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Zaire The Durability of the Patrimonial State
Under Mobutu formal institutions have always been of
little
consequence in explaining how power is distributed; the
informal
networks of influence built around the president are the
key to an
understanding of the
patrimonial (see
Glossary)
underpinnings of
the regime
(see Establishment of a Personalistic Regime
, ch. 4). In
accordance with his chiefly role, Mobutu's rule was from
the outset
based on bonds of personal loyalty between himself and his
entourage. His hegemony has been absolute, extending to
every level
of government. In an effort to forestall the emergence of
independent power centers, administrative and government
personnel
have been constantly moved around; opposition members,
alternatively rusticated and rehabilitated; and security
forces
dissolved and restructured as the circumstances dictated.
Prior to 1990, what has been termed the "presidential
brotherhood" constituted the inner circle of Mobutu's
clients,
numbering anywhere from fifteen to twenty people. Included
in this
group were the members of the Political Bureau of the MPR
and
certain key personalities of the security forces. A
somewhat larger
and shadowy entourage of courtiers and technocrats could
be
identified as the next most important group of clients,
overlapping
with yet a third group represented by the provincial
bosses. The
boundaries separating one group from the other were highly
fluid,
however, reflecting Mobutu's well-known disposition to
constantly
rearrange the structure and personnel of his government.
What held
these clients together was their presumed loyalty to the
patrimonial ruler, a loyalty nurtured by the anticipation
of
rewards commensurate with their willingness and ability to
comply
with presidential orders.
Penalties to the disloyal have always been just as
important as
rewards to the faithful in sustaining the Mobutist state.
The
coercive side of the patrimonial state is equally
pertinent to an
understanding of how Mobutu has managed to stay on top.
His real
power base lies in a wide array of paramilitary and
intelligencegathering agencies
(see The
Intelligence Apparatus and Security Forces
, ch. 5). The most important are the Special
Presidential
Division (Division Spéciale Présidentielle--DSP), an elite
force in
charge of ensuring Mobutu's personal security; the
Military Action
and Intelligence Service (Service d'Action et de
Renseignements
Militaire--SARM), in charge of military intelligence; and
SARM's
civilian counterpart, the National Documentation Agency
(Agence
Nationale de Documentation--AND). Each agency has separate
access
to the president, and each has a history of rampant
corruption and
abuse of the civilian population. Agents are grossly
underpaid, so
bribery and extortion are common currency. Arresting
innocent
citizens and holding them captive until they pay the
required
amount is by no means unusual
(see
Popular
Attitudes Toward the Civil Security Apparatus;
Civil and
Human Rights
, ch. 5).
Along
with the sanctions facing all forms of organized
opposition, the
diffuse fear instilled among the masses by the security
forces must
be seen as the most obvious explanation for Mobutu's
extraordinary
record of political longevity.
Servicing the networks of the patrimonial state is
Mobutu's own
responsibility. In practice, substantial amounts of the
government's money have been regularly diverted into the
presidential slush fund to be allocated to the faithful in
accordance with the presidential whim. Just as the
patrimonial
state can best be visualized as an extension of the
ruler's
household, the coffers of the state have long been almost
indistinguishable from Mobutu's private wealth (said to
amount to
approximately US$5 billion). The syphoning off of state
funds into
private networks is one of the norms of political
clientage
institutionalized under Mobutu
(see Patrimonial
Politics and Corruption
, ch. 3).
The opportunity costs arising from the exigencies of
the system
are readily apparent in such deficiencies as the
populace's low
standard of living, the utter neglect of the rural
sectors, the
absence of an investment budget for the development and
maintenance
of infrastructure, and the very modest amounts spent on
education
and health services
(see
Education;
Health
and Medical Services
, ch. 2). Although Mobutu's personal style bears much of the
blame
for this dismal state of affairs, part of the explanation
must also
be found in the emergence in Zaire of a polity that
combined some
of the worst features of the absolutist, bula
matari state
with the inefficiency and corruption of a patrimonial
regime.
* * *
There is an excellent body of literature available in
English
on Zaire from the precolonial era to the present. Jan
Vansina's
Kingdoms of the Savanna, Paths in the
Rainforests,
and "The Peoples of the Forest" offer authoritative
accounts of the
development of Zaire's diverse peoples and kingdoms. For
the
colonial and early independence era, the best sources are
the
numerous works by Crawford Young and René Lemarchand as
well as
Ruth Slade's King Léopold's Congo, Neil Ascherson's
The
King Incorporated, Jules Gérard-Libais's Katanga
Secession, and Ernest Lefever's Crisis in the
Congo: A
United Nations Force in Action. Dominer pour
servir, a
celebrated work by former colonial governor Pierre
Ryckmans, is
also of interest in understanding Belgian motivations and
policies.
The Mobutist era is amply covered in a number of
authoritative
works. Most notable are Thomas Callaghy's The
State-Society
Struggle: Zaire in Comparative Perspective, Michael G.
Schatzberg's Politics and Class in Zaire and The
Dialectics of Oppression in Zaire, Crawford Young and
Thomas
Turner's The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State,
and
David Gould's Bureaucratic Corruption and
Underdevelopment in
the Third World: The Case of Zaire. (For further
information
and complete citations,
see
Bibliography.)
Data as of December 1993
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