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Zaire Shaba II
In contrast to the first Shaba invasion, where the FLNC
had
launched an outright invasion of Zairian territory, Shaba
II
started with an infiltration of Zaire. Then during early
May 1978,
ten FLNC battalions entered Shaba through northern Zambia,
a
sparsely populated area inhabited by the same ethnic
groups (Lunda
and Ndembu) that made up the FLNC. A small element headed
toward
Mutshatsha, about 100 kilometers west of Kolwezi, to block
the path
of Zairian reinforcements that might attempt to move into
the area.
During the night of May 11-12, the remainder of the force
moved to
Kolwezi, where it linked up with the rebels who had
infiltrated the
town during the previous six months. Although the FAZ had
picked up
many intelligence indicators pointing to an invasion, the
town of
Kolwezi was lightly defended.
The FLNC struck at dawn on May 13 and took Kolwezi by
10:00
A.M.; FLNC forces also captured Mutshatsha. Unlike the
previous
year, the insurgents did not disperse their force. The
FLNC
invasion of 1978 differed from Shaba I in another
important
respect. In 1977 the insurgents had done little physical
damage.
Although their forces had occupied nearly a third of
Shaba, they
had stopped short of the strategically important Kolwezi,
not
interfering with mining operations or endangering
Europeans. In
1978 the rebels aimed directly at Kolwezi. By immediately
striking
this economically vital area, and by threatening
Europeans, the
FLNC provoked a much different international response than
in 1977.
This attack was a bold maneuver and might have succeeded
were it
not for the arrival within a week of 700 French and 1,700
Belgian
soldiers, supported logistically by the United States Air
Force.
The FAZ performed little better than it had done the
previous
year. Indeed, as Zaire specialist Thomas Callaghy notes,
Mobutu's
harsh suppression of an attempted military coup in
February 1978
(in which he dismissed, imprisoned, or executed 250
officers,
including many foreign-trained officers) "clearly had a
detrimental
effect on military performance during Shaba II, in which
Zairian
troops performed only marginally better than during Shaba
I." Units
of the Kamanyola Division collapsed immediately. Many took
refuge
in the European residential area, where most of the
expatriate
casualties were later suffered. Many Zairian troops
removed their
uniforms and took part in the general mayhem that
occurred. In
fact, most of the senior and mid-ranking officers had
vanished
prior to the attack, leaving junior officers and NCOs to
lead the
defense of the area. The small Kolwezi defense force
(about 300
strong) was quickly overrun. The airport also fell to the
insurgents in the initial onslaught, so Kolwezi was
effectively
under enemy control. In the attack on the airport, two
helicopters
and four Aermachi counterinsurgency jets belonging to the
Zairian
air force were destroyed on the ground and two other
Aermachis were
damaged. Thus, Zaire was unable to use even the relatively
limited
amount of modern combat equipment that would have given
the FAZ a
significant tactical advantage over the FLNC.
Shortly after taking Kolwezi, the invaders' discipline
broke
down, which led to widespread drunkenness, looting,
pillaging, and
murder. Although initial reports reaching the outside
concerning
the slaughter of Europeans turned out to be somewhat
exaggerated,
the white community was undoubtedly under assault, and
many local
Zairians were also murdered.
The FLNC was unable to retain control of Kolwezi's
airport,
however. On May 17, Zairian regular units reinforced by a
paratroop
company and supported by air strikes counterattacked,
forcing the
rebels to withdraw. The FLNC claimed that white soldiers
also
participated, but this claim is dubious. Although the
airborne unit
was trained and advised by the French, French policy
precluded the
deployment of advisers in combat, and Paris denied that
members of
the French advisory mission participated.
Determining the number of rebels involved in Shaba II
is
difficult. Some sources have offered a figure of 4,000,
although
they differ on the percentage of this force that
infiltrated prior
to the commencement of hostilities. However, probably no
more than
500 seasoned FLNC troops took part in the actual attack,
with the
balance consisting of infiltrators and other personnel
recruited
locally.
On May 19, a 700-member battalion of the French Foreign
Legion
parachuted into Kolwezi under orders to rescue the
hostages held by
the FLNC and to prepare to evacuate all whites from the
war zone.
The Belgians sent a paratroop regiment to Kamina (more
than 200
kilometers north of Kolwezi) and proceeded by road to
Kolwezi with
orders to use their weapons only if fired on first by the
rebels.
The Belgian commander reportedly had disarmed his men (by
taking
away their bullets) to avoid the possibility that they
would fire
on the Legionnaires, who were committing atrocities. This
action
led to strained relations between the Belgian forces and
the
Legionnaires, which continued in the early 1990s. The
United States
sent eighteen C-141 transports to fly logistics missions
for both
the French and Belgian forces.
FLNC resistance evaporated quickly as the Legionnaires
swept
through the city streets in a house-to-house search for
rebel
troops, and the French encountered little organized
resistance as
they cleared the town. Most of the opposition they met
came from
Zairian deserters, armed looters, and FLNC irregulars. The
bulk of
the rebel forces had already withdrawn, even evacuating
their
wounded, accompanied by a good portion of the local
population who
also fled the city.
By the end of May, the second Shaba invasion was over
except
for scattered attacks by roving bands of insurgents that
had
remained in the area after the departure of the main FLNC
force to
Zambia. The Belgian force started to withdraw, leaving a
battalion
in Kamina, and the French Foreign Legion departed by the
end of
May.
At the Franco-African Summit in late May, Morocco
(itself not
a participant) offered to send its soldiers to Zaire again
if it
received the cooperation of other African states. By May
31, a
Moroccan regiment had arrived in Kolwezi, followed a few
weeks
later by a Senegalese battalion, smaller units from Togo
and Gabon,
and a medical team from Côte d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast). These
soldiers
flew in on United States, French, and Belgian military
aircraft,
and France, the United States, and Saudi Arabia reportedly
jointly
financed this operation. This approach was a unique effort
at
peacekeeping outside the framework of an existing formal
alliance
or international organization. Most important, however,
was its
reliance on African forces to replace the departing
Europeans.
During the post-Shaba II period, Mobutu again sought
foreign
assistance to remold his military. Thomas Callaghy notes
that Zaire
went so far as to post European NCOs, known as
"godfathers," with
Zairian units to ensure that the troops were paid and fed.
In 1980
a French colonel, Maurice Mathiote, assumed command of the
Frenchtrained 31st Airborne Brigade. French officers essentially
commanded the brigade down to the company level in
peacetime,
although they would not deploy with their units to combat.
The
Belgians trained the 21st Infantry Brigade in Shaba and
remained as
advisers to this unit. The Chinese were invited to train
and equip
the 41st Commando Brigade in Kisangani, and, after
resuming
diplomatic relations with Israel in 1982, Zaire requested
and
received Israeli military assistance focusing on training
the
Special Presidential Brigade, which expanded to a division
in 1986-
-the Special Presidential Division (Division Spéciale
Présidentielle--DSP). Despite this concerted international
effort,
the FAZ remained largely ineffective except for the
airborne
brigade and the presidential unit. Zairian regular units
demonstrated their continued inability to counter
effectively the
sporadic insurgent activities in eastern Zaire that
continued in
the 1980s
(see Public Order
and Internal Security
, this
ch.).
Data as of December 1993
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