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Zaire Army
The 25,000-member army consists of one infantry
division (with
three infantry brigades); one airborne brigade (with three
parachute battalions and one support battalion); one
special forces
(commando/counterinsurgency) brigade; one presidential
guard
division; one independent armored brigade; and two
independent
infantry brigades (each with three infantry battalions,
one support
battalion). These units are deployed throughout the
country, with
the main concentrations in Shaba Region (approximately
half the
force). The Kamanyola Division, consisting of the 11th
Infantry
Brigade, the 12th Infantry Brigade, and the 14th Infantry
Brigade,
operates generally in western Shaba Region; the 21st
Infantry
Brigade is located in Lubumbashi; the 13th Infantry
Brigade is
deployed throughout eastern Shaba; and at least one
battalion of
the 31st Airborne Brigade stays at Kamina. The other main
concentration of forces is in and around Kinshasa: the
31st
Airborne Brigade is deployed at Ndjili Airport on the
outskirts of
the capital; the DSP resides adjacent to the presidential
compound;
and the 1st Armored Brigade is deployed to Mbanza-Ngungu
(approximately 120 kilometers southwest of Kinshasa).
The army is equipped with a wide variety of military
equipment,
most of which came from the United States, France, and
China (see
table 16, Appendix). In 1993 the FAZ's main military
requirements
included new military vehicles, jeeps, and communications
equipment, as well as foreign assistance in repairing and
maintaining equipment already in the inventory.
The maintenance status of equipment in the inventory
has
traditionally varied, depending on a unit's priority and
the
presence or absence of foreign advisers and technicians. A
considerable portion of military equipment is not
operational,
primarily as a result of shortages of spare parts, poor
maintenance, and theft. For example, the tanks of the 1st
Armored
Brigade often have a nonoperational rate approaching 70 to
80
percent. After a visit by a Chinese technical team in
1985, most of
the tanks operated, but such an improved status generally
has not
lasted long beyond the departure of the visiting team.
Several
factors complicate maintenance in Zairian units.
Maintenance
personnel often lack the training necessary to maintain
modern
military equipment. Moreover, the wide variety of military
equipment and the staggering array of spare parts
necessary to
maintain it not only clog the logistic network but also
are
expensive.
The most important factor that negatively affects
maintenance
is the low and irregular pay that soldiers receive,
resulting in
the theft and sale of spare parts and even basic equipment
to
supplement their meager salaries. When not stealing spare
parts and
equipment, maintenance personnel often spend the better
part of
their duty day looking for other ways to profit. American
maintenance teams working in Zaire found that providing a
free
lunch to the work force was a good, sometimes the only,
technique
to motivate personnel to work at least half of the duty
day.
The army's logistics corps is to provide logistic
support and
conduct direct, indirect, and depot-level maintenance for
the FAZ.
But because of Zaire's lack of emphasis on maintenance and
logistics, a lack of funding, and inadequate training, the
corps is
understaffed, underequipped, and generally unable to
accomplish its
mission. It is organized into three battalions assigned to
Mbandaka, Kisangani, and Kamina, but only the battalion at
Kamina
is adequately staffed; the others are little more than
skeleton
organizations.
The army's military capability is uneven, with some
units more
capable than others. For the most part, however, the
Zairian army
is not a combat-effective organization. The typical army
brigade,
such as the 21st Infantry Brigade in Lubumbashi, has
virtually no
offensive capability and only very limited defensive
capability.
The problems are manifold: ineffective leadership detracts
from
tactical and technical proficiency as well as morale; poor
maintenance results in insufficient resources for mission
accomplishment; and lack of funds limits the army's
ability to
purchase sufficient amounts of equipment or to pay
soldiers a
living wage. These conditions have long existed in almost
all
regular Zairian units and combine to keep capability at
minimum
levels.
The DSP, numbering between 7,000 and 10,000, is an
exception to
this rule. Members of the elite DSP have consistently
received
higher wages, been paid regularly, been well fed, and had
better
housing than soldiers in other units. These factors, and
(in the
past) the presence of Israeli advisers, have not only
encouraged a
better leadership environment but also produced more
motivated
soldiers.
There were, however, reports that even the DSP went for
weeks
without pay in late 1993. Only a subunit, Mobutu's
personal guards
known as Les Hiboux (The Owls), were paid regularly.
The situation in the 31st Airborne Brigade was at one
time
similar. Although paid the same basic salary as soldiers
in other
units, airborne personnel were once paid regularly. French
advisers
ensured that the soldiers of the 31st Airborne Brigade
were well
fed, trained, and clothed. Also, French command of the
unit's
logistics battalion meant that supply and equipment
maintenance
were effective. As a result, the unit was capable of
conducting
effective combat operations. The 31st Airborne Brigade
demonstrated
its effectiveness during Shaba II and the first occupation
of Moba
in 1984. That situation no longer prevailed by September
1991,
however, when unpaid personnel from the 31st Airborne
Brigade
spearheaded mass looting and pillaging in Kinshasa.
In the chaotic political climate prevailing in the
early 1990s,
the loyalty and effectiveness of individual military units
are open
to question. Clearly, the looting and rioting by military
personnel
in September 1991 and in early 1993 were indicative of a
serious
problem. By contrast, the DSP apparently has continued to
prosper
relative to other military units. According to press
reports,
Mobutu ensured the loyalty of this key unit by continuing
to pay
its members, despite the scarcity of funds and the failure
of the
regime to provide regular pay to civil servants and other
military
personnel. The DSP has continued to support the Mobutu
regime
internally, both protecting Mobutu and serving as his
primary
instrument of control. The DSP's violent attack on
students in
Lubumbashi in May 1990 is the most vivid manifestation of
its
support of Mobutu, but far from the only one. The DSP also
was used
to suppress both the September 1991 and the even more
destructive
February 1993 incidences of military looting--although in
1993 the
DSP is widely reported to have engaged in considerable
vandalism
itself before quelling the unrest. Its suppression of the
violence
reportedly included summarily executing hundreds of
military
looters. In addition, the DSP is reputed to have ransacked
the
offices and blown up the presses of Elima, the
leading
opposition newspaper, in October 1991; to have put down a
"coup
attempt" after some military personnel took over the
state-run
television station in February 1992; to have interrupted
numerous
public demonstrations, shooting unarmed demonstrators
randomly; and
to have been deployed to Nord-Kivu in mid-1993 to stop
ethnic
violence widely believed to have been instigated by
government and
security officials in the first place. In all of its
dealings with
the populace, the DSP has been accused of using undue
violence and
torture. Its fearsomeness was demonstrated graphically in
February
1993 when its members went on a punitive rampage after
civilians
killed one of its members.
Some DSP personnel reportedly were also deployed to
Angola in
the early 1990s and to Rwanda in October 1990 to support
the
beleaguered Rwandan government. The DSP undoubtedly is the
only
Zairian military force loyal and capable enough to be
deployed
abroad.
Data as of December 1993
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