Zaire Subsequent Political Developments, 1990-93
In a press conference following his April 24, 1990,
speech to
the country's assembled politicians, Mobutu suggested that
the
three authorized political parties might consist of the
long-banned
UDPS as well as two wings of the MPR, which he labeled
"moderates"
and "hard-liners." Nevertheless, despite Mobutu's attempt
to
constrict the political space he appeared to open up, his
speech
set off the inevitable multiplication of efforts to
publicize
existing organizations and to found new ones. The
best-structured
opposition movement, the UDPS, was the first to react. But
on April
29, a demonstration by supporters of its most popular
leader,
Étienne Tshisekedi, released from house arrest on the day
of
Mobutu's speech, was violently suppressed. The UDPS
claimed five
people were killed, although the government denied this.
Tshisekedi
wound up in the hospital, early in May, after being
attacked at his
home by men apparently belonging to a government security
service.
Joseph Ileo Nsongo Amba (formerly known as Joseph
Ileo), in
1960 a political adversary of Prime Minister Patrice
Lumumba and
since 1967 a frequent member of the MPR Political Bureau
and
Central Committee, responded to Mobutu's announcement of
the
multiparty system by founding the Democratic and Social
Christian
Party (Parti Démocrate et Social Chrétien--PDSC). On April
29,
Christophe Gbenye, a leader of the 1965 rural rebellions,
announced
that he had filed a request for recognition of the
Congolese
National Movement-Lumumba (Mouvement National
Congolais-Lumumba--
MNC-Lumumba).
Then on May 3, 1990, Mobutu made another speech.
Political
parties other than the MPR did not legally exist, he told
the
legislature, and were not yet authorized to hold marches
or public
meetings. (Thus, the UDPS meeting had been illegal.)
Mobutu's
twenty-three-minute speech was designed to overcome what
he called
"ambiguities and misunderstandings" following his
announcement ten
days earlier of an end to the political monopoly of the
MPR. Until
the authorities decided which three political parties were
to be
authorized--and Mobutu did not indicate when the choice
would be
made--politicians could meet privately to discuss
organizational
questions.
Most observers believed that Mobutu's espousal of
political
reform was in part an attempt to appease domestic calls
for change,
in the wake of events elsewhere in Africa and in Eastern
Europe.
The fall of Romanian dictator Nicolae Ceausescu, with whom
Mobutu
identified, apparently made an impact on Mobutu. In
addition,
Mobutu undoubtedly felt it wise at least to appear to bow
to
Western pressure for political reform. It soon became
evident,
however, that Mobutu had unleashed volatile forces that he
could
contain only with difficulty, if at all, in the long run.
Indeed,
Mobutu proceeded to embark on a checkered course of
half-hearted
moves toward democratization, interspersed with attempts
to
undercut real reform and periodically interrupted by
brutal
crackdowns on dissent.
One of the most notorious of the crackdowns occurred in
May
1990, when security forces were widely believed to have
deliberately massacred numerous protesting students at the
University of Lubumbashi. The government claimed that only
one
student was killed, but international human rights groups
and other
credible observers estimated the death toll to be between
thirty
and 100. The incident and Mobutu's refusal to allow an
international inquiry into it ultimately resulted in the
suspension
of aid by Belgium, the European Community (EC), Canada,
and the
United States.
Faced with strong international censure and growing
opposition
demands for a national conference to write a new
constitution,
organize new elections, and lead a transition to a
democratic form
of government, Mobutu did lift the ceiling on the number
of
political parties in October 1990, and legislation passed
in
December 1990 finally opened the door for the formal
registration
of political parties. He also declared that all registered
parties
would have access to the media.
By the spring of 1991, numerous political parties
existed
legally, and the regime announced that some fifty-eight
had
accepted invitations to an upcoming constitutional
conference, the
date of which had not been set, despite the rapid approach
of
December 4, 1991, the date on which Mobutu's
constitutional mandate
would expire. Among the parties refusing to cooperate with
Mobutu
were the principal opposition groups, namely the UDPS,
which
demanded Mobutu's resignation; Ileo's PDSC; and the Union
of
Federalists and Independent Republicans (Union des
Fédéralistes et
des Républicains Indépendants--UFERI) led by Jean Nguza
Karl-i-
Bond.
At the same time, Mobutu asked the prime minister of
the first
transitional government, Lunda Bululu, to resign in March
1991 and
appointed a new prime minister, Professor Mulumba Lukoji.
Most
ministerial appointees were from Kasai-Oriental,
Kasai-Occidental,
and Shaba regions in an obvious attempt to undercut
support for the
UDPS and UFERI, respectively, which drew their strongest
support
from those regions. Further undermining public confidence
in
Mobutu's commitment to reform were a brutal March 1991
attack on
peaceful Christian demonstrators in Kinshasa, in which,
according
to human rights groups, thirty-five people were killed and
dozens
wounded; and an April attempt by police to break up a
political
meeting in Mbuji-Mayi. Over forty individuals were
believed to have
been killed and nearly thirty seriously wounded in the
ensuing
ransacking and looting by protesters.
The long-awaited national conference on political
reform,
ultimately known as the Sovereign National Conference
(Conférence
Nationale Souveraine--CNS), finally convened in August
1991. It
encompassed over 2,800 political, religious, and civic
leaders,
representing some 225 political groups, whose declared
goal was to
draft a new constitution as a prelude to new elections.
The
conference was suspended by Mobutu on August 15 after
opposition
groups boycotted it on August 13, claiming that the
government was
overrepresented at the conference, had infiltrated
opposition
delegations (it was also alleged that the government had
distributed money to some opposition delegates to sway
their
votes), and was preventing certain groups from attending
the
conference. The conference was further delayed because of
the
September 23-24 mutiny by some 3,000 paratroopers in
Kinshasa, who
were protesting low wages and lack of pay. The
demonstration soon
turned into a violent rampage, with hundreds of civilians
joining
the soldiers in looting businesses and homes. Other cities
and
southern Shaba Region also experienced disturbances.
France and
Belgium sent several hundred troops to restore order and
protect
foreign nationals in Kinshasa, and the United States
supplied
transport airplanes. But the evacuation of some 10,000
foreign
residents and the virtual abandonment of numerous
foreign-run
businesses had a major impact on the economy. Indeed,
according to
most observers the economy virtually came to a standstill.
The political aftermath of the rampage was an agreement
on
September 29, 1991, by Mobutu and the opposition to form a
transitional coalition government and a promise by Mobutu
to
reconvene the conference. Under the accord, UDPS leader
Tshisekedi
was named by Mobutu as prime minister in early October
1991, and
Mobutu agreed that the cabinet would contain five Mobutu
loyalists
and six opposition leaders. However, Tshisekedi was fired
after
only one week in office in a dispute over the
apportionment of
ministerial portfolios. After the major opposition
coalition, the
Sacred Union (Union Sacrée), refused to choose a new prime
minister, Mobutu named Bernardin Mungul-Diaka, a leader of
a small
opposition party, prime minister. Tshisekedi's firing
spurred
violent demonstrations and riots, including attacks on one
of
Mobutu's villas in Kinshasa and on the new prime
minister's home.
Following the unrest, France joined other Western nations
that had
already cut off economic aid to Zaire. In addition, civil
servants
resumed a long-standing strike that had been lifted in the
wake of
what had appeared to be positive political developments.
In late November 1991, Mobutu formed another
transitional
government, this time under Nguza. Nguza was a Tshisekedi
rival in
the Sacred Union, which he subsequently left, after other
members
termed his nomination a "betrayal." Now out of the Sacred
Union,
UFERI, headed by Nguza, organized another political
coalition
within the CNS, the Alliance of Patriotic Forces. This
alliance of
some thirty parties espoused a commitment to political
change but
rejected what it termed "extremist" stands.
The new government under Nguza included ten ministers
from the
opposition, although not from the Sacred Union's UDPS and
PDSC,
which boycotted the new government, and called for a
general strike
against it. The progovernment MPR, which had not
participated in
the two previous transitional governments, was included,
and in
fact pro-Mobutu forces controlled eight posts, including
the
"reserved" domains of defense, interior and security, and
external
relations.
The long-term future of the CNS remained uncertain, and
prospects for its success were dim so long as Mobutu clung
to
power. In any case, while the CNS was mired down in
regime-
opposition conflict, Mobutu's mandate quietly expired on
December
4, 1991, and he made it clear that he would stay in power
until new
elections were held, although no firm date for such
elections had
been announced.
The CNS had reconvened on November 15, 1991, with a
plenary
session. However, disagreements over procedures for
appointing a
new prime minister delayed its formal resumption until
December 11.
At its session on December 12, Monsignor Laurent Monsengwo
Pasinya,
archbishop of Kisangani and president of the Episcopal
Conference
of Zaire, was elected president of the CNS. Monsengwo's
election
and his support by all of the opposition parties was a
blow for
Mobutu's camp, whose candidate for the conference's
presidency was
soundly defeated. In another blow to the Mobutu forces,
the
conference also elected Ileo, a leading member of the
Sacred Union
(and leader of the PDSC), as its vice president.
Following government attempts to pack the conference
with
Mobutu loyalists and to limit its powers, Prime Minister
Nguza
called for a suspension of the CNS on January 6, 1992, but
it
reconvened on January 14 to decide on issues of
geopolitical
representation. At the same time, pro-Mobutu delegates at
the
conference suspended their participation, charging that
Tshisekedi's supporters from Kasai were overrepresented.
On January
19, the government once again suspended the conference,
with the
prime minister stating that the conference proceedings
were "likely
to create a political crisis in the country." The
suspension of the
CNS was criticized by the international community.
Following a declaration by the Sacred Union that it
would
embark on a "concrete, logical action program" if the
conference
were not resumed by April 2, as well as pressure by
Belgium,
France, and the United States, the government announced on
March 28
that the conference would meet on April 6. When it met, a
majority
of the more than 2,800 delegates voted to declare that the
conference had sovereign powers not only to draw up a new
constitution but also to legislate for a multiparty
system. This
represented a direct challenge to President Mobutu, who
responded
that "some decisions made (by the conference) constitute
an act of
attempting to go beyond bounds." When conference delegates
voted on
May 6 for an act empowering them to make constitutionally
binding
decisions, Mobutu reacted by characterizing the step a
"civilian
coup d'état." To Mobutu the conference's role was limited
to
devising a draft constitution.
In August 1992, the CNS passed a Transitional Act to
serve as
a provisional constitution and, under its terms, created a
transitional government to govern for two years. According
to the
Transitional Act, the government would consist of four
institutions: a figurehead president "who reigns but does
not
govern" as head of state; a High Council of the Republic
(Haut
Conseil de la République--HCR) to serve as a provisional
legislature and to oversee new elections; a first state
commissioner (prime minister) elected by the CNS as head
of
government with full executive powers; and an independent
judiciary
encompassing the courts of law. At the same time, Mobutu
and the
CNS agreed to abide by the principles established in the
Comprehensive Political Agreement (Compromis Politique
Global). The
Comprehensive Political Agreement includes ten principles,
the most
significant being that no institution or organ of the
transition
should use its constitutional powers to prevent any other
institution from functioning. In essence, all parties
agreed to
share power and to abide by the constitutional provisions
embodied
in the Transitional Act. In January 1993, the official
status of
the Transitional Act was strengthened further when the
Supreme
Court of Justice, acting as the Constitutional Court,
declared the
Transitional Act to be the country's only binding
constitution.
As part of its August 1992 deliberations, the CNS,
symbolizing
its desire for change from the Mobutu regime, also
proposed that
Zaire resume its old name, the Republic of the Congo, and
reinstitute the former national flag and anthem. Under
pressure
from Mobutu, however, the conference backed down,
announcing that
the country would keep its name, flag, and anthem until
the
proposed changes could be submitted to the electorate in a
referendum.
Tshisekedi was duly elected transitional first state
commissioner by the CNS on August 15, 1992. On August 30,
he
appointed a transitional government of "national union"
including
various opponents of Mobutu--but no Mobutu supporters. On
December
6, 1992, the CNS dissolved itself and was succeeded by the
453-
member HCR, to be headed by CNS head Archbishop Monsengwo.
As the
supreme interim legislative authority, the HCR was
authorized to
formulate and adopt a new constitution and to organize
legislative
and presidential elections. But Mobutu refused to accept
the
authority of the HCR or the legitimacy of any constitution
it might
formulate. Instead, in October 1992, he had reconvened the
former
legislature, which had been abolished, and entrusted it
with
drafting a rival new constitution more to his liking.
The transitional government has never been able to
govern
effectively because of its inability to limit Mobutu's
powers
except on paper. Mobutu clearly violated the terms of both
the
Transitional Act and the Comprehensive Political
Agreement,
impeding the work of the other institutions from the very
start.
Using troops loyal to him, Mobutu seized control of state
radio and
television facilities, denied HCR members and cabinet
ministers
access to their government offices, and took control of
the central
bank. Moreover, Mobutu pursued a deliberate strategy of
promoting
anarchy and inciting ethnic violence in order to discredit
the
prodemocracy movement and undermine the ability of the
populace to
organize against him.
Mobutu and Tshisekedi have been at loggerheads since
Tshisekedi's election as transitional prime minister. But
the
situation deteriorated further in 1993. In mid-January
1993, the
HCR declared Mobutu to be guilty of treason because of his
mismanagement of state affairs and threatened to impeach
him unless
he recognized the legitimacy of the transitional
government.
Opposition forces organized a general strike to force the
president's resignation. In the ensuing disturbances, five
people
were killed and many others injured. Then, later that
month, Mobutu
insisted on introducing a new currency note of Z5 million
(for
value of the
zaire--see
Glossary), which Tshisekedi
denounced as
inflationary and urged merchants to reject. When many did
so,
troops who had been paid in the currency went on a rampage
of
looting and violence during which sixty-five people were
killed,
including the French ambassador to Zaire.
In the aftermath of the violence, Mobutu attempted to
reassert
his political authority by convening a special "conclave"
of
political forces in early March 1993 to chart the nation's
future,
including devising a new constitution. The HCR and the
Sacred Union
declined to participate in any such deliberations, which
clearly
were intended to undermine the existing transitional
government.
Mobutu also "dismissed" the Tshisekedi government,
although
according to the Transitional Act he did not have the
power to do
so. At his urging, the conclave then named Faustin
Birindwa as
prime minister of a so-called government of national
salvation.
Since that time, Zaire has had two parallel, rival
governments
vying for domestic and international acceptance. The
Birindwa
government has not received international recognition,
although
delegations sent by that government have been accepted by
several
United Nations (UN) specialized agencies. But the
Tshisekedi
government, although legal and recognized internationally,
lacks
the power or resources to govern. The result of this
situation is
government stalemate, which has worked to Mobutu's
advantage.
Mobutu has continued to use his control of key military
units to
obstruct the functioning of the transitional government,
to
intimidate critical opposition leaders and newspapers, to
promote
anarchy and chaos, and to incite ethnic violence.
Tshisekedi's
frustration with the impotence of his own government in
the face of
the country's economic and social deterioration became so
great
that he requested UN intervention to restore order. In
July 1993,
the secretary general of the UN appointed a special envoy
to Zaire,
but no further international action had been taken by the
end of
the year.
Mobutu's ability to obstruct the democratization
process has
also been aided by the divisiveness of his opposition. The
Sacred
Union has had its defectors, including six former members
who
joined the Birindwa government and were immediately
expelled from
the Sacred Union. Tshisekedi's UDPS also has its
differences with
other parties in the coalition, such as Ileo's PDSC and
the Unified
Lumumbist Party led by Antoine Gizenga. Moreover,
Tshisekedi has
increasingly been under fire even within the transitional
government and his own party for being too authoritarian.
But
Tshisekedi remains very popular, particularly in Kinshasa,
with
people who see him as the only opposition politician who
has
consistently opposed Mobutu.
At international urging, negotiations aimed at
resolving
Zaire's political stalemate continued throughout 1933
between
representatives of the Mobutu-appointed conclave and the
Sacred
Union. Mobutu critics believed that he was merely using
the
negotiations to attempt to regain credibility in the eyes
of the
West. Nevertheless, some progress was made. In October
1933, the
two sides reportedly reached agreement on a transitional
constitution, a joint transitional parliament, and an
electoral
schedule (presidential and legislative elections to be
held in
December 1994). No details were available on the
transitional
constitution, but it is believed to represent a compromise
between
the approaches favored by the two sides. (Mobutu
supporters favored
a presidential or semipresidential system while the
opposition
favored a parliamentary system.) The mere fact that
agreement was
reached on some previously thorny issues was interpreted
as a
positive sign. But most observers regarded any
implementation of
the agreement as highly problematic. First and foremost,
no
agreement could be reached on a prime minister acceptable
to both
sides, and neither Tshisekedi nor Birindwa was prepared to
resign.
Moreover, Mobutu himself remained a major stumbling power
block.
The opposition refused to accept his continuation in a
position of
authority, and he clearly still had no intention of
stepping down.
Thus, at the end of 1993, Zaire's political impasse was
still far
from resolution.
Data as of December 1993
|