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Zaire Relations with France
In recent years, Zaire has taken pride in its standing
as the
second-largest French-speaking country, after France
itself, and
has developed its relations with France as an alternative
to the
thornier relationship with Belgium. During the First
Republic,
France and its former colonies tended to side with
conservatives
and federalists in the former Belgian colony, against
Patrice
Lumumba and the radical, unitarist forces. In December
1963, after
the Katangan secession had been defeated, France signed a
treaty of
cultural and technical cooperation with Zaire.
Links with France were strengthened after Mobutu's coup
of
1965. His first major initiative in African regional
policy was the
creation of a Union of the States of Central Africa (Union
des
États d'Afrique Centrale--UEAC), which initially linked
Zaire to
the two least advantaged states of former French
Equatorial Africa,
namely Chad and the Central African Republic, but aimed to
form a
pole of attraction for other states. The French apparently
took
seriously the threat the new organization posed to the
Customs
Union of Central African States (Union Douanière des États
de
l'Afrique Centrale--UDEAC) and launched a diplomatic
counterattack.
French emissaries prevailed upon the Central African
Republic to
withdraw from the UEAC, which then limped along for
several years
as a partnership of Chad and Zaire, which lack a common
border.
Under France's President Charles de Gaulle, who had
been
interested in the continent for many years, African
affairs became
part of the "reserved domain" of the president. This
quasiconstitutional arrangement continued under de Gaulle's
successors
and led to the development of personal diplomacy,
including state
visits, working visits, and so-called "personal visits," a
style of
diplomacy that Mobutu found very congenial.
At the beginning of 1971, French finance minister
Valéry
Giscard d'Estaing visited Zaire, where he met with Mobutu.
This
visit initiated a personal relationship between Mobutu and
Giscard
d'Estaing, which continued and developed after the latter
became
president. Starting in 1973, France became an important
military
partner of Zaire. Mobutu ordered Mirage jet fighters, Puma
helicopters, and other items from France, and the
following year
the two countries signed an accord on "technical military
cooperation"
(see Foreign
Influences
, ch. 5).
The election of Giscard d'Estaing, in May 1974, as
successor to
President Georges Pompidou, led to a reaffirmation of
France's
African role. Giscard d'Estaing visited Kinshasa a year
later and
received a triumphal welcome from over 1 million Zairians.
Observers noted that Giscard d'Estaing was being warmly
welcomed in
part because Mobutu was distancing himself somewhat from
Belgium
and from the United States. Speaking to the leadership of
the MPR,
the French president called for a meeting of copper
producers and
consumers. Zaire reportedly agreed to grant a French
company new
prospecting rights for copper in Zaire, in exchange for
which
France would accord Zaire a moratorium on repayment of
debts. And
France announced it would equip Zaire with an ultra-modern
satellite telecommunications system. The radio and
television
installations of the Voice of Zaire, the largest in
Africa, built
by French companies with French government aid, opened in
1976.
Since then, France has continued to devote a major portion
of its
aid to Zaire to the communications sector.
When the FLNC invaded Shaba Region in 1977 and the
Belgians and
Americans hesitated to assist Mobutu, France stepped in.
The French
government reportedly responded to Mobutu's call for help
by asking
King Hassan II of Morocco to supply troops, so that the
conflict
would appear to be settled "among Africans." Obviously,
however,
France's role in transporting the Moroccans to Zaire was
crucial.
During the second Shaba invasion in 1978, France upstaged
Belgium,
sending its Foreign Legion paratroopers straight to
Kolwezi while
the Belgians landed at Kamina. Thereafter, France trained
and
advised two Zairian airborne brigades. Again in 1989,
France
upstaged Belgium, when President François Mitterrand
announced at
the Francophone Summit that his country was writing off
debt
totalling US$2.6 billion owed by thirty-five of the
world's poorest
countries, including Zaire. The subsequent Belgian
announcement
that much of Zaire's debt would be written off or
rescheduled
appeared anticlimactic.
France was slower than Belgium or the United States to
condemn
the Mobutu regime or to cut off support. It did not, for
example,
cut off aid following the killing of students at
Lubumbashi in May
1990--a step taken by Belgium, the EC, Canada, and the
United
States. France and Belgium both sent troops to restore
order and
protect foreign nationals in the aftermath of a mutiny and
violence
by unpaid paratroopers in Kinshasa in September 1991.
Then, as
events unfolded in Zaire, France, too, cut off economic
aid to
Zaire in October 1991. In addition, the French government,
together
with Belgium and the United States, in 1992 put pressure
on
President Mobutu's government to proceed with the national
conference and to hold multiparty legislative elections
that year.
In August 1992, France warmly endorsed the Tshisekedi
government, exhibiting far fewer reservations on its
viability than
Belgium and the United States. The prospect of renewed
French aid
to Zaire also was addressed.
But 1993 immediately introduced new tensions into
relations
between France and Zaire. During rioting by Zairian
military
personnel that began in January 1993, the French
ambassador to
Zaire was killed, apparently in an act of random violence.
French
troops were sent to Zaire to evacuate French nationals. In
the
aftermath of the violence, France joined Belgium and the
United
States in demanding that Mobutu live up to his agreement
and
transfer power to the Tshisekedi government. Like Belgium
and the
United States, France also has steadfastly refused to
recognize the
Mobutu-appointed Birindwa government. But all three
Western nations
have stopped short of taking stronger action against
Mobutu.
Indeed, France, even more than Belgium or the United
States, is
regarded as unwilling to impose economic sanctions on the
Mobutu
regime or to confiscate Mobutu's assets, believing that
any strong
actions against Mobutu could harm French interests in
Zaire.
Taking advantage of the West's indecision and lack of
resolve,
Mobutu enjoyed some diplomatic successes in 1993,
particularly at
the October 1993 Francophone Summit in Mauritius.
According to some
reports, Mobutu definitely made his presence felt. Far
from being
treated as a pariah, he stood next to Mitterrand at the
official
ceremonies. Moreover, Mitterrand received him at a meeting
along
with leaders of Rwanda, Burundi, and Congo. The official
French
line was that Mitterrand had agreed to the meeting only to
encourage Mobutu to put off elections in order to allow
the
opposition more time to organize. But some observers saw
the
meeting as an indication of a French softening toward
Mobutu.
Earlier in the year, French permission for Mobutu to enter
France
in order to receive dental treatment was similarly viewed.
But in
that instance the public outcry was so great that France
was forced
to back down and denied Mobutu a visa for any subsequent
visits to
France.
In September 1993, a new French ambassador arrived in
Kinshasa.
The appointment made France one of the few Western nations
to
maintain normal diplomatic relations with Zaire. Most
other
countries have reduced representation to the chargé
d'affaires
level.
Later in 1993, there were reports that France had tired
of
Tshisekedi's "intransigence" and no longer supported him
as prime
minister. There seems to be some evidence that French
support for
the Tshisekedi government is not unequivocal, as French
statements
appeared to offer general support for transitional
political forces
rather than specific support for Tshisekedi.
Data as of December 1993
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