Cyprus 1988-90 Vassiliou-Denktas Meetings
Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktas (left) and Republic of
Cyprus President George Vassiliou (right) meeting at the
intercommunal talks sponsored by the United Nations
Courtesy Embassy of Cyprus, Washington
The politics of the settlement process appeared to
change
significantly when Greek Cypriots elected George Vassiliou
president in February 1988. Vassiliou, a successful
businessman
with no important political party base (although his
parents were
founding members of the island's communist party, the
Progressive
Party of the Working People (Anorthotikon Komma
Ergazomenou Laou--
AKEL), campaigned on a pledge to solve the Cyprus problem
with new
vigor and creativity. His upset victory over Spyros
Kyprianou
seemed to indicate popular support for a new approach and
for more
rapid progress on a settlement. The UN and Cyprus's
western
partners welcomed Vassiliou's election and his statements
about the
settlement process.
The UN arranged for informal meetings between Vassiliou
and
Denktas at the Nicosia home of the UN special
representative, Oscar
Camillion. The first round of these meetings took place
between
August and November 1988. A second round occurred between
December
1988 and April 1989, but the talks faltered when the two
sides
began submitting papers and drafts that began to dominate
the
discussions. These two rounds raised new concerns that the
UN had
lost control of the process, and that reaching agreement
on a fixed
agenda or schedule might prove difficult.
In May 1989, a more formal process began, after
Secretary
General Pérez de Cuéllar assigned his two aides, Camillion
and
Gustave Feissel, to meet separately and jointly with the
parties to
draft an outline, which could be based on an "ideas paper"
that the
UN circulated on a noncommittal basis to the parties. This
third
round was stalled for the second half of 1989, over
procedural and
substantive difficulties, with the Turkish Cypriots'
objecting to
the "ideas paper." The parties met in New York with the
secretary
general to discuss their progress in February and March
1990.
The secretary general reported that the gap between the
two
sides remained wide and that he was not convinced there
was an
agreed-upon basis on which to proceed. He turned to the
Security
Council for clarification of his good offices mission, and
the
clarification was passed unanimously in Resolution 649 on
March 13.
The two sides separately indicated satisfaction with
the UN
resolution, Greek Cypriots emphasizing the active role
proposed for
the UN, including the right to make suggestions, and
Turkish
Cypriots pleased with the resolution's references to the
separate
status of the two communities and to bizonality as an
enshrined
principle in a prospective settlement.
This eighteen-month round of settlement efforts had
begun
hopefully. A period of creative tension and groping to
create new
understandings occurred in mid-1989, when Vassiliou and
his
advisers privately and informally offered important
concessions to
the Turkish Cypriot side. That is, none of the Greek
Cypriot
proposals or suggestions were binding or formally
entrenched in
official documents, but were offered discreetly as the
basis for
discussion. These concessions included a willingness to
phase in
the three freedoms, beginning with freedom of movement and
holding
freedom of settlement and property in abeyance. New
thinking and
flexibility on the territorial issue was displayed, with a
range of
options presented to the Turkish Cypriot side, such as a
smaller
but nearly exclusively Turkish Cypriot zone, rather than
various
larger but more demographically mixed zones. Greek
Cypriots tried
to link the size of the territorial swap with the degree
of
communal purity. They were more flexible than in the past
on the
issue of the presidency, offering alternatives such as
rotating the
position between the two communities or having joint
elections with
Turkish Cypriot votes weighted. Turkish Cypriots found
themselves
challenged by a more flexible interlocutor and reacted
with
caution, expressing new legal reservations about the
proposals. At
that point between October 1989 and February 1990, the
Greek
Cypriot side seemed to withdraw some of its new ideas, and
the
president found his freedom of maneuver limited by new
domestic
resistance to further concessions.
When the talks collapsed in early 1990, both sides
appeared to
be turning away from the UN process. The two governments
seemed
able to withstand domestic criticism of the talks;
opposition
complaints on both sides appeared to focus on tactics, and
did not
challenge the fundamental government positions. Both
leaders
appeared to be preparing to defend their positions to
outside
partners. Greek Cypriots mounted a renewed effort to win
international support for their position, and for the need
for
international pressure on Turkey to win concessions from
the
Turkish Cypriots. For Turkish Cypriots, the end of the
talks
heralded a period of active domestic politics. A push for
new
diplomatic recognition of the "TRNC" was under
consideration
(see Foreign Policy
, this ch.).
Data as of January 1991
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