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Vietnam The Military's Place in Society
PAVN exerts a great deal of complicated direct and indirect
influence both on party and government policy-making and on
everyday non- military life. It is so well integrated into the
social system that there is no precise point at which it can be
said that the military ends and the civilian world begins.
By official definition, Vietnam is an egalitarian,
proletarian-based classless society. This means that PAVN is not
an army of the people--although it must serve all of the people--
but that it is an army of the proletariat. Society is supposed to
support PAVN as well as police it to assure that the armed forces
meet the requirements of the new social order. Conversely, PAVN
is charged with assuming, in alliance with the party, the
leadership of the proletariat and of society in general. PAVN is
expected to be all things to the people and special things to the
party. It must both lead the people and serve them. It must be
loyal both to the political line and to the military line, even
when these conflict. It must act as the vanguard of the party yet
be scrupulously subservient to it.
Despite the praetorian qualities of Vietnamese society--the
result of centuries of martial cultural influence--PAVN, like its
predecessors, is not militaristic in the sense the term is
understood in the West. Nor is there in Vietnam what might be
called a military-industrial complex, that is, a coalition of
military and political vested interests that are distinctly
separate from the rest of the social system. Rather, the
relationship of the military and the rest of the society is
symbiotic, marked by a strong sense of material and psychological
dependence. Society's responsibility to PAVN, which is rooted in
the Constitution, requires that all of the people support the
armed forces in all ways. PAVN's duties to society, in turn,
incorporate political and economic responsibilities as well as
defense of the country. Complicating this relationship is the
party, which is neither civilian nor military but has some of the
characteristics of both.
The chief obligation of the average citizen to PAVN is
military service, which is universal and compulsory. This duty
long predates the advent of communism to Vietnam. Conscription in
traditional Vietnam was carried out in a manner similar to the
requisitioning of corvee labor. Village councils were required to
supply conscripts according to population ratio (one linh
or soldier for every three to seven villagers, depending on the
section of the country). The 1980 Constitution stipulates that
"citizens are obliged to do military service" and "take part in
the building of the national defense force." Article 52 mandates
compulsory military service as part of the state's efforts to
"stimulate the people's patriotism and revolutionary heroism." In
December 1981, the National Assembly promulgated a new Military
Obligation Law stating that "military obligation is mandated by
law and is a glorious task for a citizen. . . . All male citizens
from all rural areas, city districts, organs, state enterprises,
and vocational schools from elementary to college level,
regardless of the positions they hold, if they meet the induction
criteria of the annual state draft plan, must serve in the armed
forces for a limited time in accordance with the draft law."
Under the law there are no exemptions to military service,
although there can be deferments. This practice has led to
charges that extensive corruption allows the sons of influential
party and state officials one deferment after another.
The draft is administered by PAVN itself and is conducted
chiefly by a corps of retired officers stationed in district
offices throughout the country. The process begins with
registration, which is voluntary for all males at age sixteen and
compulsory at seventeen. A woman may register if she is a member
of the Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth League. The draft age is from
eighteen to twenty-seven. The enlistment period is three years
for ordinary enlistees, four years for technical specialists and
navy personnel, and two years for certain ethnic
minorities. Youths who do not enlist and await the draft receive
a military service classification, of which there are six. Draft
calls are issued twice a year.
Since the beginning of the war in Cambodia, the draft call
has been accompanied by enlistment campaigns to persuade youths
to volunteer rather than wait for conscription. Recruitment
drives have been conducted by PAVN veterans of the Cambodian war
who have met with prospective soldiers in school yards, where
they have presented lectures or shown films. A quota was set for
each province, by village and urban ward, but often was not met.
To make military service more equitable and attractive, a system
of options was established, which included the "three selects
program" and the "six opens program." The three who could
"select," or have a voice in the draft process, were the family,
the local mass organization (Vietnam Fatherland Front), and the
production unit, such as a commune or factory. The "six opens
program" involved the unrestricted posting of six elements of
military conscription information in which there was a high level
of public interest. This information included highlights of draft
procedures, lists of draftees and deferments, and names of party
officials, their children and their draft status. The purpose was
to allow everyone to know who was and was not being drafted and
why. A system of perquisites also was established as an
inducement for families whose sons joined PAVN. The families were
offered assistance in resolving their legal or class-status
problems, in getting work papers or added food rations, and in
obtaining permission to return from
new economic zones (see Glossary).
The General Mobilization Order of March 5, 1979, in the wake
of the Chinese invasion, suspended the voluntary enlistment
periods. In 1987 the period of PAVN service was indefinite. The
mobilization order also eased some restrictions on drafting
southerners, such as the requirement that each draftee have a
"clear history," meaning a proletarian background with no strong
ties to the previous government or to its army, the Army of the
Republic of Vietnam
(
ARVN--see Glossary). After 1979 certain ARVN
enlisted men and noncommissioned officers, chiefly technicians
and military specialists (but not ex-ARVN officers) were drafted.
Increasingly, draftees sent to Cambodia were from the South. The
mobilization order also cracked down on draft resistance, which
appeared to be widespread and even socially acceptable,
especially in the South. A common method of draft avoidance was
use of counterfeit military discharge papers, the fabrication of
which was an extensive and lucrative enterprise; in 1981 two of
five persons convicted of producing counterfeit discharges were
sentenced to death in Haiphong. A common form of draft evasion
was termed irregular compliance, i.e., the failure of a young man
to register in the hope that the cumbersome bureaucracy would
fail to catch up with him. In 1985 it was estimated that 20
percent of male youths in the South, and perhaps as many as 5
percent in the North, had not registered. Communes or factories,
which did not want to lose the services of draftable individuals,
may have tried to protect them from the local draft board.
Because a quota system was employed, a common avoidance tactic
was to supply a substitute known to be in bad health, who would
then fail his physical examination. The People's Security Service
(PSS) continually rounded up draft dodgers and deserters. Special
teams called bandit hunters raided coffee shops, noodle stands,
and other likely hangouts. Draft evaders faced a mandatory five-
year jail sentence; deserters were returned to their military
units for punishment. Measures were also taken against the
families of inductees who failed to report. For instance, a
draftee's family could be jailed, and the family's home or other
property could be impounded until he reported for duty.
PAVN's chief function is to defend the homeland. Its second,
equally important, function is to ensure the perpetuation of the
existing sociopolitical system. It also has economic
responsibilities and acts as a role model for the general
population. PAVN's behavior is expected to instill the basic
tenets of a Leninist system among the populace. It is expected to
engage in class struggle and to eliminate antiproletarian
sentiment in its ranks and in society in general. Individual
soldiers are expected to set an example of proper socialist
behavior by being dedicated, hard-working, incorruptible, and
highly skilled in the performance of their duty. Above all, PAVN
is expected to be a model of loyalty to the party and to Vietnam.
PAVN also is expected to bear a material responsibility in
the economic sector. It is commonplace in Marxist-Leninist
systems for the armed forces to contribute in some way to the
economy. In Vietnam during the First Indochina War, PAVN units,
mostly guerrilla bands, were forced to fend for themselves by
living off the countryside and on the charity of friendly
villagers. During the Second Indochina War, PAVN had a weak
quartermaster system in the South and adopted what was called the
"three-nine system," under which a PAVN unit was supplied with
food for nine months of the year but supported itself for the
remaining three, usually by gardening or bartering (lumber traded
for food, for example). Implicit in this system was the notion
that it was proper for a soldier to engage in nonmilitary
economic production activities, an idea that was increasingly
challenged with the growth of professionalism in PAVN's ranks.
After the Second Indochina War, PAVN was instructed to assume a
greater economic role. The Fourth National Party Congress
(December 1976) called on the military to "dedicate itself to the
single strategic mission of carrying out the socialist revolution
and building socialism." PAVN not only accepted this challenge
but proceeded to stake out a central claim in the economic life
of the country. PAVN's soldiers, said General Giap, would fight
the "bloodless war" of economic development as the "shock troops"
of the economic sector. Military units began operating state
farms, mining coal, building roads and bridges, repairing
vehicles, engaging in commercial fishing, and participating in
countless other economic ventures. Although the invasion of
Cambodia in 1978 followed by China's invasion of Vietnam in 1979
necessitated heavy reinforcement of the China border region and
the allocation of resources for combat, an enlargement of the
PAVN in 1983 made it possible for the troops to resume most of
their economic activities.
It was clear from the discussion of economic duties in
Vietnam's military journals that not all PAVN generals were
enthusiastic about the idea. The chief criticism was that it
detracted from what was seen as the central PAVN mission--defense
of Vietnam--which was regarded as a full-time task. Some military
critics complained that economic duty "dissipate[d] the thoughts"
of the soldiers, undermined military discipline, and was a cause
of corruption. Troops themselves also complained of the arduous
work involved, such as digging miles of irrigation ditches, the
most hated assignment of all.
The armed forces, nevertheless, engaged in the production of
weapons and military hardware, undertakings identified in the
press as "national defense enterprises" and defined by PAVN as
"production establishments of the armed forces." These included
vehicle assembly plants, ordnance plants, and explosives
factories. As in other societies with large standing armies, the
question in Vietnam was whether it made sense economically for a
military unit to engage in production: whether, for instance, it
could grow rice more productively or build a bridge more
efficiently than a civilian counterpart. Vietnamese officials
appear to have decided in favor of military participation, for
they incorporated PAVN production potential into long-range
economic planning
(see Economic Roles of the Party and the Government
, ch. 3). Contingency plans existed that called for
PAVN units to sign production contracts with central-level
ministries or provincial-level agencies, just as agricultural
collectives or construction enterprises were required to do.
Tapping the skilled manpower pool represented by PAVN may very
well be the key to significant long-range economic development in
Vietnam.
Data as of December 1987
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