Zaire Relations with the United States
Mobutu meets with President George Bush at the
White House, June, 1989.
Courtesy The White House (David Valdez)
By most accounts, the United States was involved in
both the
death of Lumumba and the coup of 1965, which brought
Mobutu to
power, although the extent of this involvement is not
certain. In
any case, because of his longstanding relations with the
American
intelligence community, Mobutu was very aware of United
States
backing both as a resource and as a handicap.
Zaire generally received firm American support in the
late
1960s and found American influence helpful in various
economic and
political disputes. The promulgation of a generous
investment code
in 1969 and a moderate political stance lured extensive
foreign,
including American, investment, and a substantial program
of United
States aid was continued. Mobutu returned from a visit to
the
United States in 1970 with pledges of substantial new
investment.
Relations continued to be warm until the Zairianization
decree of
November 30, 1973, which led to the transfer of a large
number of
foreign-owned enterprises, including facilities owned by
international oil companies, into Zairian hands.
Thereafter,
relations were chilly.
But in 1975, the United States and Zaire found
themselves
supporting the same faction in the Angolan civil war
(see Regional
Relations
, this ch.). The United States, apparently
deciding that
it needed a stable Zaire for political and economic
reasons and
sensing the potential for Zaire to support United States
strategic
interests in sub-Saharan Africa, promoted the relationship
with
Zaire. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's first official
trip to
Africa in April 1976 included a long visit to Kinshasa.
The Carter administration, which had declared its
number-one
foreign policy objective to be the promotion of human
rights, posed
a problem for the Mobutu regime, with its poor human
rights record.
For the first time, criticism of Mobutu by members of
Congress and
by voluntary agencies was met with some sympathy by the
United
States president. However, the skeptical attitude toward
the
Zairian government was partially reversed by Shaba I and
Shaba II.
On the occasion of the second invasion in 1978, President
Jimmy
Carter supported Mobutu's accusations of Cuban and Soviet
involvement, even though no hard evidence was presented.
But the
United States refused to become involved militarily and
sent only
nonlethal military supplies, such as medical and
transportation
equipment. In 1980 the House of Representatives (concerned
over
human rights violations and the misuse of United States
aid) voted
to end all military assistance to Zaire; but the Senate
reinstated
the funds, reacting to pressure from Carter and American
business
interests in Zaire.
The election of the more conservative Ronald Reagan as
United
States president was well received in Zaire, and in fact
United
States concerns about Mobutu's human rights record became
muted.
Moreover, Mobutu again was seen as providing useful
services to the
United States in its struggle against the Soviet Union and
Soviet
allies such as Libya and Angola. The domestic context in
the United
States had changed, however, in that an increasing number
of
American groups had become opposed to administration
policy toward
Zaire.
As United States-Zaire relations became more visible in
Washington, Mobutu countered by becoming more active in
promoting
a positive image of himself and his country. Two
Washington
lobbying firms with ties to the Reagan administration
received
hefty contracts from Mobutu.
Nevertheless, in November 1990, Congress cut military
and
economic aid (except for some humanitarian aid) to Zaire,
crystallizing the longstanding division between Congress
and the
executive branch and between liberals and conservatives on
Zaire
policy. As it adjourned, Congress denied the Bush
administration's
request for US$4 million in military aid and stipulated
that US$40
million in economic aid be funneled through humanitarian
agencies
not affiliated with the Zairian government. Its decision
was based
on human rights violations--the September 1990 Lubumbashi
massacre
in particular--and accusations that Mobutu's vast wealth
was
largely stolen from the Zairian people.
By 1992 the United States-Zaire relationship had
reached a
turning point. The end of the Cold War had diminished the
strategic
significance of Zaire to the United States, and events in
Zaire
since 1990 had made it clear that Mobutu's days in power
were
numbered. In 1991-92, the United States, together with
Belgium and
France, attempted to promote peaceful political change in
Zaire, by
pressuring Mobutu to oversee the transition to democratic
government and to depart voluntarily. The Zairian
opposition,
however, still perceived this approach as a continued
"propping up"
of the Mobutu regime and called for an unequivocal United
States
rejection of Mobutu, which was not forthcoming.
In October 1992, the United States joined Belgium and
France in
extending official support to the Tshisekedi government.
The United
States also reiterated its support for the national
conference and
its hope that the conference would lead ultimately to fair
and free
elections.
Since that time, the United States has continued to
support the
legitimacy of the Tshisekedi government and to insist that
the
Mobutu government live up to its promise to turn over real
power to
that government. It has consistently denounced Mobutu's
obstruction
of the transition process and has refused to recognize the
rival
Birindwa government. Moreover, the Clinton administration
has taken
several concrete steps to show its displeasure with the
Mobutu
regime. The United States has not replaced its ambassador
to Zaire,
who was reassigned in March 1993. The United States also
refused to
allow Zaire's central bank governor into the United States
to
attend a World Bank-IMF meeting and has made it clear that
Mobutu
is not welcome in the United States. Nevertheless, the
United
States has stopped short of taking or even advocating
harsher
measures against the regime, such as the imposition of
economic
sanctions or the confiscation of Mobutu's assets abroad.
As such,
in the view of some observers the United States has put
only very
limited pressure on Mobutu to step down. Many see this
policy as an
indication that the United States still regards Mobutu as
a
stabilizing factor, a viewpoint that would explain United
States
acceptance of Mobutu as part of the transition process in
Zaire.
The United States-brokered political accord that
accompanied the
Transitional Act permitted President Mobutu to remain as
titular
head of state and thus a legitimate institution of
government,
albeit with limited powers. One unintended effect of this
arrangement has been to confer some legitimacy on Mobutu
and thus
allow him to obstruct the transition process and the
functioning of
the legitimate government under Tshisekedi.
Throughout 1993 the United States has continued to urge
the
various political forces in Zaire to continue negotiating,
apparently believing that ongoing negotiations will
eventually lead
to a power-sharing compromise. It appears increasingly
likely that
the United States would accept a so-called "neutral
administration"
replacing both the Mobutu-appointed government and the
Tshisekedi
government.
Data as of December 1993
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