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Spain Foreign Policy under Franco
The overriding need to strengthen the regime determined
foreign policy in the first phase of Franco's rule.
Weakened by
the devastation of civil war, the country could not afford
to
become involved in a protracted European conflict.
Although
Franco was deeply indebted to Germany and to Italy for
their
decisive contribution to his victory over the Republicans,
he
declared Spain's neutrality in the opening days of World
War II.
His sympathies, nevertheless, were openly with the Axis
powers;
he had, in fact, already joined the Anti-Comintern Pact
and had
signed a secret treaty of friendship with Germany in March
1939.
There was genuine enthusiasm for the fascist cause among
important elements of the Franco regime, especially the
Falange.
Spain altered its policy of neutrality following the
lightning success of Germany's 1940 spring offensive. The
German
armies appeared invincible, and Franco was eager to assure
Spain
a voice in the postwar settlement. In June 1940, The
Spanish
government adopted a policy of nonbelligerency, which
permitted
German submarines to be provisioned in Spanish ports and
German
airplanes to use Spanish landing strips. This stance was
widely
interpreted as foreshadowing Spain's entry on the side of
the
Axis powers; the German Nazi leader, Adolf Hitler, and
Franco
discussed this move on more than one occasion. The two
dictators
could never come to terms, however. The German invasion of
the
Soviet Union in 1941 presented Franco with a unique
opportunity
to participate in the conflict without a declaration of
war and
to get revenge for the Soviet Union's aid to the
Republicans.
Franco agreed to a Falangist request for the official
formation
of a Blue Division of volunteers--which reached a maximum
strength of 18,000 men--to fight on the eastern front.
Franco
still believed that the Axis powers would win the war, and
he
considered the intervention of Spanish volunteers to be an
inexpensive way of assuring recognition of Spain's
colonial
claims after the war was over.
The war turned in favor of the Allies with the entry of
the
United States in December 1941 and the Allied landing in
Casablanca in November 1942. At that time, Spain replaced
its
pro-Axis policy with a genuinely neutral stance. Spain
withdrew
the Blue Division from the eastern front in November 1943,
thus
ending Franco's major collaboration with Nazi Germany. In
May
1944, Spain and the Allies concluded an agreement. The
Spanish
government agreed to end wolfram shipments to Germany, to
close
the German consulate in Tangier, and to expel German
espionage
agents. In exchange for these actions, the Allies were to
ship
petroleum and other necessary supplies to Spain.
By the end of 1944, Spain had entered into a period of
"benevolent neutrality" toward the Allies. Spain allowed
Allied
aircraft to land inside its borders and permitted Allied
intelligence agents to operate in Madrid. In spite of this
opportunistic policy shift, Spain was ostracized at the
end of
the war by the victorious powers. Although the United
States
president, Harry S. Truman, and the British prime
minister,
Winston Churchill, successfully resisted Stalin's
proposals at
the Potsdam Conference in July 1945 for Allied
intervention
against Franco, Spain was denied membership in the United
Nations
(UN) because its government had come to power with the
assistance
of the Axis powers and had collaborated with them during
the war.
A resolution adopted by the second meeting of the UN
General
Assembly in December 1946 expressed the most severe
postwar
censure of the Franco regime. According to this
resolution, Spain
would be banned from the UN and would not be allowed to
participate in any of its specialized agencies, as long as
Franco
remained in power. Franco did not appear seriously
concerned by
this censure, nor by the subsequent exclusion of Spain
from the
Marshall Plan. In fact, he used the international
ostracism to
strengthen his hold over the Spanish government. During
this
period of isolation, the Argentine government of Juan
Peron
(president, 1946-55) provided Spain with crucial economic
support.
Franco was convinced that attacks on his regime were
the work
of communist forces, and he felt certain that the Western
powers
would someday recognize Spain's contribution in
maintaining its
solitary vigil against bolshevism. As events evolved,
Spain's
anticommunist stance proved to be a significant factor in
the
United States decision to revise its policy toward Spain
in view
of the Cold War.
As the United States became increasingly concerned with
the
Soviet threat following the fall of Czechoslovakia, the
Berlin
blockade in 1948, and the outbreak of the Korean War in
1950,
United States policy makers also began to recognize the
strategic
importance of the Iberian Peninsula; furthermore, they
realized
that ostracism had failed and that the Franco regime was
stronger
than ever. The United States government took steps to
normalize
its political and economic relations with Spain in the
years
1948-50. In September 1950, President Truman signed a bill
that
appropriated US$62.5 million for aid to Spain. In the same
year,
the United States supported a UN resolution lifting the
boycott
on Franco's regime and resumed full diplomatic relations
with
Spain in 1951. As Spain became an increasingly important
link in
the overall defense system of the United States against
the
Soviet Union, the period of isolation came to an end.
Two major agreements signed in 1953 strengthened the
Franco
regime: the Concordat with the Vatican and the Pact of
Madrid.
The Concordat, signed in August 1953, was to replace the
1851
document that the republic had abrogated. The new
agreement
provided full church recognition of Franco's government.
At the
same time, it reaffirmed the confessional nature of the
Spanish
state; the public practice of other religions was not
permitted.
The agreement was more favorable to the Vatican than to
Franco;
it included measures that significantly increased the
independence of the church within the Spanish system. The
Concordat served, nevertheless, to legitimize the regime
in the
eyes of many Spaniards, and it was instrumental in
strengthening
Franco's hold over the country.
The Pact of Madrid, signed shortly after the Concordat,
further symbolized the Spanish regime's rehabilitation. It
also
marked the end of Spanish neutrality. The Pact consisted
of three
separate, but interdependent, agreements between Spain and
the
United States. It provided for mutual defense, for
military aid
to Spain, and for the construction of bases there. The
United
States was to use these bases for a renewable ten-year
period,
but the bases remained under Spanish sovereignty. Although
the
pact did not constitute a full-fledged military alliance,
it did
commit the United States to support Spain's defense
efforts;
furthermore, it provided Spain with much-needed economic
assistance. During the first ten years of the Pact of
Madrid, the
United States sent approximately US$1.5 billion in all
kinds of
aid to Spain.
Two years later, in 1955, the UN approved Spain's
membership.
In a visit by the United States president, Dwight D.
Eisenhower,
to the Spanish capital in 1959, the two generals received
warm
public welcomes as they toured the city together. The
visit
further emphasized Franco's acceptance and the end of
Spain's
ostracism. Franco placed a high value on Spain's
relationship
with the United States, for the prestige it conferred as
well as
for strategic reasons. This relationship continued to be a
dominant factor in the development of the country's
foreign
policy.
Spain's European neighbors were less willing than the
United
States to modify their aversion to Franco's authoritarian
rule.
The West European members of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) vetoed efforts to include Spain.
Spain's
applications for association with the European Community
(EC--see Glossary)
were also repeatedly rejected. Although a Trade
Preference Treaty between Spain and the EC signed in 1970
seemed
to herald a thaw in relations, Spain's entry into the EC,
continued to be a political issue throughout Franco's
lifetime.
Spanish membership in the Community, considered by Spanish
economists and businessmen as crucial for Spain's economic
development, had to await the democratization of the
regime
(see Spain and the European Community
, ch. 4).
A more intractable problem than Spain's entry into the
EC was
the fate of Gibraltar, a sore point in Anglo-Spanish
relations
since 1713, when Spain ceded the area to Britain under the
terms
of the Treaty of Utrecht
(see War of the Spanish Succession
, this
ch.). The question of sovereignty, which had been dormant
during
the years of the Second Republic, revived in the 1960s and
jeopardized otherwise friendly relations between Britain
and
Spain. Spain has never relinquished its claim to
Gibraltar, while
the British have maintained that the inhabitants of the
area
should determine Gibraltar's fate. The heterogeneous
population
of Gibraltar enjoyed local democratic self-government and
an
increasingly higher standard of living than that
prevailing in
Spain; therefore it was not a surprise when they voted
almost
unanimously in a referendum held in 1967 to remain under
British
rule. The UN repeatedly condemned the "colonial situation"
and
demanded--to no avail--its termination. In 1969 Spain took
steps
to seal off Gibraltar from the mainland and to accelerate
the
economic development program for the area surrounding it,
known
as Campo de Gibraltar. The situation continued in
stalemate
throughout the remainder of the Franco regime.
Franco may have been frustrated with the problem of
Gibraltar, but he was optimistic about his potential for
maintaining a powerful position for Spain in North Africa.
As a
former commanding officer of Spanish colonial garrisons in
Morocco, Franco had developed close ties to the area, and
during
the postwar period, he placed great emphasis on
maintaining
Spain's position in the Arab world. Appealing to
historical,
cultural, and political ties, Franco endeavored to act as
self-
appointed protector of Arab interests and to portray Spain
as an
essential bridge, or mediator, between Europe and the Arab
countries.
Despite the regime's position as a colonial power in
northwest Africa, relations between Spain and the Arab
countries
became closer in the late 1940s, in part because of
Spain's
nonrecognition of Israel. A visit by Spain's foreign
minister to
the Middle East resulted in a variety of economic and
cultural
agreements, and the Arab states assumed a benevolent
attitude
toward Spain's position in Morocco. Nevertheless, France's
decision to withdraw from Morocco in early 1956, following
the
successful struggle waged by Moroccan nationalists against
French
control, left little prospect of Spain's retaining its
zone. (In
the spring of the same year, France relinquishied the
protectorate.)
In the following decades, Spain's position in North
Africa
eroded further. A long series of conflicts with Morocco
resulted
in the abandonment of much of Spain's colonial territory
in the
1960s. When Morocco's Mohammed V made it clear in 1958
that he
had designs on the Spanish Sahara, Spain opposed any
change of
status for the area. In 1975, however, Spain reversed its
policy
and declared its readiness to grant full independence to
the
Spanish Sahara under UN supervision. Following the march
of
300,000 unarmed Moroccans into the territory in November
1975,
Spain agreed to cede the Spanish Sahara to Morocco and
Mauritania. At the time of Franco's death, Spain's only
remaining
presence in North Africa consisted of the
Spanish-inhabited
enclave cities of Ceuta and Melilla and the small garrison
spot
called Penon de Velez de la Gomera, all on Morocco's
Mediterranean coast
(see Gibraltar, Ceuta, and Melilla
, ch. 4).
Data as of December 1988
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