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Spain Policies, Programs, and Growing Popular Unrest
Severe repression marked the early years of the regime,
as
Franco sought to impose absolute political control and to
institutionalize the Nationalist victory in the Civil War.
The
schisms that had preceded and precipitated the war were
maintained as the vanquished were excluded from political
participation. Franco restricted individual liberties and
suppressed challenges to his authority. The regime imposed
prison
terms for "revolutionary activity," and executions were
carried
out through 1944, albeit at a decreasing rate. These
repressive
measures engendered an atmosphere of fear. In addition,
the
traumatic effect of years of internecine violence,
widespread
deprivations, suffering, and disillusionment had left most
of the
Spanish population acquiescent, willing to accept any
system that
could restore peace and stability.
During the first phase of the regime, the military
played a
major role. The state of martial law that was declared in
July
1936 remained in effect until 1948. With the backing of
the armed
forces, Franco used his extensive powers to invalidate all
laws
of the Second Republic that offended his political and
ethical
beliefs. He banned civil marriage, made divorce illegal,
and made
religious education compulsory in the schools.
Publications were
subject to prior censorship, and public meetings required
official permission. He returned most of the land
nationalized
under the republic's agrarian program to its original
owners. The
state destroyed trade unions, confiscating their funds and
property. Vertical syndicates replaced the unions.
In 1939 Franco initiated a program of reconstruction
based on
the concept of economic self-sufficiency or autarchy
(see The Franco Era, 1939-75
, ch. 3). The program, aimed at
increasing
national economic production, favored the established
industrial
and financial interests at the expense of the lower
classes and
the agricultural regions. Acute shortages and starvation
wages
were widespread in the early 1940s, a period which saw the
worst
inflation in Spain's history. By the end of the decade,
Spain's
level of economic development was among the lowest in
southern
Europe. Furthermore, the ostracism that Spain experienced
because
of Franco's collaboration with the Axis powers during
World War
II and because of the dictatorial nature of his regime
deprived
the country of the benefits of the Marshall Plan, which
was a
major factor in the rebuilding of Europe's postwar economy
(see Foreign Policy under Franco
, this ch.).
As the 1940s drew to a close, agricultural imbalances,
labor
unrest, and a growing pressure for industrial development
forced
the regime to begin to modify its autarchic policies.
Spain's
need for food, raw materials, energy, and credit made it
necessary for the country to establish some link to the
international economy. Spain achieved this goal when the
United
States decided to seek the political and strategic
advantages of
Spanish friendship in the face of an increasingly
aggressive
Soviet Union. With the infusion of American capital,
Spain's
economy revived, and living standards began to improve.
There was
a degree of economic liberalization, and industrial
production
increased significantly in the 1950s. Economic
liberalization did
not result in a relaxation of authoritarian control,
however. The
regime swiftly repressed workers' demonstrations in the
spring of
1951 and student protests in 1956.
The regime's "families" did not agree unanimously on
the new
economic policies, and there were clashes between the
progressive
and the reactionary forces. The Falange resisted the
opening of
the regime to capitalistic influences, while the
technocrats of
the powerful Catholic pressure group, Opus Dei,
de-emphasized the
role of the syndicates and favored increased competition
as a
means of achieving rapid economic growth. The technocrats
prevailed, and members of Opus Dei assumed significant
posts in
Franco's 1957 cabinet
(see Political Interest Groups
, ch.
4).
Although Opus Dei did not explicitly support political
liberalization, it aspired to economic integration with
Europe,
which meant that Spain would be exposed to democratic
influences.
Measures proposed by these technocrats to curb
inflation, to
reduce government economic controls, and to bring Spanish
economic policies and procedures in line with European
standards
were incorporated in the Stabilization Plan of 1959. The
plan
laid the basis for Spain's remarkable economic
transformation in
the 1960s. During that decade, Spain's industrial
production and
standard of living increased dramatically.
Rapid economic development had political and social
consequences, however. Economic expansion resulted in a
larger
and better educated middle class than had ever existed in
Spain,
as well as in a new urban working class. Furthermore, the
unprecedented degree of foreign cultural influence had a
marked
impact on Spanish society
(see Social Values and Attitudes
, ch.
2). All of these factors contributed to an increasing
level of
dissatisfaction with the restrictions that Franco had
imposed.
These restrictions were seen as impediments to further
growth and
modernization.
The technocrats had hoped that greater economic
prosperity
would eliminate hostility toward Francoism, but tension
between
an increasingly dynamic Spanish society and the oppressive
regime
that governed it resulted in growing domestic opposition
throughout the 1960s. The expanding industrial labor force
became
increasingly militant. Workers organized clandestine
commissions,
and recurrent strikes and bombings were indications that
Franco
would not be able to maintain his repressive grip on the
labor
force indefinitely.
In addition, regional discontent was giving rise to
escalating violent protests in the Basque region and in
Catalonia. Agitation was also growing among university
students
who resented the strictures of Franco's regime. There was
even
opposition among the members of one of Franco's former
bastions
of support, the clergy. The younger liberal priests in the
Catholic Church in Spain had responded with enthusiasm to
the
Second Vatican Council, which emphasized individual
liberties and
progressive social policies. The priests were also
increasingly
vocal in their attacks on the oppressive aspects of
Francoism.
The unrest of the mid-1960s did not seriously threaten
Spain's stability, however, and Franco--after twenty-five
years
in power--felt the regime was sufficiently secure and
economically booming for a slight loosening of his
authoritarian
control. The Organic Law of the State, which had been
approved by
referendum in 1966, provided this modicum of
liberalization while
it solidified Franco's political system
(see Franco's Political System
, this ch.). The Law on Religious Freedom, approved
in June
1967, eased restrictions on non-Catholics. In the same
year, the
regime modified censorship laws, and a considerably wider
expression of opinion followed. In July 1969, Franco
provided his
regime with a greater degree of legitimacy and continuity
by
naming as his successor a legitimate heir to the throne,
Prince
Juan Carlos de Borbon.
The closing years of Franco's regime were marked by
increasing violence and unrest. The anticipation of the
dictator's demise and his increasing incapacity
destabilized the
country, and there was ongoing conflict between those who
sought
to liberalize the regime in order to secure its survival
and
those of the bunker mentality who resisted reforms. As a
recession in the late 1960s overtook rapid economic
expansion,
labor agitation heightened. An unprecedented wave of
strikes and
increasing rebellion in the universities moved Franco to
proclaim
a state of exception throughout Spain in the early months
of
1969. Freedom of expression and assembly were among the
constitutional rights that were suspended, and Spain
appeared to
be returning to the repressive conditions of the 1940s.
The
revival of dictatorial policies had international
repercussions
and threatened negotiations with the United States for
renewal of
an agreement on United States military bases. Franco
lifted the
state of exception in March 1969, but the government's
efforts to
achieve legitimacy had been seriously undermined. The
remaining
years of Franco's rule saw periods of intensified
opposition to
which the government responded with harshly repressive
measures
that merely served to broaden and to inflame the
resistance,
leaving the regime in a state of constant turmoil.
The most virulent opposition to the Franco regime in
the late
1960s and the early 1970s came from the revolutionary
Basque
nationalist group, Basque Fatherland and Freedom (Euskadi
Ta
Askatasuna--ETA; see
Threats to Internal Security
, ch. 5).
This
extremist group used terror tactics and assassinations to
gain
recognition of its demands for regional autonomy. The
ETA's most
daring act was the assassination in December 1973 of Luis
Carrero
Blanco, whom Franco had appointed as his first prime
minister.
Carrero Blanco had embodied hard-line Francoism, and he
was seen
as the one who would carry on the Caudillo's policies. His
assassination precipitated the regime's most serious
governmental
crisis and interrupted the continuity that Franco had
planned.
The tensions that had been mounting within the regime
since
the late 1960s would have made a continuation of Franco's
system
untenable even without Carrero Blanco's death. Conflicts
between
the reactionary elements of the regime and those who were
willing
to open the door to reform had plagued Carrero Blanco.
These
conflicts continued under his successor, Carlos Arias
Navarro. In
his first speech to the Cortes on February 12, 1974, the
new
prime minister promised liberalizing reforms, including
the right
to form political associations; however, diehard
Francoists on
the right, who equated any change with chaos, and radical
reformers on the left, who were not content with anything
less
than a total break with the past, condemned Arias Navarro.
Both camps were dissatisfied with the political
associations
bill that eventually became law in December 1974. The law
required that political participation be in accord with
the
principles of the National Movement and placed
associations under
its jurisdiction. The law offered no significant departure
from
Francoism. Would-be reformers saw it as a sham;
reactionaries
criticized it as the beginning of a limited political
party
system.
Opposition to the regime mounted on all sides in 1974
and
1975. Labor strikes, in which even actors participated,
spread
across the country. Universities were in a state of
turmoil, as
the popular clamor for democracy grew more strident.
Terrorist
activity reached such a level that the government placed
the
Basque region under martial law in April 1975. By the time
of
Franco's death on November 20, 1975, Spain was in a
chronic state
of crisis.
Franco's legacy had been an unprecedented era of peace
and
order, undergirded by his authoritarian grip on the
country.
While forced political stability enabled Spain to share in
the
remarkable period of economic development experienced by
Europe
in the 1960s, it suppressed, but did not eliminate,
longstanding
sources of conflict in Spanish society. The economic and
social
transformation that Spain experienced in the last decades
of
Francoist rule complicated these tensions, which were
exacerbated
as the regime drew to a close. At the time of Franco's
death,
change appeared inevitable. The form that the change would
take
and the extent to which it could be controlled were less
certain.
Data as of December 1988
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