship, dominated by Mobutu and a
clique of
close associates.
The chaos of the First Republic obviously provided a
justification for Mobutu's coup of 1965, and for his
subsequent
establishment of a single-party dictatorship. However, as
Zairians
struggle to establish multiparty democracy in the 1990s,
it is
important to remember that the legacy of the First
Republic was not
all negative. When political debate was opened after 1990,
a number
of politicians invoked the 1964 Constitution of Luluabourg
(Luluabourg is now called Kananga) as a model for a new
federalist
constitutional order.
Once in power, Mobutu reversed the process of
territorial
fragmentation that had begun in 1960. From twenty-one
provincettes in 1965, the number of administrative
divisions
was cut first to twelve provinces (known as regions after
1972),
then to eight, plus Kinshasa, representing a nearly
complete
restoration of the colonial boundaries. (In the early
1990s, the
most populous region, Kivu, was divided into three
regions--Nord-
Kivu, Sud-Kivu, and Maniema, corresponding to the three
provincettes of the 1960s. Under Mobutu the
regions, once
quasi-federal political units with their own governments,
were
reduced to administrative subdivisions of the unitary
state. Not
until 1984, when Mobutu accepted suggestions from external
aid
donors that he carry out political "liberalization," were
the
regions given legislative assemblies and a degree of
politico-
administrative autonomy. The extreme centralization of
power under
Mobutu, and the abuses that followed from that
centralization, led
to a push for decentralization once political debate
emerged after
1990. The push for democratization is attributable, above
all, to
the courage of opposition groups and of ordinary Zairians.
Yet
external linkages were important, notably the publicity
given to
the Union for Democracy and Social Progress (Union pour la
Démocratie et le Progrès Social--UDPS) in Europe and North
America.
Mobutu's style of governance reflects both continuity
and
change. Much analysis has focused on the changes wrought
by Mobutu,
but outside observers often fail to understand an
important area of
cultural continuity from which the Mobutu regime has
derived much
of its power and legitimacy. Mobutu is a president, not a
king. He
travels in jet aircraft and appears on television. Yet
some of his
ideas, and some of the ideas that his subjects have about
him, are
based on traditional Zairian sources and uses of power.
First, it is important to distinguish between the
ideology and
the practice of leadership. Ideologically, a precolonial
Congolese
ruler (emperor, king, or chief) was seen as a father to
his people.
He had a priestly function, as intermediary between the
material
and spiritual worlds. The symbols of rule expressed his
uniqueness;
only the ruler could wear the skin of the leopard or the
feathers
of the eagle, for these beasts were kings of their
respective
spheres of the animal world.
At the same time, and particularly in the vast
equatorial
forest (Mobutu's home area), the ruler was an
entrepreneur. He
built up wealth, which he used on his own behalf, but also
on
behalf of his people. The successful "big man"
(mokonzi in
Lingala) built up a community of blood relatives, allies,
clients,
dependents, wives, slaves, and others. Copper, the symbol
of wealth
in precolonial Zaire, adorned the chiefs and elders.
However--and
this point was missed by many analysts until recently--the
community was described in terms of genealogy, the ruler
being
presented (and his rule justified) in terms of his being
the head
of the family.
This model of the ruler as father (ideologically) and
entrepreneur (behaviorally) has carried over into
postcolonial
Zaire. For example, in reconstructing the army after the
mutinies
and secessions of the early 1960s, Mobutu behaved very
much as the
"big man." He tied other officers to him by means of
resources,
often from his foreign backers, which he channeled to
them, meaning
that troops loyal to Mobutu were more likely to be paid,
and to be
paid on time, than other troops.
After 1965, and especially after 1970, Mobutu's
relationship
with his principal political associates--government
ministers,
advisers, and high-ranking military personnel--also was
based on
the "big man" model. Indeed, the term presidential
monarch
has been used, appropriately, to describe Mobutu. Acting
as "Father
of the Nation," his self-awarded title, Mobutu presided
over a
political system that had the formal trappings of a
republic but
was in reality the personal fiefdom of the president, who
used the
national treasury as his personal checkbook and disbursed
both
rewards and punishments at will. Cabinet ministers, for
example,
were routinely shuffled in and out and political allies
exiled or
"recuperated," as political fortunes rose and fell--or as
Mobutu's
whims dictated.
The Mobutu regime also sought legitimacy through
ideology. The
MPR initially espoused a doctrine of nationalism, borrowed
from
Lumumba's Congolese National Movement (Mouvement National
Congolais--MNC) and other parties of the early
postindependence
era. By 1971 it was promoting
authenticity
(see Glossary),
espousing "authentic" Zairian nationalism and rejecting
foreign
cultural influences. The most dramatic symbol of this
Zairianization
(see Glossary) process was the change of
the
country's name to Zaire in October 1971 and the gradual
renaming of
its cities and provinces (later regions). By 1974 the
official
ideology had metamorphosed into
Mobutism (see
Glossary),
in which
the acts and sayings of the leader were glorified,
increasingly to
a ridiculous degree. To "Founder-President" were added
ever more
extravagant praise-names: "Guide of the Revolution,"
"Helmsman"
(borrowed from Mao Zedong), "Mulopwe" (emperor, or even
god-king),
and finally "Messiah." At this point, the ideology of the
regime
had become so overblown that many Zairians and most
foreign
observers found it impossible to take seriously. But many
of the
themes in the Mobutist ideology--the yearning for cultural
and
economic autonomy and for strong, paternalistic
leadership--
resonated with deeply held opinions on the part of
Zairians, among
both the elite and the general poulace. Nevertheless, it
is
difficult to avoid the conclusion that this ideology
served to
justify the domination of the political system by a
self-serving
ruling class.
Cultural nationalism inevitably brought the Mobutu
regime into
conflict with the Roman Catholic Church, which, along with
the
state and the business community, made up the "colonial
trinity."
But the church, whose active following includes 46 to 48
percent of
the population of Zaire, possesses worldwide links and a
resilient
institutional infrastructure and thus was able to
withstand the
regime's pressures. Catholic institutions, for example,
particularly schools and health services were--and
remain--
comparable in extent and vastly superior in quality to
those of the
state.
Although the church had welcomed the Mobutu regime, the
hegemonic ambitions of the MPR aroused suspicion, and a
conference
of bishops in 1969 privately noted "dictatorial
tendencies" in the
regime. The following year, Joseph Cardinal Malula
expressed fears
about the regime's intentions at a mass celebrating the
tenth
anniversary of independence. In the presence of both King
Baudouin
of Belgium and Mobutu, he denounced political elites for
"a
fascination with the triumphant and the superficial, and a
hunger
for the lavish."
The Roman Catholic Church also viewed as an affront the
absorption of the jewel of its educational system,
Lovanium
University, into the secular National University of Zaire
(Université Nationale du Zaïre--UNAZA) in August 1971.
Even more
serious was the regime's announcement in December 1971
that party
youth branches had to be established in the seminaries.
Another battle took place over the concept of
authenticity. The
regime's stress on "mental decolonization" and "cultural
disalienation" could be seen as a disguised attack on
Christianity
as an import from the West. One symbolic accoutrement of
the
authenticity campaign, the 1972 elimination of Christian
forenames,
was treated by the church as a particular affront. The
church's
opposition to the name changes led to a dramatic riposte.
Cardinal
Malula, archbishop of Kinshasa, became the target of
attacks as a
"renegade of the revolution"; he was evicted from the
residence the
regime had built for him and was forced to leave the
country for
three months in 1972.
In late 1972, the regime moved to monopolize the
socialization
process, banning all religious broadcasts and dissolving
church-
sponsored youth movements. The zenith of this campaign
came at the
end of 1974 when the religious school networks were
nationalized,
celebration of Christmas as a public holiday was ended,
and the
display of religious artifacts was limited to the interior
of
churches. (The school networks were, however, returned to
the
churches eighteen months later when the state proved
unable to
operate them effectively.)
Over the following years, the Roman Catholic bishops in
Zaire
continued to criticize the Mobutu regime. In 1976
Monsignor
Kabanga, archbishop of Lubumbashi, issued a pastoral
letter
denouncing a system under which, "Whoever holds a morsel
of
authority, or means of pressure, profits from it to impose
on
people and exploit them, especially in rural areas. All
means are
good to obtain money, or humiliate the human being. . . ."
It was
small wonder, then, that the Roman Catholic Church
maintained moral
standing in the eyes of the population and that Monsignor
Laurent
Monsengwo Pasinya, archbishop of Kisangani, was chosen
president of
the national conference that was convened in the early
1990s to
oversee a transition to a democratic, multiparty political
system.
Despite the importance of cultural nationalism, over
which
church and state battled, the primary component of Zairian
nationalism was economic and was designed to wrest control
of the
economy from foreign interests and place it firmly in
Zairian
hands. As early as 1967, this desire had led to a clash
with
Belgium over control of Zaire's major industrial concern,
the Upper
Katanga Mining Union (Union Minière du
Haut-Katanga--UMHK), which
mined copper and cobalt. Eventually, a compromise was
reached under
which a state-owned mining company, General Quarries and
Mines
(Générale des Carrières et des Mines--Gécamines) was
created. The
settlement proved lucrative to UMHK and brought
unanticipated costs
to Zaire.
The linkage between politics and the economy became
increasingly clear in the 1970s. In 1973 the government
seized
2,000 economic enterprises owned by foreigners (but not
those owned
by Americans) and turned them over to Zairians, mainly
members of
the political elite. Mobutu was the leading beneficiary.
Within a
few months, the scope of the disaster of this
Zairianization was
clear, but instead of turning back, Mobutu plunged forward
into the
"radicalization of the revolution," apparently inspired by
his
visit to China and North Korea. "Radicalization"
supposedly
included the nationalization of trade and the mobilization
of
agricultural brigades to relieve food shortages. But in
its
application, the new measure became an assault on the
primarily
Belgian-owned industrial sector. The effect was to extend
the chaos
of Zairianization to virtually all spheres of the economy.
As the Zairian economy went into a tailspin, Mobutu
finally
came to realize the magnitude of the catastrophe ushered
in by
Zairianization and radicalization. In November 1975, he
introduced
a new policy of
retrocession
(see Glossary), under which a
substantial portion of Zairianized enterprises were
returned to
their original owners. Meanwhile, however, almost
irreparable
damage had been inflicted upon the economy.
The economic disaster resulting from Zairianization was
compounded by the regime's insistence on undertaking
large-scale
industrialization, in the process squandering the
country's mineral
wealth and neglecting the agricultural sector. To fund its
grandiose industrial projects, the regime resorted to
heavy foreign
borrowing. When the prices of commodities (especially
copper), on
which Zaire was heavily dependent, dropped drastically and
the cost
of vital imports, such as petroleum products, skyrocketed
in the
mid-1970s, export earnings and government revenues dropped
sharply,
and Zaire faced a grave economic and financial crisis.
Since 1975, Zaire's massive foreign debt has had a
major impact
on policy, both foreign and domestic. Some causes of the
huge debt,
such as the rise in the price of petroleum imports and the
fall in
the price of copper exports, were beyond Zaire's control.
Others
were not, notably Zairianization and radicalization, the
squandering of funds on prestige projects, and their
diversion into
overseas bank accounts by the president and the elite.
As a consequence of the debt, foreign creditors became
major
actors in the Zairian political process--and in economic
development, thus making a mockery of Mobutu's
much-vaunted quest
for economic independence. In 1976 the first of a series
of
economic stabilization programs was adopted under the
guidance of
the International Monetary Fund (
IMF--see
Glossary) and
other
external forces. During the next eighteen years, Zairian
authorities alternately cooperated with and struggled
against the
international financial institutions. In 1994 this era
came to an
end (for a time, at any rate) as the
World Bank (see
Glossary)
closed its office in Kinshasa, and Zaire was expelled from
the IMF.
In line with the IMF's economic orthodoxy, the "Mobutu
Plan of
1976 and each successive was supposed to reduce
corruption,
rationalize and control expenditures, increase tax
revenues, limit
imports, boost production, improve the transportation
infrastructure, eliminate arrears on interest payments,
ensure that
principal payments were made on time, and improve
financial
management and economic planning. But ultimately all
efforts at
reform or significant change were undercut by the
patrimonialism
(see Glossary) and rampant corruption that characterized
the
regime.
Zaire's public and publicly insured debt was
rescheduled by the
Paris Club (see
Glossary) at least seven times between
1976 and
1987. Zaire's private creditors also rescheduled their
part of the
debt in 1980 and at various times thereafter, and numerous
meetings
of World Bank and Western aid consortia were held to
generate
further official assistance, starting in 1979.
When the first two standby agreements with the IMF
yielded
meager results, the IMF and the World Bank decided in the
early
1980s to send their own teams of experts to run key posts
in the
Bank of Zaire (the country's central bank), the Customs
Office, and
the Ministries of Finance and Planning. The head of the
Bank of
Zaire team, Erwin Blumenthal of the Federal Republic of
Germany
(West Germany), cut off credit and exchange facilities to
firms of
members of the political elite and imposed very strict
foreign
exchange quotas. However, Mobutu and his colleagues were
able to
evade many of the restrictions and to wear down Blumenthal
and the
other experts. After Blumenthal's departure, the
international
teams were careful to avoid what one member called the
"political
hotspots," and the regime continued on its
self-destructive course.
In 1981 Zaire began to cooperate with the IMF, laying
off large
numbers of civil servants and teachers. In 1983 it agreed
to
devalue its currency by 80 percent and to liberalize the
economy.
In response, the IMF agreed to a fifth standby agreement,
and the
Paris Club agreed to roll over more than US$1 billion of
debt, with
a maturity of eleven years, in contrast to the eight years
normally
approved for debtor nations. In 1985 and 1987, the Paris
Club
rescheduled Zaire's debt for ten years and fifteen years,
respectively, making it clear that the greater leniency
being shown
to Zaire was a reward for following IMF guidelines.
Although Zaire appeared to be following the IMF
guidelines,
benefits were slow to appear in terms of improved economic
activity
within the country, not to mention improved living
conditions.
Mobutu, said to be one of the ten wealthiest men in the
world,
continued to enrich himself at the expense of the people,
whose
living standards continued to decline.
During the years when lenders and Western governments
were
somewhat successful in controlling the financial practices
of
Zaire's rulers, they paid dearly for their success in that
they
were forced to provide the regime with additional support
to
compensate for the withdrawn financial opportunities.
Belgium,
France, Israel, and the United States, among others,
provided both
symbolic and instrumental backing in the form of military
assistance. In the case of the United States, the military
relationship increased when the two countries found
themselves
supporting the same faction in the Angolan civil war in
1975. In
1986-87 Mobutu reportedly agreed to allow the United
States to ship
arms to Angolan rebels via Zaire and to refurbish the air
base at
Kamina (in southeastern Zaire), in exchange for increased
aid as
well as United States pressure on the IMF to treat Zaire
leniently.
Mobutu and his regime thus benefitted substantially from
the
perceived Untied States need to assure a stable Zaire and
to garner
Zairian support for United States strategic interests in
sub-
Saharan Africa.
Over the years, the Western powers rewarded Mobutu both
economically and militarily and for the most part
maintained
silence in the face of increasing evidence of his regime's
abuses.
Only since the end of the Cold War has support for Zaire
become
more conditional. By early in the 1990s, the West had
terminated
most aid to the Mobutu regime and was putting increasing
pressure
on Mobutu to improve his human rights record and institute
multiparty democracy.
In the early years of his regime, many Zairians gave
Mobutu
credit for restoring order and securing the country's
borders.
Increasingly, however, the forces of order have become
sources of
disorder within the country. Rather than protecting the
Zairian
people, the armed forces and security forces prey upon
them and are
perceived, justifiably, as instruments of repression.
Examples of
their excesses abound. One of the most egregious instances
occurred
in Bandundu in 1978, when the security forces summarily
executed
about 500 people following a minor uprising set off by a
self-
proclaimed prophet. Another occurred in 1981, when perhaps
100
diamond miners were killed in Kasai-Oriental. The incident
that
gained the greatest international attention and that had
the most
serious repercussions for the Mobutu regime was the May
1990
massacre of students at the University of Lubumbashi. Up
to 100
students were killed in the incident, ultimately prompting
most
multilateral and bilateral donors to terminate all but
humanitarian
aid to Zaire.
Just as they have failed to provide internal order, so,
too,
have the armed forces failed to secure Zaire's borders. In
1977 and
1978, Shaba Region was invaded by Angola-based rebels, who
had to
be repulsed by foreign troops. In 1984 and again in 1985,
another
opposition group briefly held the town of Moba on the
shore of Lake
Tanganyika, again demonstrating the Zairian military's
lack of
capability--and the government's lack of control of its
territory.
In 1993 there were reports that the Zairian army had
clashed with
troops of yet another opposition group, this time along
the Uganda
border. In 1994 Zaire's border with Rwanda also became a
major
source of insecurity, as over one million refugees fled
from
perceived danger in their home country.
In 1977, following the first Shaba invasion, Mobutu
responded
to Western pressure for reform by paying lip service to
the notion
of democracy in Zaire. Competitive elections among
multiple
candidates for the legislature were permitted--but only
within the
single-party framework, which is to say that the system
still
offered no real political choice. All electoral choice, or
competition, took place solely within the MPR.
Nevertheless, by
1980, some of the deputies elected in 1977--The Thirteen,
as they
were called--had challenged Mobutu's system of rule
through an open
letter cataloging regime abuses. The Thirteen ultimately
evolved
into an internal opposition party, the UDPS. Despite being
banned,
with its leaders largely exiled or under internal house
arrest, the
UDPS was to prove remarkably resilient and formed the core
of
opposition to the regime when a political opening occurred
in the
early 1990s.
In April 1990, Mobutu radically transformed the
political
environment by announcing the establishment of the Third
Republic,
ostensibly a new, multiparty system of government. The
initiative
was presented as a magnanimous gesture on the part of the
president, but in fact Mobutu was bowing to renewed
pressure for
change from Western governments and international
financial
institutions. In addition, his move was a calculated
attempt to
quell growing domestic discontent.
It soon became clear that Mobutu's announcement had
unleashed
volatile forces that he would be hard-pressed to contain.
And, in
fact, Mobutu proceeded to embark on a checkered course of
half-
hearted moves toward democratization, interspersed with
periodic
brutal crackdowns on dissent.
The immediate result of Mobutu's announcement was the
unleashing of efforts to publicize existing organizations
and to
found new ones. Although Mobutu backpedaled furiously,
attempting
to constrict the political space he had appeared to open
up, by
December 1990, independent political parties were
permitted to
register. By mid-1991, over 200 political parties had been
recognized. Most significant among them was the UDPS,
which had
emerged as the main opposition party. Other major
opposition
parties were the Democratic and Social Christian Party
(Parti
Démocrate et Social Chrétien--PDSC) led by Joseph Ileo and
the
Union of Federalists and Independent Republicans (Union
des
Fédéralistes et des Républicains Indépendants--UFERI) led
by Jean
Nguza Karl-i-Bond. Opposition activities were spearheaded
by a
multiparty coalition, the Sacred Union (Union Sacrée).
In August 1991, Mobutu also convened a long-promised
national
conference ultimately known as the Sovereign National
Conference
(Conférence Nationale Souveraine--CNS), which was
ostensibly
designed to oversee the drafting of a new constitution and
to
manage the transition to a democratic, multiparty
political system.
But inevitably conflicts arose between a conference
determined to
assert its sovereign powers and a president equally
determined not
to cede control of the government, and the conference was
very much
an on-again-off-again institution throughout 1991 and most
of 1992.
Nevertheless, the conference, encompassing over 2,800
delegates, did meet--intermittently--to debate the
country's
political future from August 1991 until it finished its
work in
December 1992. In August 1992, the conference passed a
Transitional
Act to serve as a provisional constitution. That act
established a
parliamentary system with a figurehead president, a
453-member High
Council of the Republic (Haut Conseil de la
République--HCR) to
serve as a provisional legislature, and a first state
commissioner
(prime minister) to serve as head of government. Mobutu
and the
conference also agreed to abide by the Comprehensive
Political
Agreement (Compromise Politique Global), which included
ten
principles, the most significant being that no institution
or organ
of the transition should use its constitutional powers to
prevent
any other institution from functioning. In essence, all
parties
agreed to share power and to abide by the constitutional
provisions
embodied in the Transitional Act.
UDPS leader Étienne Tshisekedi wa Mulumba was duly
elected
transitional first state commissioner by the CNS on August
15,
1992. On August 30, he appointed a transitional government
of
"national union," including various Mobutu opponents, but
no Mobutu
supporters. In December 1992, the CNS dissolved itself and
was
succeeded by the HCR, headed by Archbishop Monsengwo. As
the
supreme interim legislative authority, the HCR was
authorized to
formulate and adopt a new constitution and to organize
legislative
and presidential elections. But Mobutu refused to accept
the
authority of the HCR or the legitimacy of any constitution
it might
formulate, instead reconvening the former legislature,
which had
been suspended, and entrusting it with drafting a rival
constitution more to his liking. In March 1993, Mobutu
further
undermined the Tshisekedi transitional government when he
convened
a special "conclave" of political forces to chart the
nation's
future, including devising a new constitution. Mobutu then
dismissed the Tshisekedi government, although according to
the
Transitional Act he did not have the authority to do so.
At his
urging, the conclave then named Faustin Birindwa as prime
minister
of a so-called government of national salvation.
Since that time, Zaire has had two parallel, rival
governments
vying for domestic and international acceptance. The
Birindwa
government did not receive international recognition (nor
has the
government headed by Birindwa's successor). But the
Tshisekedi
government, although recognized internationally, has from
the
beginning lacked the power or resources to govern. Indeed,
it has
never been able to govern effectively because of its
inability to
limit Mobutu's powers except on paper. The result of this
situation
is government stalemate, which worked to Mobutu's
advantage.
Mobutu has been able to cling to power because of three
main
factors. First, he has maintained control of key
institutions,
including the central bank, state radio and television
facilities,
the security police, and the military, particularly the
elite
Special Presidential Division (Division Spéciale
Présidentielle--
DSP). In fact, control of key military units has been
critical to
Mobutu's continued exercise of power. He has used those
units to
obstruct the functioning of the transitional government,
to
intimidate critical opposition leaders and the media, to
promote
anarchy and chaos, to disperse popular demonstrations, and
to
incite ethnic violence. Mobutu has also retained control
over the
network of diplomatic representatives abroad, in
particular Zaire's
delegations to the UN and its specialized agencies.
Likewise, he
apparently has maintained control over the network of
regional,
subregional, and local administrators in the interior of
the
country.
Mobutu's position also has been strengthened by his
ability--
and that of his allies--to incite ethnic violence, thereby
promoting instability, fostering anarchy, weakening the
opposition,
and undermining mass political mobilization against his
regime.
Officially instigated cases of ethnic violence clearly
occurred in
Shaba, where, beginning in August 1992, attacks on
Luba-Kasai--
Tshisekedi's ethnic group--were incited by Nguza and other
former
opposition figures, including the governor of Shaba,
Gabriel Kyungu
wa Kumwanza. Officials may also have played a role in
ethnic
violence in Nord-Kivu, where indigenous local people
attacked
immigrants from Burundi and Rwanda, collectively known in
Zaire as
the Banyarwanda. Both instances of ethnic tension reflect
a history
of enmity and resentment. But most observers believe that
the
recent violence is less historical than the result of
deliberate
government manipulation designed to divert popular
resentment of
the Mobutu regime. In the Nord-Kivu case, Mobutu also was
able to
demonstrate his control of the use of force, sending in
the DSP to
quell the violence.
In Shaba, however, Mobutu stood aside and let events
proceed
without interference, no doubt because they appeared to be
working
to his advantage. In addition to instigating the ethnic
cleansing
campaign in Shaba, Nguza and Kyungu have raised the
specter of
Shaban autonomy, at times threatening to pursue it if
Tshisekedi
were to be "forced on" the nation as prime minister in a
political
settlement. Observers note that both issues have been used
to the
detriment of Tshisekedi and the UDPS and to the benefit of
Mobutu,
who can thus present himself as the only political figure
who can
hold Zaire together, including Zaire's most vital region,
mineral-
rich Shaba.
A final factor in Mobutu's ability to retain power is
his
consummate political skill. Over and over again, he has
succeeded
in dividing the opposition and in co-opting key opponents.
For
example, in October 1991, Mobutu appointed Tshisekedi as
prime
minister of a transitional coalition government, but fired
him just
one week later following a dispute over the apportionment
of
ministerial portfolios. When the Sacred Union refused to
choose a
successor, Mobutu named Bernardin Mungul-Diaka, leader of
a small
opposition party, as prime minister. Then, in late
November 1991,
Mobutu formed another transitional government, this time
under
Nguza. The appointment of Nguza proved to be highly
beneficial to
Mobutu, in that it brought Mobutu the support of Nguza and
his
followers while at the same time fracturing the
opposition. At the
time, Nguza was a Tshisekedi rival in the Sacred Union,
but he
subsequently left the Sacred Union, after other members
termed his
nomination as prime minister a "betrayal." He then created
a rival
political coalition within the CNS, the Alliance of
Patriotic
Forces. Encompassing some thirty parties, led by UFERI,
the
Alliance ostensibly remained committed to political change
but
rejected "extremist" stands.
Mobutu's appointment of Birindwa as prime minister in
March
1993 further undercut opposition forces. Birindwa proved
to have
little difficulty in recruiting ministers for a
government.
Political expediency aside, co-optation of political
figures by
Mobutu and Birindwa was facilitated by the disastrous
economic
situation. In June 1993, six political leaders from the
Sacred
Union joined the Birindwa government and then left the
Sacred
Union, claiming that the Sacred Union had become too
extremist.
They then formed their own coalition, which they called
the
Restored Sacred Union (Union Sacrée Rénovée). Having
joined the
Mobutu-appointed Birindwa government, the six could no
longer be
regarded as ardent proponents of political change. The
same could
be said of Nguza, given his acceptance of a position as
first
deputy prime minister in charge of defense in the Birindwa
government.
In 1994 Mobutu's tactics of stalling and dividing the
opposition bore further fruit. Birindwa resigned as prime
minister
of the rival, Mobutu-appointed government. The selection
of a
successor then fell to the new 780-member legislature
created in
late 1993. That body, the High Council of the Republic
(Haut
Conseil de la République--HCR)-Parliament of the
Transition
(Parlement de la Transition--PT), or HCR-PT, encompassed
both the
HCR and Zaire's former, pro-Mobutu legislature. After five
months
of political vacuum, in June 1994 the HCR-PT finally
elected a
candidate from the moderate opposition, Léon Kengo wa
Dondo, to
replace Birindwa. The election was an affront and setback
for
Tshisekedi. Although continuing to assert his claim to be
the sole
legitimate head of government, Tshisekedi was not among
the seven
candidates for the job of government leader. Instead, he
simply
called upon members of the HCR-PT to "confirm" his
position as
prime minister.
Kengo was a founder of the Union of Independent
Democrats
(Union des Démocrates Indépendants--UDI) in 1990. Although
denounced at its founding as "MPR II," the UDI in fact
represented
a claim to an independent future by politicians and
businessmen
formerly close to Mobutu. Kengo had been premier twice
before, in
the 1980s, and was considered an advocate of fiscal
austerity as
promoted by the IMF. His candidacy in 1994 was put forward
by the
Union for the Republic and Democracy (Union pour la
République et
la Démocratie--URD), a coalition including the UDI and
other
moderate groups within the Sacred Union. The radical wing
of the
Sacred Union, driven primarily by the UDPS, termed Kengo's
selection "illegal and anticonsitutional" and continued to
regard
Tshisekedi as the country's only legitimate prime
minister.
For its part, the HCR-PT claimed to be acting in accord
with
popular sentiment. But observers note that the HCR-PT's
claim to
represent popular feeling is questionable, given the
swelling of
its ranks by members of the pro-Mobutu parliament. In
fact, nobody
can say whether or to what extent the Mobutists and their
allies in
Kengo's UDI as well as the other moderate parties really
represent
a majority of the Zairian people.
Political unrest continued as Tshisekedi attempted to
assert
his authority and pro-Mobutu forces strove to discredit
Tshisekedi.
On June 5, Tshisekedi, speaking publicly for the first
time in
three months in front of a large crowd in Kinshasa,
threatened to
paralyze the diamond extraction industry if Mobutu
continued to
refuse him the job of prime minister. He called on diamond
workers
to go on indefinite strike to halt production and exports
of
diamonds. The threat was regarded as credible because
Tshisekedi
has continued to enjoy broad support from the working
class,
especially in his home region of Kasai-Oriental, where
diamond
mining is centered. If successful, such a strike would
have a major
impact on the Mobutu regime, which has come to relay on
the diamond
industry for revenue since the demise of Gécamines and the
copper
industry.
One response to Tshisekedi's threat was further
harassment and
the concoction of what he termed, credibly, "a plot"
against him.
A week after his speech, Tshisekedi was arrested and
detained for
ten hours. According to the official version of events,
Tshisekedi
had been driving within a military camp near the
presidential
residence at Nsele, east of Kinshasa, in a car containing
arms and
ammunition. In protest of Tshisekedi's arrest,
demonstrators burned
cars and set tires alight in a Kinshasa suburb. During the
demonstration, one of Tshisekedi's advisers was arrested
by the
Civil Guard and allegedly tortured.
The demonstration was just one sign that the task
confronting
Kengo--guiding the country through the transition toward
the Third
Republic--is a daunting one given the extremely confused
political
situation in the country and the general state of collapse
at all
levels. As he said in a brief speech after his election,
his
priority will be to restore the authority of the state. He
also
promised to promote "national harmony, reconciliation,
tolerance,
democracy, and the exercise of freedom." It appeared to
most
observers, however, that these goals would be extremely
difficult
to achieve, considering the economic and social situation.
While the struggle between Mobutu and the opposition
has
dragged on, the nation's economic and financial situation
has
continued to deteriorate. The country remains heavily
indebted and
impoverished. A large proportion of its population lives
outside of
the formal economy, eking out a marginal existence through
subsistence agriculture and informal trade or barter. The
standard
of living for most of the population has continued to
decline.
The export-oriented Zairian economy has been in a free
fall for
a number of years, suffering the effects of monumental,
institutionalized corruption, neglect, and mismanagement.
The
economic crisis was worsened by the rampant looting and
rioting by
unpaid troops in late 1991 and again in early 1993, which
in turn
led to the mass exodus of the foreign technicians who had
kept the
economy going--in particular copper production and
economic
infrastructure.
Throughout the 1990s, Zaire's economy has been
described in
only the direst of terms. It has been characterized as
desperate,
in ruins, dysfunctional. In fact, the formal economy has
almost
ceased to function. The banking system has collapsed
because of the
rampant hyperinflation and the drastic fall in the value
of the
currency. The central bank, which in the past served as
Mobutu's
personal piggy bank, is for all practical purposes
bankrupt. Most
other banks have closed, and those that have remained open
deal in
cash transactions only. The state takes in few revenues:
the tax
collection system is defunct, few if any customs revenues
are
collected, most foreign aid has been cut off, and copper
production, long the mainstay of the economy and the main
source of
government revenues, has dropped off significantly. The
government
has been able to pay its bills only by printing new
currency.
The effects of the economic chaos on Zairian society
are
enormous: unemployment and poverty are widespread, the
economic
infrastructure has decayed, state institutions have ceased
to
function, and most state-run hospitals and schools have
closed.
Civil servants, teachers, and health-care workers have
largely
ceased working because they have not been paid, and
medical
equipment and medicine are scarce. As a result, diseases
once
eradicated have begun to reappear. Acquired immune
deficiency
syndrome (AIDS), sleeping sickness, and malnutrition have
become
increasingly prevalent. Malnutrition is particularly
common among
children, as the price of food exceeds the financial
resources of
more and more Zairian families. The availability of safe
drinking
water also has become problematic.
Most observers of Zaire's deplorable economic and
social
conditions marvel at how a land of such superlative
natural
endowments--enormous mineral deposits, immense forests,
mighty
rivers, and abundant fertile soils--could have sunk so
low. By
rights, Zaire should have become one of sub-Saharan
Africa's most
developed and wealthiest states. But instead it is an
impoverished
nation in a rich land, with its economy and society in
total
disarray and most of its citizens (80 percent by some
estimates)
living in absolute poverty. When ethnic conflict-- which
has
resulted in the internal displacement of several hundred
thousand
Zairians in the early 1990s--is taken into account as
well, Zaire's
characterization as "an African horror story" in a recent
article
by Bill Berkeley in the Atlantic Monthly appears
well
founded.
And yet, as press accounts continue to emphasize,
Zairians have
somehow survived, their ability to do so a reflection of
their
ability to fend for themselves. In the absence of a
functioning
government, economy, or social services sector,
enterprising
individuals have resorted to the informal economy to make
a living
and to obtain the goods and services they need. In
essence,
government services--such as health care, schools, road
maintenance--have been "privatized." Moreover, a de facto
decentralization of government power has occurred.
Recognizing the
weakness of the central government, which can no longer
project its
power or offer its services much beyond the capital city,
regions
and local communities have stepped into the void to
provide what
order and services they can. For example, local businesses
may pay
for maintenance of local infrastructure, and local
merchants may
band together to pay local military and security forces to
provide
peace and protection.
A less positive result of the individual Zairian's
quest for
survival is, of course, the widespread corruption that has
resulted. Recent travelers to Zaire note the proliferation
of
"enterprising" individuals and "facilitators" who prey on
those
entering the country, attempting to extract payment for a
multitude
of services. Similarly, anyone traveling in Zaire
encounters
frequent roadblocks set up by security officials who then
extort
money in exchange for the right to pass.
On a larger scale, the massive official corruption and
greed
characterizing the Mobutu regime have had disastrous
results for
the country and its people. In an August 1994 article in
the
Washington Post, "An African Giant Falls under Its
Own
Weight," Keith Richburg examines the causes of Zaire's
desperate
state in the 1990s. He notes that Zaire has not broken up
into
civil war like Liberia or been overcome by tribal
slaughter like
neighboring Rwanda. Rather, it has crumbled under the
weight of
years of rampant corruption, greed, incompetence, neglect,
and
decay.
Since the end of the Cold War, Africa has appeared to
lose much
of its significance to the developed world, and African
nations
generally make headlines only when their situation has
become
catastrophic. Throughout the mid-1990s, Zaire has
occasionally been
featured in the Western media, attention focusing on the
mystery of
how the nation could continue to operate and how Mobutu
could
continue to survive. But as the status quo continued in
Zaire,
international attention largely shifted elsewhere.
Zaire entered the spotlight, indirectly, in July 1994
as over
1 million refugees fleeing ethnic violence in neighboring
Rwanda
crossed the border into Goma in eastern Zaire. In August
there were
fears of an additional mass exodus from Rwanda into
Bukavu, Zaire,
when the French withdrew their troops from Rwanda. The
number of
new refugees into Bukaku remained much lower than
expected,
however, estimated at about 70,000 at the end of August
(but the
area as a whole was inundated by a total refugee
population of
about 400,000).
That Zaire could appear as a safehaven is supremely
ironic
given the condition of Zaire's economy, society, and
polity in
1994. The irony of the situation was further dramatized by
the
behavior of Zairian border and security forces, who
allowed the
flood of refugees to pass, but not before robbing them of
whatever
food, weapons, and other valuables they had managed to
bring with
them. In addition, there were reports of attempts by
Zairian
officials to extort cash payoffs to permit international
relief
flights to land (or to depart), although such flights are
supposed
to be exempt from landing charges. Zairian soldiers
reportedly also
helped themselves to relief supplies.
The massive influx of Rwandan refugees poses enormous
problems
for Zaire, a country already gripped by anarchy and
lawlessness and
demonstrably unable to meet the needs of its own
population,
including the many internally displaced Zairians. The area
is quite
inaccessible and is served by a very limited
transportation
infrastructure in very poor condition. This situation
hampers the
ability of international relief organizations, the UN, and
foreign
governments to deliver the food, clear water, and health
care
supplies and personnel that are so desperately needed. In
addition,
security has become a major problem as well. The refugee
camps are
beset by common thievery as well as attacks by Hutu
extremists
seeking Tutsi spies. Maintaining control in the camps is
the
responsibility of Zairian military and security forces,
but doing
so is beyond their capability, despite the presence of
several
thousand troops in the area, including 400 elite troops
dispatched
to Goma in response to the Rwandan refugee crisis.
Moreover, the
security forces themselves have contributed to the
lawlessness in
the region by preying on both the local poplace and the
refugees.
A popular protest erupted in one of the camps in Goma
after a
soldier killed a moneychanger who apparently refused to
comply with
a demand for money.
The squalid, disease-ridden refugee camps that have
proliferated in the areas surrounding Goma and Bukavu
represent
public health hazards, as witness the cholera epidemic
among
refugees in Goma. In addition, they are blights on the
previously
scenic landscape in these resort areas on Lac Kivu. Some
individual
refugees, eschewing the camps, reportedly have flooded the
towns,
pitching tents in the streets, chopping down trees for
firewood,
using sidewalks as toilets, and grazing livestock on lawns
and open
spaces. Even if the toll on Zairians were not so great, it
should
come as no surprise that local Zairians have not welcomed
the
refugees. To understand why, one need only recall the
ethnic
violence against the Banyarwanda--earlier immigrants from
Rwanda
and Burundi--that spread throughout Nord-Kivu in the early
1990s.
Given all of these factors, the refugee influx appears
likely
to add unbearably to the existing chaos in Zaire.
Moreover, some
analysts fear the prospect of regional conflict if Zaire
were to
permit Rwandan Hutu refugees to set up an exile government
or stage
commando raids into Rwanda. Mobutu apparently met with the
new
Rwandan government and pledged not to permit such
antiregime
activities, but there is substantial room for skepticism.
Contributing to this skepticism is Mobutu's love of
meddling, as
demonstrated by his involvement in the Angolan civil war.
In
addition, Mobutu supported the Rwandan regime ousted in
1994. The
Zairian opposition also has accused Mobutu of complicity
in ethnic
violence in Rwanda in May 1994. Mobutu allegedly allowed
arms to be
sent to Hutu hardliners who attacked both Tutsis and Hutu
moderates; those same Hutu extremists are among the
refugees who
have now fled to Zaire.
There are also indications that Mobutu might somehow
turn the
crisis to his advantage. Before the crisis, Mobutu had
become a
pariah in the eyes of the West. But as the likelihood of
Mobutu's
overthrow receded, and in the face of the overwhelming
human
tragedy in Rwanda, Western leaders appear to have become
reconciled
to the idea of working with Mobutu. Mobutu reportedly
played a role
in facilitating the French intervention in Rwanda in
support of the
collapsing Hutu regime, and there are reports that
Birindwa's
replacement by Kengo was brokered by the French, who
wanted to
ensure Mobutu's compliance with its Rwanda policy. The
United
States, too, has been forced to deal with Mobutu and has
at last
replaced its ambassador, long absent from Kinshasa as a
sign of
official United States displeasure with the Mobutu regime.
Thus, as the summer of 1994 drew to a close, Mobutu
appeared to
have profited from the Rwandan refugee crisis,
consolidating his
political position domestically and rehabilitating his
image
internationally. Despite the deterioration of Zaire and
the
deplorable conditions in which most Zairians live, Mobutu
appears
so strongly entrenched that many observers believe he
might succeed
in winning the presidential election set for 1995--even if
he does
not rig the election. Unfortunately, such an electoral
result will
only bring more stagnation and disintegration to Zaire.
September 9, 1994
Thomas Turner and Sandra W. Meditz
Data as of December 1993
|