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Zaire The Congolese National Army
The mutiny quickly spread throughout the country; soon
the
Force Publique was in full-scale revolt. Prime Minister
Patrice
Lumumba promised a one-grade promotion for all army
personnel, but
this action failed to mollify the mutineers. As reports
circulated
concerning ugly incidents perpetrated by mutinous black
soldiers
against European residents, panic gripped the white
population, and
several thousand fled the country. Brussels put its
military on
alert and decided that it must act unilaterally. Early on
the
morning of July 10--the tenth day of independence--Belgian
troops
intervened in Élisabethville (now Lubumbashi), where they
quickly
brought the situation under control, but disorder spread
to other
parts of the country. Belgian paratroopers dropped into
several key
areas to restore order. Although temporarily effective,
the
greatest impact of this intervention was to convince the
newly
independent country that Belgium was trying to reassert
its
colonial control.
Within days Lumumba removed the more than 1,000
European
officers from the command structure, although a few
remained as
advisers, and replaced them with Congolese NCOs. These new
officers
were chosen mainly on the basis of seniority, but some
were
elected. Lumumba appointed two political followers with
prior
military experience to head the army. Victor Lundula was
promoted
to major general and named commander of the army to
replace General
Janssens, and Mobutu was promoted to colonel and made
chief of
staff. Lumumba also changed the name of the Force Publique
to the
Congolese National Army (Armée Nationale Congolaise--ANC).
But
within two weeks of independence, the newly named army had
degenerated, in many cases, into armed gangs of renegades
whose
loyalties were to local strongmen, ethnic groups, or
regions rather
than to the national government.
This process was aggravated further when eleven days
after
independence, Katanga, the country's richest province,
seceded.
Although Belgium declined to grant diplomatic recognition
to the
new state, it did supply military assistance and may have
seconded
officers and NCOs to Katanga's military force, the
Katangan
Gendarmerie (Gendarmerie Katangaise). In addition, other
Belgian
functionaries remained at their posts, and the European
sector in
general lent crucial support to the rebels. Soon after,
the
southeastern portion of the diamond-producing province of
Kasai,
corresponding to the southern portion of what is now the
KasaiOriental Region, also seceded. As a result, by August 1960
the new
state had lost the two areas that had produced over half
its
revenues and foreign exchange and faced the threat of
permanent
disintegration.
Because of the general breakdown of law and order and
to
prevent the complete overthrow of authority, President
Joseph
Kasavubu and Lumumba appealed for United States, United
Nations
(UN), and Soviet assistance in July 1960. An uneasy
international
accord arranged that the UN would provide assistance, and
within
three months the UN had established a force in the country
that
numbered 20,000 at its peak. Once the UN force was
present, the
Congo in effect had several armies competing for power:
the UN
force, two secessionist forces, and the ANC. Furthermore,
the
splintered loyalties of the ANC meant that there were a
variety of
other competing military organizations as well.
The armed forces became as much a threat to state
authority as
an instrument of it. The various units were, at best,
uncertain
weapons in the hands of various contenders for power. In
the
capital and the surrounding area, Mobutu, rather than the
central
government, commanded the loyalty of ANC personnel. The
ANC troops
in Kasai supported the secessionist movement led by Albert
Kalonji.
Lumumba, dismissed by the president in September, later
fled toward
the northeastern Congo, but was captured en route and
subsequently
killed by Katangans. The February 1961 announcement of his
death
sparked an uprising in the northeast Congo and
particularly in the
Stanleyville (now Kisangani) area where the ANC and
General Lundula
backed Antoine Gizenga, who claimed to represent the only
legitimate government of the republic
(see
fig. 5;
The Center No Longer Holds, ch. 1).
In Katanga, Moïse Tshombe had his own force
of
Belgian-advised gendarmes. Since these forces were
concerned
primarily with maintaining the positions of their patrons,
the UN
provided the main element of security in the country.
Furthermore,
in this competition, the capacity to pay troops was
instrumental to
any semblance of control. Here Mobutu had a major
advantage,
primarily because he had access to the disorganized
national
treasury.
The central government defeated the Kasai secession--as
well as
the northeastern regime led by Gizenga, which sought
national
power--relatively quickly, but the larger insurgency in
Katanga
proved more difficult. It was not until January 1963 that
UN forces
were able to end the Katanga secession. Peace was,
however, shortlived . A wave of rebellions broke out again in various
parts of the
republic in late 1963. Soon after the departure of UN
forces in
June 1964, these rebellions controlled roughly one-third
of the
country
(see
fig. 6;
Rural
Insurgencies: The "Second Independence,"
ch. 1).
The most interesting of these rebellions was the Kwilu
uprising
in the area around Kikwit led by Pierre Mulele. Mulele is
credited
with organizing the first large-scale peasant insurrection
in an
independent African state, espousing a combination of
Marxism and
Maoism heavily imbued with magico-religious overtones. The
Kwilu
revolt continued until December 1965, and the threat of
Mulele to
the central government did not end until his execution in
October
1968.
To help deal with the insurgencies, former Katangan
secessionist leader Moïse Tshombe was brought back as
national
prime minister in mid-1964. Tshombe mobilized his Katangan
gendarmes, recalling them from exile in Angola, recruited
white
mercenaries, and obtained aid from Belgium and the United
States to
turn back the insurgents. Although the latter received
Chinese and
Soviet assistance and also, for several months in 1965,
help from
a Cuban contingent under Ernesto "Che" Guevara, government
forces
eventually gained the upper hand. Nevertheless, several
months
passed before the government could reestablish a tenuous
authority
in many affected areas.
The defeat of these rebellions took a great toll on
both the
government and the military. The army had performed poorly
and was
clearly unable to maintain order without external
reinforcement.
After defeating the insurgents, the army took out its
humiliation
on those it suspected of aiding them. These episodes
combined to
implant in the populace an indelible fear of disorder and
insecurity and a deeply ingrained suspicion and distrust
of the
military, which continued in the early 1990s.
During 1965 the political situation deteriorated.
General
Mobutu had become commander in chief of the ANC, and, as
the
individual controlling the largest number of loyal troops,
he
staged a bloodless coup d'état on November 24, 1965,
becoming
president of the country
(see Mobutu's
Second Coming
, ch.
1).
Data as of December 1993
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