Zaire Rural Insurgencies: The "Second Independence"
Figure 6. Rural Insurgencies, 1964
Source: Based on information from Hermann Kinder and Werner
Hilgemann, The Anchor Atlas of World History, 2, Garden
City, New York, 1978, 268.
From January to August 1964, rural insurgency engulfed
five
provincettes out of twenty-one and made substantial
inroads
into another five, raising the distinct possibility of a
total
collapse of the central government
(see
fig. 6). The
extraordinary
speed with which the rebellions spread among the rural
masses
attests to the enormous insurrectionary potential that had
been
building up in previous years. Prolonged neglect of the
rural
sectors, coupled with the growing disparities of wealth
and
privilege between the political elites and the peasant
masses,
inefficient and corrupt government, and ANC abuses,
created a
situation ripe for major uprising. Further aggravating the
frustration of the rural masses, the promise of a life
more
abundant made at the time of independence had remained
unfulfilled.
It seemed to many, especially disaffected youths, that
nothing
short of a "second independence" would bring them
salvation.
Among the several factors that combined to precipitate
rebellion, none was more consequential than the
dissolution of
parliament in September 1963, a move spurred by the
incessant
divisions and bickerings among deputies. The immediate
result was
to deprive the opposition of the only remaining legitimate
avenue
for political participation. Faced with this situation,
several
deputies affiliated with the MNC-Lumumba, among them
Christophe
Gbenye and Bocheley Davidson, decided to move to
Brazzaville, in
the former French Congo, and organize a National
Liberation Council
(Conseil National de Libération--CNL). In time the CNL
became the
central coordinating apparatus for the eastern rebellion.
Another major factor behind the insurrection was the
anticipated withdrawal of the UN forces by June 30, 1964.
The
prospective elimination of the only reliable crutch
available to
the central government acted as a major incentive for the
opposition to mobilize against Adoula.
Finally, with the arrival in the Kwilu area of Pierre
Mulele in
July 1963, a key revolutionary figure entered the arena.
Once
affiliated with Antoine Gizenga's PSA, Mulele traveled
widely in
Eastern Europe before reaching China, where he received
sustained
training in guerrilla warfare. Upon arriving in Kwilu,
Mulele
proceeded to recruit a solid phalanx of followers among
members of
his own ethnic group, the Mbunda, as well as among
Gizenga's
kinsmen, the Pende, both of whom had long been the target
of
government repression. The Kwilu rebellion began in
January 1964,
when Mulelist insurgents attacked government outposts,
mission
stations, and company installations. On January 22 and 23,
four
European missionaries were killed, and on February 5 the
chief of
staff of the ANC was ambushed and killed. Troops were
immediately
sent to the area, and by April a measure of stability had
been
restored to the area. The Kwilu rebellion did not finally
end until
December 1965, however.
The central figure behind the eastern rebellion was
Gaston
Soumialot, who, in January 1964, was sent to Burundi by
the CNL,
with the mission of organizing the rebellion. With the
full support
of the Burundi authorities, and thanks to his own skill in
exploiting local conflicts and working out tactical
alliances with
Tutsi exiles from Rwanda, Soumialot was able to recruit
thousands
of dedicated supporters in eastern Kivu, along the border
with
Burundi. On May 15, the town of Uvira fell to the rebels,
and,
shortly thereafter, so did Fizi. From then on, the rebels
(now
widely known as Simbas, from the Swahili for lions) made
an
increasing use of magic to claim immunity to bullets.
Panicstricken , two heavily armed ANC battalions were routed by
speartoting Simbas believed to have been rendered invincible by
their
antibullet concoctions.
As the rebel movement spread, discipline became more
difficult
to maintain, and acts of violence and terror increased.
Thousands
of Congolese were executed, including government
officials,
political leaders of opposition parties, provincial and
local
police, school teachers, and others believed to have been
Westernized.
In Kivu, Maniema, and north Katanga, the administrative
vacuum
caused by the utter failure of the provincette
experiment
was a key factor behind the initial success of the
rebellion. In
north Katanga, Baudoinville (later Virungu, now Moba) fell
on July
19; Kindu, in Maniema, was taken on July 24; and in early
August
the Soumialot forces, now calling themselves the National
Liberation Army (Armée Nationale de Libération--ANL),
captured the
Lumumbist stronghold of Stanleyville. Equipped with
armaments left
by the routed ANC units, the Simbas pushed on north and
west of
Stanleyville, eventually penetrating as far west as Lisala
on the
Congo River. On September 5, with the proclamation of a
revolutionary government in Stanleyville, the eastern
rebellion
reached its high-water mark: almost half of Zaire and
seven local
capitals out of twenty-one were in rebel hands.
No less astonishing than the swiftness of rebel
victories was
the inability of the insurgents to consolidate their gains
and
establish an alternative system of administration to one
they had
so easily destroyed. Corruption, administrative
inefficiency, and
ethnic favoritism turned out to be liabilities for the
rebel
leaders as much as they had been for previous provincial
administrators. Heavy reliance on specific ethnic
communities
(Tetela-Kusu in the east, Pende and Mbunda in Kwilu) for
manning
the military and administrative apparatuses of the
rebellions was
seen by many as a reversion to tribalism. Further
complicating
ethnic tensions between the ANL leadership and the Simbas,
serious
conflicts erupted at the provincette level over who
should
get the lion's share of the property seized from the
enemy.
Finally, countless disputes disrupted the CNL leadership
in exile,
stemming from personality differences as well as
disagreements over
questions of tactics and organization.
The rapid decline of popular support for the eastern
rebellion
is in large part a reflection of the very inadequate
leadership
offered by the CNL and local cadres. The military setbacks
suffered
by the ANL in the fall of 1964 were not just the result of
poor
leadership, however; even more important in turning the
tide
against the insurgents was the decisive contribution made
by
European mercenaries in helping the central government
regain
control over rebel-held areas. Much of the credit for the
government's success went to Tshombe, who in July 1964 had
been
recalled from exile and replaced Adoula as prime minister.
A year
and a half after his defeat at the hands of the UN forces,
the most
vocal advocate of secessionism had suddenly emerged as the
providential leader of a besieged central government.
As he set about the task of quashing the rebellions,
Tshombe
could rely on two major assets denied to Adoula, i.e., the
Katangan
gendarmes, recalled from exile in Angola, and a few
hundred battlehardened white mercenaries. The former were immediately
integrated
into the ANC, with the latter providing the much-needed
leadership
for the conduct of military operations against rebel
forces.
Supported by air strikes, these units spearheaded attacks
against
rebel strongholds. As the white mercenaries took the
offensive and,
with their technical superiority and discipline, began to
recapture
rebel strongholds, the fighting grew progressively more
brutal, and
numerous atrocities were committed by all of those
involved.
Mercenary elements played a decisive role in retaking
Lisala on
September 15, Boende on October 24, and Kindu on November
6. By
then, the revolutionary government in Stanleyville had
decided to
hold local European residents hostage, in the hope of
using them as
bargaining chips in negotiations with the central
authorities.
Their action resulted in the joint Belgian-American
parachute
rescue operation (code-named Dragon Rouge, or Red Dragon)
on
Stanleyville, on November 24, scheduled to coincide with
the
arrival of ANC and mercenary units in the vicinity of the
provincial capital. The capture of Stanleyville dealt a
devastating
blow to the eastern rebellion. The two key rebel leaders,
Gbenye
and Soumialot, went into exile in Cairo; demoralization
quickly set
in among Simbas; by the end of the year, the eastern
rebellion was
reduced to isolated pockets of resistance. Nonetheless,
for months
thereafter insecurity was widespread in the northeast, as
well as
along the Fizi-Uvira axis in Kivu.
Tshombe's popularity within the Congo and his prestige
throughout Africa were severely damaged by the
Belgo-American
operation against Stanleyville, which had also provoked
heated
debates in the UN. Moreover, political opposition to
Tshombe's
conduct of government greatly increased in the capital. In
particular, Tshombe had antagonized both Kasavubu and
Mobutu.
Data as of December 1993
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