|
Vietnam Administration
PAVN's systems for dealing with administrative, managerial,
logistic, and manpower problems remained rudimentary in 1987.
Vietnam's two major military operations, against Cambodia and
China, caused serious administrative difficulties to surface.
Many were traceable to the condition of the Vietnamese economy,
which in the late 1970s and 1980s had declined in virtually every
sector
(see Economic Setting
, ch. 3). As more than one observer
noted, Vietnam stayed in the bicycle age while the rest of Asia
moved into the computer age. PAVN's logistic requirements
suffered accordingly.
Vietnam's military budget remained a closely guarded secret
and was doubly difficult to estimate because it was largely
covered by Soviet military assistance that reportedly did not
need to be repaid. According to a generally accepted estimate,
about 50 percent of the state budget was devoted to national
defense. Soviet military assistance to Vietnam has varied greatly
from year to year depending on PAVN's precise needs. In the
mid-1980s, it was authoritatively estimated to be the equivalent
of at least US$350 million per year.
Vietnam's manpower resources are relatively extensive. In
1987 its population was about 62 million, with approximately 6.5
million males of military-service age and 650,000 reaching draft
age each year. Normally, 60 percent of those screened for
military duty were found to be physically and mentally fit for
full service. Other restrictions, such as those based on class,
race, religion, and place of origin (i.e., the South), reduced
the manpower pool somewhat. In 1986 PAVN was conscripting at the
rate of about 300,000 annually.
To reassert discipline within PAVN ranks, a system of
"military inspection and control" was instituted that served both
judicial and police functions within PAVN. Under this system, the
activities of officers and enlisted men were monitored to prevent
wrongdoing (such as corruption) and to ensure continued
discipline, obedience to orders, and adherence to PAVN
regulations and state laws. This system was backed by a new code
of military justice that regulated personal conduct. For enlisted
personnel the code specified, in ascending order of severity, the
following punishments for misconduct: censure, restriction to
camp on days off (denial of shore-leave in the case of naval
personnel), warning, disciplinary detention of from one to ten
days (not applied to female military personnel), assignment to a
lesser position, demotion, discharge, and dismissal from military
service.
Officers were not subjected to disciplinary detention as
noncommissioned officers and enlisted men were. The seven
punishments for officers (in ascending order of severity) were
censure, warning, assignment to a lesser position, dismissal from
position, reduction in rank, deprivation of officers' insignia,
and dismissal from military service.
The new regulations also established commendations and a
series of incentive awards. Approximately 100,000 PAVN officers
and enlisted men received medals and other commendations each
year. PAVN pay has always been notoriously low. Although pay was
increased in the 1978 overhaul of the armed forces, it remained
below comparable income levels elsewhere in the society and was
constantly undercut by high inflation. Pay was based on rank,
length of service, size of family, and honors and awards
received. Seniority pay (1 percent of base pay times years of
service), family allowances, a 30-percent hardship-service bonus
for those assigned to Cambodia, and a 10-percent cost-of-living
bonus for those assigned to the South were added to base pay.
A veteran PAVN soldier who was discharged, retired, or
demobilized became a "revolutionary retiree." In 1987 at least 50
percent and possibly 60 percent of all adult males in Vietnam had
served in the armed forces.
The veteran in Vietnam has become a figure of increasing
importance. Officially he has been viewed with a mixture of
appreciation and obligation, but privately leaders have worried
that the socioeconomic isolation of veterans could lead to the
formation of a vested interest bloc. In general, veterans have
been treated well by the society and have been provided with
social welfare benefits. Vietnamese women were assigned a major
place in the revolution by VCP cadres quite early. Several of the
early PAVN military cadres were women, including the legendary Ha
Thi Que, a military theorist who adapted Maoist guerrilla war
strategy to Vietnam. The principle that women represent a potent
source of support continued to be upheld in the 1980s. Military
service for women was voluntary and was open to those over
eighteen who were members of the VCP or party youth
organizations. Estimates of the number of women in PAVN ranged
from 5 to 15 percent of the 2.9-million-member force. Most held
technical or administrative assignments, although, in earlier
years, combat assignments in guerrilla units were common and
command assignments were not unknown. For instance, the
third-ranking general officer in the PLAF during the war in the
South was a woman. There were no confirmed reports of women in
PAVN engaged in combat duty in Cambodia, although it is possible
that some were there; and there was no general conscription
program for women, although they were encouraged to volunteer and
the VCP asserted that it was their duty to do so.
Data as of December 1987
|
