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Zaire Ethnic Groups
According to Mobutu's diagnosis, "tribalism," or ethnic
politics, was one of the First Republic's major ills. The
Manifesto
of N'Sele and other major statements of "authentic Zairian
nationalism" declared overt promotion of ethnic identity
to be
illegal. Steps taken against tribalism included
suppression of
institutional arenas in which ethnicity could be
mobilized,
apparent exclusion of overt ethnic patronage within the
state, and
prohibition of the articulation of ethnic ideologies. The
first
step included dismantling electoral assemblies and
political
assemblies, which was accomplished during the Second
Republic
regime's first year. The bewildering assortment of
political
parties--more than 200 of them had taken part in the 1965
balloting--was swept away by the stroke of a pen. They
were
replaced by a single party, the MPR, "the nation
politically
organized." The twenty-one provincettes were
recombined,
ultimately becoming eight regions (plus Kinshasa), which
became
mere administrative subdivisions of the recentralized
state.
First Republic politicians had sustained their
clientele
through the open use of the resources of the state for
patronage.
Particular ministries had become ethnic fiefdoms, both at
the
central and provincial levels. Local administrators were
named at
the provincial level, with ethnic criteria frequently
paramount.
Most of these practices were swept away by the new
regime's total
centralization of power. The state remained a vast
patrimonial
domain, but the distribution of benefits was above all a
presidential prerogative. Functionaries in the command
hierarchy of
the territorial administration were posted outside of
their ethnic
zones as a matter of principle. Ministers were frequently
rotated,
inhibiting the entrenchment of particular ethnic groups in
given
departments.
Ethnic associations were banned early in the Second
Republic.
But it is clear that they continued to exist, as was made
evident
on each national holiday when they were among the groups
sending
messages of congratulations to President Mobutu. Moreover,
Mobutu
was widely regarded as favoring his own ethnic group and
region.
Political liberalization, following Mobutu's speech of
April
1990, did not extend to recognition of ethnic political
parties.
Those groups denied recognition included a revived version
of the
Kongo ethnic party, Alliance of the Kongo People (Alliance
des
Bakongo--Abako) and a new party, Anamongo, which would
have
represented the Mongo of Équateur, Tetela-Kusu of
Kasai-Oriental
and Maniema, and related groups.
Nevertheless, ethnic rivalries and tensions continued
to
fester. Interethnic fighting in Shaba between adherents of
Nguza
and UFERI--primarily Lunda, the dominant ethnic group in
Shaba--and
Tshisekedi and UDPS supporters--primarily
Luba-Kasai--erupted in
August 1992 and continued sporadically thereafter. The
specter of
secession also arose anew, as Shaba expressed its
opposition to the
Tshisekedi government. The region's governor, Gabriel
Kyungu wa
Kumwanza, a disciple of Nguza, went so far as to recommend
the
expulsion of Luba-Kasai living in Shaba, and Nguza
bitterly
denounced the CNS (whose investigative commission had
recommended
that he be indicted for his role in the Shaba ethnic
violence) and
refused to rule out the eventual secession of the region.
Throughout 1993 violence continued in Shaba, and
indigenous
ethnic groups in Nord-Kivu also initiated attacks on
ethnic
Rwandans and Burundians, collectively known in Zaire as
the
Banyarwanda
(see The
Significance of Ethnic Identification
, ch. 2).
In both instances of ethnic tension, there is a history of
enmity
and resentment. But most observers believe that the recent
violence
is less historical than the result of deliberate
government
manipulation designed to divert popular resentment of the
Mobutu
regime.
In Nord-Kivu, government and security officials
condoned and
even instigated the attacks. In Shaba local government
officials
also played a major role in inciting ethnic violence. In
fact,
Kyungu launched a campaign known as "Katanga for the
Katangese."
Under its auspices, vigilante youth brigades, calling the
LubaKasai "insects" and "foreigners" who were to blame for the
misery
of the true Katangan people, began attacking the homes and
businesses of Luba-Kasai, in effect systematically
expelling them
from Shaba.
In several public appearances in late 1993, Kyungu,
with the
apparent approval of Nguza, reiterated calls for Shaban
autonomy,
threatening to pursue it immediately if Tshisekedi were to
be
"forced on" the nation as prime minister in a political
settlement.
He also repeated demands for Luba-Kasai to leave Shaba.
Observers note that Kyungu and Nguza have used both the
autonomy drive and the ethnic cleansing campaign to
promote their
own political agenda and the interests of UFERI, to the
detriment
of Tshisekedi and the UDPS. Some observers also see their
actions
as an indication that Nguza and Kyungu, both formerly
Mobutu
opponents but now both part of the Birindwa government,
Nguza as
first deputy prime minister in charge of defense and
Kyungu as
governor of Shaba, have been bribed or co-opted by Mobutu.
Mobutu
can thus be seen as using them to reinforce his position
as the
only one who can hold Zaire together. Indeed, few would
argue that
mineral-rich Shaba is vital to Zaire's future.
Data as of December 1993
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