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Zaire External Threats to Regime Stability
Further aggravating the economic fiasco of
Zairianization were
the military setbacks suffered by the Zairian army in the
course of
its intervention in the Angolan civil war. In late 1974,
in order
to counteract the growing influence of the neo-Marxist
Popular
Movement for the Liberation of Angola (Movimento Popular
de
Libertação de Angola--MPLA), Mobutu chose to throw his
weight
behind Holden Roberto's pro-Western National Front for the
Liberation of Angola (Frente Nacional de Libertação de
Angola--
FNLA), and by July 1975, with Angolan independence just
around the
corner, units of the Zairian army made their way into
Angola and
joined the FNLA in an effort to seize control of the
capital. But
as the Zairian-FNLA forces approached the vicinity of
Luanda, they
encountered stiff resistance from the MPLA, acting in
concert with
remnants of the old Katangan gendarmes. Eventually, Cuban
soldiers
supporting the MPLA inflicted a devastating defeat upon
the
Zairian-FNLA units
(see Involvement
in Angola
, ch. 5).
While the defeat of the Zairian troops in Angola cast
grave
doubts on their military capabilities, their performance
during the
1977 and 1978 Shaba invasions proved equally disastrous.
The FAZ
not only failed to stop the invasions but showed their
usual
disposition to steal and loot civilian property. Only
after the
intervention of Moroccan troops in 1977, and of the French
Foreign
Legion in 1978, were the invaders forced back into Angola,
accompanied by thousands of civilians fleeing their
homeland for
fear of retribution
(see
Shaba I;
Shaba II
, ch. 5).
The 1977 and 1978 invasions were spearheaded by the
Front for
the National Liberation of the Congo (Front pour la
Libération
Nationale du Congo--FLNC), the only Zairian opposition
movement
that at the time claimed a measure of credibility. The
distant
origins of the FLNC are traceable to Tshombe's Katangan
gendarmes,
many of whom had found refuge in Angola after the
secession; others
were incorporated into the Zairian army, and those few who
survived
the Kisangani mutinies of 1966 and 1967 fled to Rwanda. Of
the few
thousand who found a haven in Angola in 1963, many joined
the
irregular units then being assembled by the Portuguese
(the socalled Black Arrows) to fight the Angolan insurgents. In
1968 the
Black Arrows transformed themselves into the FLNC.
Understandably
mistrustful of Mobutu and the FNLA with which he was
allied, when
Portuguese rule was about to crumble in 1974, the FLNC
threw its
support to the MPLA.
After the independence of Angola, the FLNC returned to
its
original sanctuary, near the Shaba border. It was from
this base
area that the "rebels" launched their first invasion into
Shaba, on
March 8, 1977. The towns of Dilolo, Kisenge, and Kapanga,
all in
south and west Shaba, fell into their hands with little or
no
resistance from the FAZ. In mid-April, as the FLNC closed
in on
Kolwezi, a major mining town in south Shaba, Mobutu issued
an
urgent call for military assistance to France and Morocco,
and
shortly thereafter French transport airplanes proceeded to
airlift
Moroccan troops into Shaba. Unwilling to engage the
Moroccans, the
invaders quickly retreated into Angola. FAZ units then
moved in to
orchestrate a brutal "pacification campaign" that led to a
massive
exodus of civilian populations into Angola.
A year later, in May 1978, the FLNC launched another
invasion
into Shaba, this time from Zambia. Once again, the
performance of
the FAZ proved less than spectacular. Encountering
virtually no
resistance from the Zairian army, the attacking units
moved into
Kolwezi on May 13. Greeted as liberators by the young and
the
unemployed, many of whom bitterly resented the presence of
a
sizeable group of expatriates in this major industrial
town, the
FLNC leadership appeared utterly incapable of controlling
its
troops, much less those Zairians who had spontaneously
cast in
their lot with the invaders and who now took the law into
their
hands. Scores of Europeans were massacred, some by the
FLNC, some
by Zairian civilians, and many more, according to
knowledgeable
observers, by Zairian troops anxious to loot European
property. As
on previous occasions, the FAZ showed itself to be little
more than
a rabble. Not until May 19, after paratroops from the
French
Foreign Legion and Belgium were airlifted into Shaba, was
Kolwezi
recaptured. By then more than 100 European residents had
lost their
lives as well as large numbers of Kolwezi residents and
FAZ and
FLNC soldiers. Again hundreds of Africans withdrew into
Angola,
anticipating vengeance from Mobutu's FAZ.
Zairian allegations of joint Soviet-Cuban involvement
in the
Shaba invasions were instrumental in prompting a favorable
response
from Mobutu's friends (France, Belgium, and the United
States) to
his request for immediate military assistance. But the
evidence in
support of these allegations is scanty at best. Quite
aside from
the part played by the FLNC in spearheading the invasions,
the
sharp deterioration of the Zairian economy after 1975,
coupled with
the rapid growth of anti-Mobutist sentiment in the copper
belt and
elsewhere, were crucial factors behind the Shaba crises in
1977 and
1978. His impeccable anti-Soviet credentials nonetheless
gave
Mobutu guarantees of Western backing against his domestic
foes, as
well as substantial rewards in the form of United States
development assistance and military aid. In later years,
Mobutu
converted the Kamina Base into a major link in the supply
route for
arms shipments to Jonas Savimbi's National Union for the
Total
Independence of Angola (União Nacional para a
Independência Total
de Angola--UNITA). In so doing, he once again benefited
from the
convergence of his regional foreign policy goals and
United States
strategic objectives in southern Africa
(see Regional
Relations
, ch. 4). Mobutu's endorsement of United States security
objectives
in southern Africa made it possible for his regime to
benefit
financially from foreign aid while resisting domestic
pressures for
economic, social, and political reforms.
Data as of December 1993
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