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Cyprus 1977 Makarios-Denktas Accords
After intensive efforts by Waldheim, Makarios and
Denktas met
on January 27, 1977, the first meeting between the two men
since
the Turkish Cypriots had withdrawn from the government of
the
republic in 1964. By then Makarios was leaning toward
negotiation
on the basis of a bizonal federation, provided that there
be some
Turkish Cypriot territorial concessions. He continued to
insist on
a strong central government and freedom of movement for
all
Cypriots. He demanded 80 percent of the territory,
proportionate to
the size of the Greek Cypriot population, but indicated
that he
might accept 75 percent if it included Varosha, the
formerly
prosperous tourist area of Famagusta to which 35,000 Greek
Cypriots
wanted to return. Denktas apparently indicated readiness
to
consider about 68 percent.
On February 12, 1977, the two men met and agreed on
four
guidelines. The first was that Cyprus would be an
independent,
nonaligned, bicommunal federal republic. Second, the
territory
under the administration of each community was to be
discussed in
light of economic viability, productivity, and property
rights.
Third, questions of principle such as freedom of movement
and
settlement, rights of ownership, and certain special
matters were
to be open for discussion, taking into consideration the
fundamental decision for a bicommunal federal system and
certain
practical difficulties. Finally, the powers and functions
of a
central government would be such as to safeguard the unity
of the
country.
This achievement raised hopes among Cyprus's foreign
friends
that a settlement could be reached. These hopes were
dashed when
President Makarios, the central figure in the Greek
Cypriot
community, died of a heart attack in August 1977. Spyros
Kyprianou,
his successor, pledged to adhere to positions he believed
Makarios
would have taken.
Over time, it became clear that Kyprianou enjoyed less
political room to maneuver than his predecessor, partly
because of
the growing political strength of the refugees and
displaced
persons. Kyprianou found in this group a ready-made
constituency,
and he embraced their advocacy of their right to return to
homes
and property and their call for a permeable border and
unimpeded
free movement and unrestricted settlement. This position
sharpened
differences with the Turkish Cypriot advocacy of a tightly
controlled border and guarantees that the ethnic balance
established by the de facto partition would remain
undisturbed.
In April 1978, a new set of Turkish Cypriot proposals
was made
public, but was quickly rejected by the Greek Cypriot
negotiator,
Papadopoulos, who objected to both the proposals
constitutional and
territorial aspects. Kyprianou dismissed Papadopoulos in
June over
disagreements.
Later in 1978, external powers tried their hand at a
Cyprus
proposal. President Jimmy Carter had convinced a slim
majority in
the United States Congress to lift the arms embargo
imposed against
Turkey because of its intervention on Cyprus; Carter
pledged to
renew diplomatic efforts to resolve the Cyprus problem.
The United
States then worked with Britain and Canada to launch a new
settlement plan. The twelve-point plan (often called the
ABC plan
because of its American, British, and Canadian
sponsorship)
proposed a biregional, independent federal republic. The
state's
constitutional structure would conform to the
Makarios-Denkta
guidelines of February 1977, as well as to pertinent
clauses of the
1960 constitution. There would be two constituent regions.
The
federal government would be responsible for foreign
affairs,
defense, currency and central banking, trade,
communications,
federal finance, customs, immigration and emigration, and
civil
aviation. Residual functions would rest with the two
regions. A
bicameral legislature would be established, with the upper
chamber
evenly divided between the two communities, and the lower
one
divided on a population-ratio basis. The Council of
Ministers would
be jointly selected by the president and vice president,
one of
whom would be a Greek Cypriot and the other a Turkish
Cypriot. On
territorial issues, the plan envisioned significant
Turkish Cypriot
geographic concessions, although the size and locale of
the two
regions would take into account factors such as economic
viability,
security, population distribution, and history. The plan
addressed
the refugee issue, and called for essentially a
demilitarized
republic and withdrawal of all foreign forces except for
an agreedupon contingent.
The Republic of Cyprus government objected to many
points in
the plan, largely because it preempted various positions
of the two
sides. The Greek Cypriot foreign minister said he would
have
preferred an agenda that did not go into so much detail.
Other
Greek Cypriot forces, including the church and some
political
parties, also opposed the plan. In the Greek community,
only
Glafkos Clerides urged its acceptance as a basis for
talks. Turkish
Cypriots also formally rejected the plan as an overall
settlement
package.
However, the ABC plan stimulated further efforts toward
a
settlement, and the UN Security Council acted quickly to
resume
intercommunal talks, on the basis of an agenda that
combined the
Makarios-Denktas guidelines with some aspects of the
allied plan.
Two other effects of the American initiative should be
noted.
The plan was the last American-drafted proposal for Cyprus
and
convinced some in the Western policy community that even a
fairminded effort had little chance of winning Cypriot
acceptance.
Second, it reinforced Cypriot anxiety about having
solutions
imposed from outside. By the early 1990s, many features of
the
initiative remained part of the UN-brokered negotiating
effort, but
Cypriots remained committed to writing their own plan.
Data as of January 1991
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