Zaire Zairianization, Radicalization, and Retrocession
Presidential compound at Ngaliema on the Congo
River near Kinshasa
Courtesy Zaire National Tourism Office
The conquest of economic independence figured
prominently on
Mobutu's agenda from the outset. Government moves to
establish
greater control over foreign enterprises operating in the
country
brought about a confrontation with the Belgian-owned Upper
Katanga
Mining Union (Union Minière du Haut-Katanga--UMHK), which
was
nationalized in January 1967, and a new state-owned
company formed
(see Postindependence
, ch. 3).
It was not until November 1973, however, that specific
and more
extensive measures were announced to restore the control
of the
economy to Zairian nationals. "Zaire is the country that
has been
the most heavily exploited in the world," Mobutu declared
on
November 30. "That is why," he added, "farms, ranches,
plantations,
concessions, commerce, and real estate agencies will be
turned over
to sons of the country." In this way began the campaign
that became
known as
Zairianization
(see Glossary;
Zairianization
, ch. 3).
At first, "the sons of the country" consisted
essentially of
high-ranking party members and government officials, in
all
approximately 300 people. Major plantations and ranches
and large
commercial business enterprises were given to the top
political
elite. Smaller enterprises were allocated to local
notables. Army
officers, judges, members of the regional administration,
and
ambassadors failed to qualify as potential recipients
(acquéreurs).
The self-serving character of this decision caused
immediate
public indignation. Faced with mounting opposition to his
Zairianization policies, Mobutu announced that the
economic
activities covered by the November 30 measures would be
entirely
taken over by the state. Those citizens who wished to
acquire a
plantation or a farm would have to buy it from the state.
Considerable confusion followed in the wake of this
announcement.
For one thing, the criteria used for assessing individual
qualifications--party militancy, integrity, commercial
experience,
solvency--could be interpreted in many different ways; for
another,
the screening procedure was at best arbitrary, and when a
candidate
failed to meet the stipulated conditions, a bribe
(matabiche) was often the quickest way to clinch a
favorable
decision from the local authorities. As Crawford Young and
Thomas
Turner observed, "what transpired was a tumultuous,
disorderly and
profoundly demeaning scramble for the loot . . . . Success
in the
scramble was above all a measure of political influence
and
proximity to the ultimate sources of power."
Zairianization engendered economic disaster on an
unprecedented
scale. In a matter of months, commercial networks were
utterly
disrupted; massive layoffs were reported; and shortages of
basic
commodities became increasingly widespread, along with
liquidations
of assets. Asset stripping in the retail sector became a
common
practice. Efforts of the regime to introduce price
controls did
little to curb inflation. The plantation sector of the
economy,
meanwhile, was brought to a virtual standstill.
Confronted with a wholesale plunder of the Zairian
economy, on
December 30, 1974, Mobutu announced a ten-point
"radicalization"
program intended to bring about "a revolution in the
revolution."
Officially, major economic initiatives remained the
exclusive
domain of the state. The main thrust of radicalization was
aimed at
the self-serving attitude of the acquéreurs. Party
leaders
were expected to turn their properties over to the state
and devote
themselves to agricultural activities. Party cadres were
chastised
for their "mercenary behavior" and lack of civic sense.
More
importantly, the large-scale, Belgian-owned corporations
that had
been left untouched by the Zairianization decrees were now
targeted
for nationalization. Thus, the calamitous effects of
Zairianization
were extended to the commanding heights of the economy.
While being
constantly reminded of their revolutionary duties, members
of the
political class were given yet another opportunity to draw
further
benefits from their control of an even larger sector of
the
economy.
As the Zairian economy went into a tailspin, Mobutu
finally
came to realize the magnitude of the catastrophe ushered
in by
Zairianization and radicalization. In November 1975, he
announced
the creation of a stabilization committee in charge of
examining a
retrocession
(see Glossary) formula designed to return a
substantial portion of Zairianized enterprises to their
original
owners. Agreement was reached on a return of 40 percent
equity in
both radicalized and Zairianized businesses; in time,
however,
foreign owners were allowed to regain as much as 60
percent in
equity, with the remaining 40 percent remaining in Zairian
hands.
Meanwhile, almost irreparable damage had been inflicted
upon
the economy, and the insatiable greed of the political
class was
made all the more intolerable by the conditions of acute
penury now
confronting the rural masses. The fall of copper prices
and the
sharp rise in the cost of oil imports in 1974 further
propelled the
economy into a period of prolonged stagnation
(see Economic
Decline
, ch. 3). Zaire's growing dependence on foreign
lending
agencies made a mockery of Mobutu's insistence on the
conquest of
economic independence. And with the disparities of wealth
and
privilege between the political class and the populace
only
slightly diminished by "retrocession," growing social
turbulence
became inevitable
(see Opposition
to the Regime prior to 1990
, ch. 4;
Public
Order and Internal Security
, ch. 5).
Data as of December 1993
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