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Zaire Shaba I
Mobutu's ill-considered involvement in Angola returned
to haunt
him in March 1977 when the Front for the National
Liberation of the
Congo (Front pour la Libération Nationale du Congo--FLNC)
invaded
Zaire's Shaba Region. Included in the invading force was a
small
remnant of the Katangan gendarmes. When Kasavubu recalled
Tshombe
from exile in 1964, elements of this force had been
incorporated
into the ANC to help fight the insurrections simmering
throughout
the country. After Tshombe disappeared from the political
scene,
the Katangan contingent mutinied in 1966 and again in
1967. When
these uprisings failed, most of the contingent left for
Angola
under Nathaniel Mbumba's leadership. During the late
1960s, the
former gendarmes began to congregate in Angola along
Zaire's
southern border, and during the late 1960s and early
1970s, they
fought for the Portuguese against Angolan nationalist
movements.
After the Portuguese departed in 1975, the MPLA enlisted
the rebel
Zairians in their cause and, with Cuban assistance,
continued to
arm and train them. It was the remnants of this force,
augmented by
other Zairian dissidents from Shaba and elsewhere, and
still led by
Mbumba, which invaded Shaba in 1977.
The invaders launched a three-pronged attack on March
8, 1977.
Within weeks the FLNC had captured several towns and
controlled the
railroad to a point thirty kilometers from the
copper-mining town
of Kolwezi. Shortly after the invasion began, the
dissidents made
it clear that they were not merely a reincarnation of the
earlier
Katangan secessionist movement but instead aimed to take
over the
entire country and depose Mobutu. After their initial
success, the
rebels stalled on their way to Kolwezi; nevertheless,
Mobutu's
position seemed dire. This rapid advance and the threat to
Kolwezi
forced Mobutu to appeal for international assistance.
Belgium, France, and the United States responded to
Mobutu's
request by immediately airlifting military supplies to
Zaire. Other
African states also supported Zaire during this crisis,
and Egypt
and Morocco joined Belgium, France, and the United States
by
providing assistance. Egypt provided fifty pilots and
technicians.
The pilots flew the French-built Mirage jets of the
Zairian air
force throughout the conflict. Morocco provided 1,500
combat
troops. French aircraft airlifted these soldiers to
Kolwezi on
April 9, and on April 14, a combined Zairian and Moroccan
force
counterattacked. This reinforcement immediately improved
the FAZ's
morale, and by the end of May the joint force had regained
control
of Shaba. In addition to the recapture of Shaba, the
Moroccan
presence had the added benefit of permitting Mobutu to
keep his
elite airborne units in Kinshasa, ready to respond to a
crisis
elsewhere in the country.
The invading force had expected a general uprising in
support
of its operation; however, because of the fragmentation of
Zairian
opposition groups, as well as the FLNC's distinctive
ethnic base
(Lunda and Ndembu), this uprising did not materialize. The
FLNC was
prevented from consolidating its gains and became
susceptible to
the Zairian-Moroccan counterattack. Nevertheless, during
what came
to be known as the Eighty-Day War, the FLNC suffered no
serious
defeats, its troop strength had not diminished
significantly, and
its capability to conduct insurgent operations remained
intact. The
FLNC withdrew to Angola, and possibly to Zambia, and began
to
regroup for another attack. Thus, although to a limited
extent the
crushing of Shaba I might be regarded as a model of
international
cooperation, the victorious forces failed to complete the
job.
Probably more significant, however, was Zaire's failure to
follow
up its military success with political and economic
reforms to
ensure long-term stability. Government reprisals after
Shaba I
drove 50,000 to 70,000 refugees to Angola. Also, Zaire's
continued
support for Angolan dissident groups ensured continued
Angolan
government support for the FLNC.
The poor performance of Zaire's military during Shaba I
gave
evidence of chronic weaknesses. One problem was that some
of the
Zairian soldiers in the area had not received pay for
extended
periods. Senior officers often kept the money intended for
the
soldiers, typifying a generally disreputable and inept
senior
leadership in the FAZ. As a result, many soldiers simply
deserted
rather than fight. Others stayed with their units but were
ineffective.
During the months following the Shaba invasion, Mobutu
sought
solutions to the military problems that had contributed to
the
army's dismal performance. He implemented sweeping reforms
of the
command structure, including wholesale firings of
high-ranking
officers. He merged the military general staff with his
own
presidential staff and appointed himself chief of staff
again, in
addition to the positions of minister of defense and
supreme
commander that he already held. He redeployed his forces
throughout
the country instead of keeping them close to Kinshasa, as
had
previously been the case. The Kamanyola Division, at the
time
considered the army's best unit and referred to as the
president's
own, was assigned permanently to Shaba. In addition to
these
changes, the army's strength was reduced by 25 percent,
presumably
to eliminate disloyal and ineffective elements. Also,
Zaire's
allies provided a large influx of military equipment, and
Belgian,
French, and American advisers assisted in rebuilding and
retraining
the force.
Data as of December 1993
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