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Spain THE POST-FRANCO ERA
Transition to Democracy
The democratization that Franco's chosen heir, Juan
Carlos,
and his collaborators peacefully and legally brought to
Spain
over a three-year period was unprecedented. Never before
had a
dictatorial regime been transformed into a pluralistic,
parliamentary democracy without civil war, revolutionary
overthrow, or defeat by a foreign power. The transition is
all
the more remarkable because the institutional mechanisms
designed
to maintain Franco's authoritarian system made it possible
to
legislate a democratic constitutional monarchy into
existence.
When Prince Juan Carlos took the oath as king of Spain
on
November 22, 1975, there was little reason to foresee that
he
would be the architect of such a dramatic transformation.
Franco
had hand-picked Juan Carlos and had overseen his
education. He
was considered an enigma, having publicly sworn loyalty to
the
principles of Franco's National Movement while privately
giving
vague indications of sympathy for democratic institutions.
More
was known of his athletic skills than of his political
opinions,
and observers predicted that he would be known as "Juan
the
Brief."
Juan Carlos confirmed Arias Navarro's continuation in
office
as prime minister, disappointing those who were hoping for
liberal reforms. Arias Navarro had served as minister of
the
interior under Carrero Blanco, and he was a loyal
Francoist. His
policy speech of January 28, 1976, was vague--devoid of
concrete
plans for political reform. The hopes and expectations
aroused by
the long-awaited demise of Franco were frustrated in the
initial
months of the monarchy, and a wave of demonstrations,
industrial
strikes, and terrorist activity challenged the country's
stability. The government responded with repressive
measures to
restore law and order. These measures inflamed and united
the
liberal opposition. At the same time, the cautious reforms
that
the Arias Navarro government proposed met with hostile
reaction
from orthodox Francoists, who pledged resistance to any
form of
change.
It was in this volatile atmosphere that Juan Carlos,
increasingly dissatisfied with the prime minister's
ability (or
willingness) to handle the immobilists as well as with his
skill
in dealing with the opposition, asked for Arias Navarro's
resignation. Arias Navarro submitted his resignation on
July 1,
1976. Proponents of reform were both surprised and
disappointed
when the king chose, as Arias Navarro's successor, Adolfo
Suarez
Gonzalez, who had served under Franco and who had been
designated
secretary general of the National Movement in the first
government of the monarchy. The new prime minister's
Francoist
links made it appear unlikely that he would promote major
evolutionary change in Spain, but it was these links with
the
political establishment that made it possible for him to
maneuver
within the existing institutions to bring about the
reforms that
Juan Carlos desired.
Throughout the rapid democratization that followed the
appointment of Suarez, the collaboration between the king
and his
prime minister was crucial in assuaging opposition from
both the
immobilists of the old regime and those who agitated for a
more
radical break with the past. Whereas Suarez's political
expertise
and pragmatic approach enabled him to manipulate the
bureaucratic
machinery, Juan Carlos's ability to maintain the
allegiance of
the armed forces made a peaceful transition to democracy
possible
during these precarious months.
In July 1976, the government declared a partial amnesty
that
freed approximately 400 political prisoners. On September
10,
Suarez announced a program of political reform, calling
for a
bicameral legislature based on universal suffrage. With
skillful
maneuvering, he was able to persuade members of the Cortes
to
approve the law, thereby voting their own corporatist
institution
out of existence, in November. The reforms were then
submitted to
a national referendum in December 1976, in accordance with
Franco's 1945 Law on Referenda. The Spanish people voted
overwhelmingly in favor of reform: about 94 percent of the
voters
(78 percent of the electorate took part in the referendum)
gave
their approval. The results of the referendum strengthened
the
position of the Suarez government and of the king and
represented
a vindication for those who favored reform from above
rather than
revolution.
In the first six months of 1977, significant reforms
were
enacted in rapid succession. There were further pardons
for
political prisoners in March; independent trade unions
replaced
vertical and labor syndicates; and the right to strike was
restored. In April the National Movement was disbanded.
Suarez and the king began to prepare the Spanish people
for
the first free elections--to be held on June 15,
1977--since the
Civil War. The legalization of political parties began in
February, and an electoral law outlining the rules for
electoral
competition was negotiated with opposition political
forces and
went into effect in March. The government adopted the
d'Hondt
system of proportional representation, which favored the
formation of large parties or coalitions
(see Electoral System
, ch. 4).
A major crisis appeared to be in the offing over the
issue of
legalizing the Communist Party of Spain (Partido Comunista
de
Espana--PCE). Parties of the left and the center-left
demanded
legal recognition, refusing to participate in the
elections
otherwise. Suarez feared a strong reaction from military
leaders,
however, if such a step were taken. Members of the armed
forces
had been dedicated to the suppression of Marxism since the
time
of the Civil War; moreover, Suarez had assured them the
previous
September that the PCE would never be legalized.
In a bold but necessary move, Suarez legalized the PCE
on
April 9, 1977. Military leaders were upset by the decision
and
publicly expressed their dissatisfaction with the measure,
but
they grudgingly accepted it out of patriotism. Juan
Carlos's
close relations with senior military officers were a
factor in
defusing a potentially explosive state of affairs. His
earlier
efforts to replace ultraconservative commanders of the
armed
forces with more liberal ones also benefited him when he
took
this controversial step. The moderation that the
communists
exercised in accepting the monarchy in spite of their
avowed
republicanism also helped to normalize the political
situation.
As the country prepared for elections, a large number
of
diverse political parties began to form. Only a few of
these
parties gained parliamentary representation following the
June
15, 1977, elections, however, and none achieved an
absolute
majority. The Union of the Democratic Center (Union de
Centro
Democratico--UCD), a centrist coalition of several groups,
including Francoist reformists and moderate opposition
democrats,
led by Suarez, emerged from the election as the largest
party,
winning 34.6 percent of the vote (see
table 2, Appendix).
The leading opposition party was the Spanish Socialist
Workers' Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Espanol--PSOE),
which
received 29.3 percent of the vote. Having been in
existence since
1879, the PSOE was Spain's oldest political party. A group
of
dynamic young activists, led by a Seville lawyer, Felipe
Gonzalez
Marquez, had taken control of the party from the exiles in
1972,
and their revolutionary idealism, combined with pragmatic
policies, enabled the PSOE to appeal to a broader spectrum
of the
electorate. Both the neo-Francoist right, embodied in the
Popular
Alliance (Alianza Popular--AP), and the PCE were
disappointed
with the election results, which gave them each less than
10
percent of the popular vote
(see Political Parties
, ch.
4).
Catalan and Basque regional parties accounted for most of
the
remaining votes.
The election results were a victory for both moderation
and
the desire for change. They boded well for the development
of
democracy in Spain. The domination of Spain's party system
by two
relatively moderate political groups marked an end to the
polarization that had plagued the country since the days
of the
Second Republic. The political skill of Suarez, the
courage and
determination of Juan Carlos, and the willingness of
opposition
leaders to sacrifice their hopes for more radical social
change
to the more immediate goal of securing political democracy
helped
to end the polarization. The deferral of these hopes led
to
eventual disenchantment with the Suarez government, but in
1977
it was a key factor in the peaceful transition to
democracy.
A formidable array of problems, including a growing
economic
crisis, Basque terrorism, and the threat of military
subversion,
confronted the new Suarez government. Long-range solutions
could
not be devised until after the new constitution had been
approved, but in the interim, the socioeconomic
difficulties had
to be faced. It was apparent that austerity measures would
have
to be taken, and Suarez knew he needed to gain support for
a
national economic recovery program. This was achieved in
October
1977 in the Moncloa Pacts, named for the prime minister's
official residence where leaders of Spain's major
political
parties met and agreed to share the costs of, and the
responsibility for, economic reforms. The parties of the
left
were promised an increase in unemployment benefits, the
creation
of new jobs, and other reforms; in return they agreed to
further
tax increases, credit restrictions, reductions in public
expenditures, and a 20 percent ceiling on wage increases.
The new government set forth a provisional solution to
demands for regional autonomy. Preautonomy decrees were
issued
for Catalonia in September and for three of the Basque
provinces
in December, 1977. The significance of these decrees was
primarily symbolic, but the decrees helped to avoid
potentially
disruptive conflict for the time being by recognizing the
distinctive political character of the regions and by
promising
autonomy when the constitution was ratified. The regional
issue
nevertheless continued to be the government's most
intractable
problem, and it became even more complicated as autonomist
demands proliferated throughout the country. During the
early
months of the Suarez government, there were disturbing
indications that the army's toleration of political
pluralism was
limited. Military unrest also boded ill for the regime's
future
stability.
The major task facing the government during this
transitional
period was the drafting of a new constitution. Since
previous
constitutions had failed in Spain because they had usually
been
imposed by one particular group and were not the
expression of
the popular will, it was imperative that the new
constitution be
based on consensus. To this end, the Constitutional
Committee of
the Cortes in August 1977 elected a parliamentary
commission
representing all the major national parties and the more
important regional ones. This group began its
deliberations in an
atmosphere of compromise and cooperation. Although members
of the
group disagreed over issues of education, abortion,
lock-outs,
and regionalism, they made steady progress. The Cortes
passed the
document they produced--with amendments--in October 1978.
The new 1978 Constitution is long and detailed, because
of
its framers' desire to gain acceptance for the document by
including something for everyone. It proclaims Spain to be
a
parliamentary monarchy and guarantees its citizens
equality
before the law and a full range of individual liberties,
including religious freedom. While recognizing the
autonomy of
the regions, it stresses the indivisibility of the Spanish
state.
The Constitution was submitted to popular referendum on
December
6, 1978, and it was approved by 87.8 of the 67.7 percent
of the
eligible voters who went to the polls
(see The 1978 Constitution
, ch. 4).
After the king had signed the new Constitution, Suarez
dissolved the Cortes and called another general election
for
March. It was widely predicted that the results would show
an
erosion of support for Suarez and the UCD (which had begun
to
show signs of fragmentation) and a gain for the PSOE. The
PSOE
was experiencing its own internal crisis, however. The
party's
official definition of itself as Marxist hampered
Gonzalez's
efforts to project an image of moderation and
statesmanship. At
the same time, the party's more radical members were
increasingly
resentful of Gonzalez's ideological moderation. Contrary
to
expectations, the PSOE did not improve its position when
Spaniards went to the polls on March 1, 1979. The election
results were not significantly different from those of
1977, and
they were seen as a reaffirmation and a consolidation of
the
basic power structure.
Data as of December 1988
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