|
Zaire NATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
Through the mid-1980s, Mobutu had characterized Zaire
as
surrounded by a "red belt" of radical states supported by
the
Soviet Union and Libya. Except for Angola, however, these
countries
lack either the motivation or the militarily means to
threaten
Zaire seriously. In the early 1990s, Zaire's relations
with even
its most hostile neighbors had improved. As a consequence,
Zaire
does not face any serious external threats, although
border flareups , cross-border smuggling, refugees, and mutual support
of
insurgent groups have caused strains between Zaire and
many of its
neighbors
(see
fig. 1;
Regional
Relations, ch. 4).
Militarily, the
most serious strains occurred in Zaire's relations with
Uganda,
Tanzania, Zambia, and Angola.
Relations with Uganda at times have approached open
conflict.
Uganda's instability since the 1971 rise to power of Idi
Amin Dada
concerns Zaire, particularly because the border region
between the
two countries is remote and mountainous, and neither side
exercises
effective control over the area. A considerable amount of
smuggling
also occurs along the border, often resulting in violence.
In
response to this violence, Zaire announced in June 1988
that it
would set up a naval unit on the Zairian side of Lake
Edward to
reinforce security and to stop smuggling and piracy.
Despite the
intent to keep this force on the Zairian side of the
border,
observers feared that Uganda might regard the measure as
provocative.
Another contentious issue between the two countries is
their
perceived mutual support of insurgent groups. Zaire's
alleged ties
to Amin concerned successive Ugandan administrations. In
January
1989, the Zairian government rejected an attempt by the
former
Ugandan president to establish residence in Zaire. Amin
was
expelled from Zaire, bound for Saudi Arabia, although
Uganda had
earlier requested his extradition to Kampala. Zaire's
conflict with
Uganda also concerned the activity of the Zairian
insurgent group,
the Congolese Liberation Party (Parti de Libération
Congolaise--
PLC), which operated primarily out of bases in the
Ruwenzori
Mountains along the Zaire-Uganda border. The organization
began
insurgent attacks in 1985, and during the next three years
attacked
several small towns along the Zairian side of the border.
Although
the PLC was unable to take and hold any terrain, it
demonstrated
Zaire's inability to control the area effectively, and the
PLC's
rout of small FAZ detachments highlighted the military's
deficiencies.
Zaire's relations with Tanzania have been similarly
strained
because of Kinshasa's belief that Tanzania supported and
harbored
Zairian insurgents, specifically the PRP. This
organization caused
extreme embarrassment to the Zairian government in 1984
and again
in 1985 when it captured the Zairian town of Moba along
the shores
of Lake Tanganyika. Although in both instances Zairian
government
forces were able to recapture the town a few days later,
their
demonstrated lack of control in integral parts of Zairian
territory
and the poor performance of the Zairian troops who fled
before the
PRP were sore points for Kinshasa. Nevertheless, although
the
Zairian government accused Tanzania of active complicity
in these
attacks, observers believed it unlikely that Dar es Salaam
did more
than provide safe haven for the PRP.
Much of the distrust centered on the poor relations
between
Mobutu and Tanzania's former president, Julius Nyerere.
Mobutu
opposed Nyerere's socialist orientation, and Nyerere
considered
Mobutu a puppet of the United States. Nevertheless,
Mobutu's
relations with Nyerere's successor, Ali Hassan Mwinyi,
seemed much
better, particularly when the latter stated that he would
not
permit insurgents to use his country as a springboard for
attacks
against a neighboring country. Observers believe that this
remark,
along with Tanzanian support for President Mobutu's
efforts to
mediate national reconciliation in Angola, might presage
greater
cooperation between the two countries.
Relations with Zambia have also been tense because of
the
extensive smuggling activity along the border. Also, the
FLNC's use
of Zambian territory during its 1978 invasion of Zaire's
Shaba
Region proved an irritant to bilateral relations, as did a
centuryold border dispute over the area between Lake Tanganyika
and Lake
Mweru.
In the late 1980s, however, relations between the two
countries
improved. Although smuggling continued to be an irritant,
Zaire and
Zambia settled their border dispute on September 18, 1989.
In
addition, Zambian support for Mobutu's efforts to mediate
an end to
the Angolan civil war contributed to improved relations.
Angola has presented the gravest potential threat to
Zaire's
national security. This threat has its roots in the
support each
country gave to the other's insurgent groups. Zaire
supported the
Angolan insurgent group, the FNLA, against the
communist-backed
MPLA, and after the FNLA's demise, Kinshasa transferred
its support
to the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
(União
Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola--UNITA).
Angola, on
the other hand, supported the FLNC and its invasions of
Zaire's
Shaba Region in 1977 and 1978. Although relations improved
periodically during the late 1970s and early 1980s,
Zairian support
for UNITA, particularly the alleged use of Kamina's
military base
in Shaba Region as a transit point for supplies from the
United
States, kept relations somewhat tense.
Zaire's concern was based on the size and strength of
Angola's
armed forces. Angola had the largest military (more than
100,000
personnel) of all of Zaire's neighbors. Its services were
also the
best equipped, possessing large quantities of
sophisticated Soviet
weapons. Moreover, because of the experience gained in its
longrunning civil war against UNITA, the Angolan military's
capability
easily surpassed that of the FAZ. This imbalance, along
with the
long land border between the two countries, made Luanda
loom large
in Kinshasa's national security concerns.
Several factors, however, limited the Angolan
government's
ability to threaten Zaire. The ongoing UNITA insurgency
forced
Luanda to orient its military toward this internal threat.
Furthermore, past Western support for Kinshasa, especially
during
the Shaba crises, had not gone unnoticed in Luanda. There
were also
close military ties between Zaire and the United States.
Reportedly, the United States had supplied weapons through
Zaire to
UNITA in the late 1980s.
Relations between Angola and Zaire started to improve
somewhat
in late 1988 when negotiations began over repatriation of
refugees
to their respective countries. Although the repatriations
stalled
because of mutual suspicions, negotiations resumed, and on
September 27, 1989, the first refugees returned home.
Approximately
310,000 displaced Angolans remained in Zaire in early
1992.
Also during this period, President Mobutu arranged for
a summit
of African leaders to discuss Angolan national
reconciliation. The
summit, which took place in Gbadolite, Zaire, on June 22,
1989, led
to a temporary cease-fire in the Angolan civil war and
also called
for subsequent negotiations on national reconciliation.
Known as
the Gbadolite Declaration, this agreement both
necessitated and
resulted in improved negotiations between Kinshasa and
Luanda.
Although the Gbadolite Declaration agreement was
short-lived, the
1991 cease-fire agreement between Luanda and UNITA and
resultant
attempts to form a new broad-based Angolan government were
expected
to reduce potential conflict between Angola and Zaire.
As for relations with other African states, Zaire's
support for
Western initiatives and conservative regimes in Africa has
had
mixed consequences. Actions such as training Chadian
soldiers at
the Zairian Commando Training Center and sending troops to
Chad to
support United States and French policy in that country
helped
Zaire secure Western economic and military assistance, but
they
also earned Mobutu the enmity of many African leaders.
Particularly
important in this regard was Zaire's support for the UNITA
insurgency in Angola.
Data as of December 1993
|
