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Spain Franco's Political System
The leader of the Nationalist forces, General Franco,
headed
the authoritarian regime that came to power in the
aftermath of
the Civil War. Until his death in November 1975, Franco
ruled
Spain as "Caudillo by the grace of God," as his coins
proclaimed.
In addition to being generalissimo of the armed forces, he
was
both chief of state and head of government, the ultimate
source
of legitimate authority. He retained the power to appoint
and to
dismiss ministers and other decision makers. Even after he
grew
older, began to lose his health, and became less actively
involved in policy making, Franco still had the final word
on
every major political decision.
Ideology or political theories were not the primary
motivators in Franco's developing of the institutions that
came
to be identified with his name. Franco had spent his life
as a
professional soldier, and his conception of society was
along
military lines. Known for his iron political nerve, Franco
saw
himself as the one designated to save Spain from the chaos
and
instability visited upon the country by the evils of
parliamentary democracy and political parties, which he
blamed
for destroying the unity of Spain. His pragmatic goal was
to
maintain power in order to keep what he termed the
"anti-Spain"
forces from gaining ascendancy.
The political structures established under Franco's
rule
represented this pragmatic approach. Because he never
formulated
a true, comprehensive, constitutional system, Franco had
great
flexibility in dealing with changing domestic and
international
situations. Seven fundamental laws decreed during his rule
provided the regime with a semblance of constitutionalism,
but
they were developed after the fact, usually to legitimize
an
existing situation or distribution of power.
The first of these fundamental laws was the Labor
Charter,
promulgated on March 9, 1938. It set forth the social
policy of
the regime, and it stressed the mutual obligations of the
state
and its citizens: all Spaniards had the duty to work, and
the
state was to assure them the right to work. Although the
decree
called for adequate wages, paid vacations, and a limit to
working
hours, it ensured labor's compliance with the new regime
by
labeling strikes as treason. Later legislation required
Spanish
workers to join vertical syndicates in which both owners
and
employees were supposed to cooperate for the good of the
nation.
Another fundamental law, the Constituent Law of the
Cortes
(1942), provided the trappings of constitutionalism. This
Cortes
(Spanish Parliament), was purely an advisory body, and it
had
little in common with democratic legislatures. Most of its
members were indirectly elected or appointed, and many
were
already part of the administration. The Cortes did not
have the
right to initiate legislation or to vote against the
government;
it could only approve laws presented by the executive.
There was
no vestige of power attached to this function because the
law
permitted Franco to legislate by decree without consulting
the
Cortes. The Council of Ministers, the members of which
were
appointed by, and presided over, by Franco, exercised
executive
authority. Franco had the right to dismiss these
ministers.
Following the Allied victories in 1945, Franco sought
to
impress the world's democratic powers with Spain's
"liberal"
credentials by issuing a fundamental law that was
ostensibly a
bill of rights--the Charter of Rights. The rights granted
by this
charter were more cosmetic than democratic, because the
government bestowed them and could suspend them without
justification; furthermore, the charter placed more
emphasis on
the duty of all Spaniards to serve their country and to
obey its
laws than on their basic rights as citizens. Thus, for
example,
the charter guaranteed all Spaniards the right to express
their
opinions freely, but they were not to attack the
fundamental
principles of the state.
The Law on Referenda, also issued in 1945, was a
further
attempt by Franco to make his regime appear less
arbitrary. It
provided that issues of national concern would be
submitted for
the consideration of Spanish citizens by means of popular
referenda. Franco decreed this law without having
consulted the
Cortes, however, and he retained the sole right to
determine
whether a referendum would be called. The law stipulated
that
after 1947, a referendum would have to be called in order
to
alter any fundamental law; Franco retained the right to
decree
such laws, however--a right which he exercised in 1958.
Additional measures that were taken in the immediate
postwar
years to provide the Franco regime with a facade of
democracy
included pardons and reduced terms for prisoners convicted
of
civil war crimes and a guarantee that refugees who
returned would
not be prosecuted if they did not engage in political
activities.
The regime announced new elections for municipal councils;
council members were to be selected indirectly by
syndicates and
heads of "families." The government retained the right to
appoint
all mayors directly.
The Law of Succession (1947) was the first of the
fundamental
laws to be submitted to popular referendum. It proclaimed
that
Spain would be a "Catholic, social, and representative
monarchy"
and that Franco would be regent for life (unless
incapacitated).
Franco had the authority to name the next king when he
thought
the time was appropriate and also to revoke his choice at
a later
date if he so desired. The law also provided for a Council
of the
Realm to assist Franco in the exercise of executive power
and for
a three-member Regency Council to be in charge of the
government
during the period of transition to the Caudillo's
successor. When
the plebiscite was held, over 90 percent of the 15 million
voters
approved the measures. Although the Law of Succession
ostensibly
reestablished the monarchy, it actually solidified
Franco's rule
and legitimized his position as head of state by popular
suffrage.
The sixth fundamental law, the Law on the Principles of
the
National Movement--which Franco decreed unilaterally in
1958--
further defined the institutions of Franco's government.
The
National Movement--a coalition of right-wing groups
referred to
as political "families"--termed a "communion" rather than
a
party, was designated as the sole forum for political
participation. The law reaffirmed the nature of Spain as a
traditional, Catholic monarchy. All top government
officials, as
well as all possible future successors to Franco, were
required
to pledge their loyalty to the principles embodied in this
law
(which was presented as a synthesis of all previous
fundamental
laws).
The final fundamental law, the Organic Law of the
State, was
presented in 1966. It incorporated no major changes, but
was
designed to codify and to clarify existing practices,
while
allowing for some degree of reform. It established a
separation
between the functions of the president of government
(prime
minister) and the head of state, and it outlined the
procedures
for the selection of top government officials. It included
other
measures designed to modernize the Spanish system and to
eliminate vestiges of fascist terminology. Although
presented as
a move toward democratization, it nevertheless retained
the basic
structure of an authoritarian system.
Franco initially derived his authority from his victory
in
the Civil War. The armed forces gave his regime security;
the
Roman Catholic Church and the National Movement gave it
legitimacy. The National Movement was the only recognized
political organization in Franco's Spain. It was not a
political
party, and it did not have an overt ideological basis. Its
membership included monarchists, Falangists, conservative
Catholics, members of the armed forces, as well as
business
groups with (vested interests in continuity), technocrats,
and
civil servants. Although there was some overlap among
these
groups, they had distinct, and often contradictory,
interests.
The force that fused them together was their common
loyalty to
Franco. Franco was particularly skillful in manipulating
each of
these "families," giving each a taste of power, but not
allowing
any group or individual to create an independent base from
which
to challenge his authority.
Franco's political system was virtually the antithesis
of the
final government of the republican era--the Popular Front
government. In contrast to the anticlericalism of the
Popular
Front, the Francoist regime established policies that were
highly
favorable to the Catholic Church, which was restored to
its
previous status as the official religion of Spain. In
addition to
receiving government subsidies, the church regained its
dominant
position in the education system, and laws conformed to
Catholic
dogma. Gains in regional autonomy were reversed under
Franco, and
Spain reverted to being a highly centralized state. The
regime
abolished regional governmental bodies and enacted
measures
against the use of the Basque and the Catalan languages.
Further
contrast between the Popular Front government and the
Franco
regime was apparent in their bases of support. Whereas the
liberal leftists and the working class elements of society
had
supported the Popular Front, the conservative upper
classes were
the mainstay of Franco's government.
Above all, Franco endeavored to remove all vestiges of
parliamentary democracy, which he perceived to be alien to
Spanish political traditions. He outlawed political
parties,
blaming them for the chaotic conditions that had preceded
the
Civil War. He eliminated universal suffrage and severely
limited
the freedoms of expression and association; he viewed
criticism
of the regime as treason.
In spite of the regime's strong degree of control,
Franco did
not pursue totalitarian domination of all social,
cultural, and
religious institutions, or of the economy as a whole. The
Franco
regime also lacked the ideological impetus characteristic
of
totalitarian governments. Furthermore, for those willing
to work
within the system, there was a limited form of pluralism.
Thus,
Franco's rule has been characterized as authoritarian
rather than
totalitarian.
Whereas there is generally consensus among analysts in
designating the regime as authoritarian, there is less
agreement
concerning the fascist component of Franco's Spain. In its
early
period, the Francoist state was considered, outside Spain,
to be
fascist. The Falangist program of national syndicalism
reflected
the pattern of fascism prevalent in Europe during those
years;
nevertheless, core Falangists never played a major role in
the
new state. Most of the key leaders of the Falange did not
survive
the Civil War, and Franco moved quickly to subordinate the
fascist party, merging it as well as more conservative and
traditional political forces into the broader and vaguer
National
Movement under his direct control. The links between
Franco's
regime and the Roman Catholic Church, as well as the
course of
international developments, further mitigated the fascist
component. Thus, while there was a definite fascist
element
during the first decade of Franco's rule, most analysts
have
concluded that early Francoism can more accurately be
described
as semifascist.
Data as of December 1988
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