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Cyprus 1963 Constitutional Breakdown
The 1960 constitution did not succeed in providing the
framework for a lasting compromise between Greek and
Turkish
Cypriots. Rather, its bicommunal features impeded
administration
and gave rise to continuing dissension, which culminated
finally in
armed violence between members of the two communities.
Beginning in
late 1963, Turkish Cypriots withdrew from the government,
and by
1965 the Greek Cypriots were in full charge.
The constitution failed to allay the suspicion and
distrust
that had increasingly divided the two communities,
especially since
the eruption of intercommunal violence in 1958. Many Greek
Cypriots
viewed the Zurich-London agreements as imposed on Cyprus
from
outside, and therefore illegitimate. Their main objection
to the
agreements, however, was that they barred the unification,
or
enosis, of Cyprus with Greece. Greek Cypriots also viewed
the
constitutional provisions drafted to safeguard minority
rights as
granting the Turkish Cypriots disproportionate privileges
that the
Turkish Cypriots abused. Therefore, some politically
active
elements of the Greek Cypriot community were motivated to
undermine
the constitution, or at least press for modifications.
Turkish Cypriots, some of whom also would have
preferred
different arrangements than those contained in the
independence
documents, such as taksim, or partition, of the
island and
union of its two parts with the respective motherlands
(so-called
double enosis), nonetheless maintained that the separative
provisions of the constitution were essential to their
security and
identity as a separate national community.
A number of quarrels broke out over the balance of
representation of the two communities in the government
and over
foreign policy, taxation by communal chambers, and other
matters,
bringing the government to a virtual standstill. The
leading cause
of disagreements was the ratio of Greek Cypriots to
Turkish
Cypriots in the civil service. Turkish Cypriots complained
that the
seventy-to-thirty ratio was not enforced. Greek Cypriots
felt that
the provisions discriminated against them, because they
constituted
almost 80 percent of the population. Another major point
of
contention concerned the composition of units under the
sixty-to-
forty ratio decreed for the Cypriot army. President
Makarios
favored complete integration; Vice President Fazil Küçük
accepted
a mixed force at the battalion level but insisted on
segregated
companies. On October 20, 1961, Küçük used his
constitutional veto
power for the first and only time to halt the development
of a
fully integrated force. Makarios then stated that the
country could
not afford an army anyway. Planning and development of the
national
army ceased, and paramilitary forces arose in each
community.
From the start, Greek Cypriots had been uneasy about
the idea
of separate municipalities, which Turkish Cypriots were
determined
to preserve. Also, the Greek Cypriot Communal Chamber
never set up
a communal court system, whereas Turkish Cypriot communal
courts
were established.
Still another issue that provoked strong Greek Cypriot
criticism was the right of the veto held by the Turkish
Cypriot
vice president and what amounted to final veto power held
by the
Turkish Cypriot representatives in the House of
Representatives
with respect to laws and decisions affecting the entire
population.
Turkish Cypriot representatives had exercised this veto
power with
respect to income tax legislation, seriously limiting
government
revenues.
In late 1963, after three years' experience of unsteady
selfgovernment , Makarios declared that certain constitutional
provisions "threatened to paralyze the State machinery."
Revisions
were necessary, he said, to remove obstacles that
prevented Greek
and Turkish Cypriots from "cooperating in the spirit of
understanding and friendship." On November 30, 1963,
Makarios
proposed thirteen amendments to be considered immediately
by the
leaders of the Turkish Cypriot community.
These proposals, outlined in a presidential memorandum
entitled
"Suggested Measures for Facilitating the Smooth
Functioning of the
State and for the Removal of Certain Causes of
Intercommunal
Friction," reflected all the constitutional problems that
had
arisen. The president's action had far-reaching
implications. Most
important, it deeply eroded Turkish Cypriot confidence in
the
fragile power sharing arrangement. The proposals also
automatically
involved Greece, Turkey, and Britain, which as signatories
to the
Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance had pledged to
guarantee the
status quo under the constitution.
The proposed amendments would have eliminated most of
the
special rights of Turkish Cypriots. For instance, they
would have
abolished many of the provisions for separate communal
institutions, substituting an integrated state with
limited
guarantees for the minority community. The administration
of
justice was to be unified. Instead of the separate
municipalities
that the constitution had originally called for in the
five largest
towns, municipalities were to be unified. The veto powers
of the
president and vice president were to be abandoned, as were
the
provisions for separate parliamentary majorities in
certain areas
of legislation. Turkish Cypriot representation in the
civil service
was to be proportionate to the size of the community. By
way of
compensation, the Turkish Cypriot vice president was to be
given
the right to deputize for the Greek Cypriot president in
case of
his absence, and the vice president of the House of
Representatives
was to be acting president of the body during the
temporary absence
or incapacity of the president.
Küçük reportedly had agreed to consider these
proposals. The
Turkish government, however, rejected the entire list. In
any case,
intercommunal fighting erupted in December 1963, and in
March 1964
the UN Security Council authorized the establishment of an
international peace-keeping force to control the violence
and act
as a buffer between the two communities.
Data as of January 1991
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