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Cyprus The Foreign Policy of Internationalization
Greek Cypriots have focused most of their foreign
policy
energies since 1974 on winning broader international
support for a
Cyprus settlement providing for a withdrawal of Turkish
troops and,
to the extent possible, a restoration of the status quo
ante of a
single government on the island and the free flow of
people and
goods throughout its territory. The republic continued to
enjoy
international recognition as the legal government of
Cyprus, and
Cyprus's membership in the Nonaligned Movement (NAM), the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE),
the United
Nations, and the Commonwealth Conference provided
opportunities to
promote these aims. Resolutions passed by these
organizations
called for the withdrawal of foreign troops, condemned
Turkey's
settler policy, urged the immediate implementation of UN
resolutions, and called for sanctions against Turkey.
Cyprus placed considerable importance on its membership
in the
NAM. It hosted a number of NAM meetings and headed an
effort in
1989 and 1990 to redefine the NAM's objectives in light of
the
dramatic changes in East-West relations and the virtual
end of
superpower rivalry and competition. Support from the
nonaligned
states was particularly important during UN debates. Greek
Cypriots
were aware that UN resolutions lacked direct effect on
Turkey
unless accompanied by substantive sanctions, but they
hoped that
collective international pressure might yield some
results. On
occasion, the republic was persuaded by its Western allies
to
forego the annual UN General Assembly resolution debate,
avoiding
repetitious and largely ineffective rituals and allowing
the UNsponsored talks to proceed without undue pressure.
President
Vassiliou adapted the traditional Greek Cypriot strategy
to his new
thinking by occasionally modifying his language, avoiding
punitive
measures, and emphasizing positive incentives to engage
Turkish
Cypriots in negotiations. After the collapse of the 1990
UN talks,
however, Greek Cypriot positions in international
organizations
returned to earlier phases, seeking direct condemnation of
Turkish
and Turkish Cypriot policies and practices.
The strategy of internationalization became more
Europeoriented in 1990. After the fall of the Berlin wall and
the
commitment to unification of the two Germanies, the Greek
Cypriot
republic perceived its situation as increasingly anomalous
and
unacceptable. It argued that, after Soviet troops
completed
withdrawing from Eastern Europe, Cyprus would be the only
country
in Europe with foreign occupying troops. The unification
of Germany
also underscored the deep Greek Cypriot yearning for
reunification,
and Greek Cypriots held candlelight processions around the
old
walls of the capital, Nicosia, calling for an end to the
division
of the island.
The decline of the relative importance of NATO among
European
institutions had both advantages and disadvantages for
Greek
Cypriot foreign policy. On the one hand, it appeared to
reduce
Turkey's leverage over its Western allies and opened the
way for
broader pressures on Turkey. On the other hand, the
potential
loosening of Turkey's ties with Western partners could
also weaken
those countries' influence on Turkey's policies. In
addition, the
preoccupation with Germany and the emergence of new
violent
conflicts in the Balkans made it harder to keep the
attention of
European powers on Cyprus.
The proposals in mid-1990 to expand the mission and
scope of
the CSCE appealed to Greek Cypriots. They had found
participation
in the CSCE, along with six other neutral and nonaligned
European
states, less satisfactory when the organization's main
function was
as a forum for East-West confidence-building measures. In
a future
united Europe, however, Cypriots could envision a greater
role for
the small states in the CSCE, and some believed that the
CSCE's
expanded conflict-mediation role might have benefits for
Cyprus.
The Italian proposal for a southern variant of the CSCE,
the CSCMediterranean , found tentative support from both Cypriot
communities.
Data as of January 1991
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