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Vietnam Leadership
PAVN's officer corps and its underlying concept of command
have changed significantly since the first officer corps was
formed in the 1930s. The initial leaders were a few dozen
individuals chosen primarily for their ability to mobilize
villagers and motivate troops, rather than for their tactical
knowledge. As the corps developed, its lack of trained and
experienced battlefield commanders was made the best of, and a
premium was placed on collective military decision making (the
dual command system) and on a military strategy that did not
require a large number of military tacticians. Hierarchy among
officers was played down, and the concept of "officer" was not
applied. Leaders were cadres, and were required to guide the
revolution, but it was not necessary that leaders be
distinguished from one another, only from those they led
(combatants). Cadres were either military, nonmilitary, or a mix
of the two--it did not matter which; only cadre status was
important. Gradually, military cadres evolved into PAVN officers,
a trend that was intensified following the Second Indochina War
when PAVN moved to develop a military structure to conform with
other armed forces around the world. The influence of Soviet
advisers and the growing importance of military technology
accelerated the trend. Military professionalism, as a result,
became one of the chief characteristics of the PAVN officer and
soon distinguished him from military cadre, such as the political
officer.
Although the exact size of the PAVN officer corps was not
known in 1987, various estimates suggested it comprised about
180,000 officers, or roughly 15 percent of a force of
approximately 1.2 million. In 1955 the officer corps reportedly
had accounted for only 9.5 percent of a force of about 210,000.
The general officer corps in 1987 included the ranks of
senior general, colonel general, lieutenant general, major
general, and, in some cases, senior colonel, depending on the
command held. The number of general officers totaled at least
450. The central feature of their interaction with
one another was based on the Chinese political custom of bung
di or faction-bashing, which highlighted factional infighting
and reflected a broader power struggle within the party and
within the system as a whole. Senior generals, colonel generals,
and some lieutenant generals had their own constituencies, which
in part they controlled and which in part controlled them. There
were political alliances, some permanent and some temporary, as
well as relations based on familial ties, past associations,
common interests, and personalities.
The end of the Second Indochina War found the PAVN officer
corps seriously debilitated. Its ranks had been thinned by battle
casualties, and the remaining officers were for the most part
overaged and undereducated. An ambitious officer development
program was launched as part of the "Great Campaign"
(see History
, this ch.). The officer training system was overhauled,
modernized, and greatly expanded with the assistance of Soviet
military advisers. The curriculum in officer-training schools was
revised to introduce new leadership methods, modern managerial
techniques, and greater use of technology in administering the
armed forces. The age bulge was addressed by encouraging
retirements, and, for the first time, specific retirement ages
were established: for company-grade officers the age was set at
thirty-eight; for majors, forty-three; for lieutenant colonels,
forty-eight; for colonels, fifty-five; and for senior colonels
and general officers, sixty. Modern military administration and
management methods were introduced, especially in personnel
matters, and greater attention was directed toward such concerns
as officers' pay, benefits, career development, uniforms,
commendations, and intangible honors.
PAVN leaders were commonly believed to be men of implacable
determination, indifferent to reverses and failures, enormously
self-confident, and confident in their chosen strategy and their
cause. If there was a weakness in the ability of the individual
PAVN officer, it was compensated for by the collective decisionmaking process that put several minds to work on a single
problem. The net effect was a military leadership that could
mobilize the Vietnamese soldier and instill in him the necessary
discipline to fight repeatedly against overwhelming odds.
Data as of December 1987
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