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Colombia Civic Action, Counterinsurgency, and Internal Security
The military became extensively involved in civic
action and
counterinsurgency programs during the 1960s and 1970s.
During the
early 1960s, when government concerns were directed at
preventing
the establishment of a Cuban-style revolution, the
guerrillas
remaining from the years of la violencia were cast
as
subversives or bandits. This portrayal of the government's
opponents as foreign-directed or criminal elements was not
wholly
without substance and helped to legitimize the military's
continuing role in the maintenance of internal security.
It also
strengthened ties between the armed forces and the
civilian
population and, by extension, elevated the military's
prestige.
In an effort to enhance the success of the military's
internal
security mission, the civilian leadership reorganized the
military
command and authorized measures to improve technical
capacity and
training. The General Command of the Military Forces was
reorganized once again--this time as a planning agency
under the
Ministry of War--and was assigned to help rebuild the
nation
following the devastation wrought by la violencia.
The
General Staff, in turn, reported to the General Command
and
coordinated military, public, and private resources in
helping the
military maintain order and contribute to national
development. The
United States Military Assistance Program (MAP) also
facilitated
the development of the Colombian armed forces.
This strengthening of ties between the Colombian and
United
States militaries led to the adoption of new military
strategies
and tactics. Articles on unconventional warfare began to
appear in
the professional military journals. New emphasis was
placed on
assigning light, self-sufficient infantry units to combat
brigades
in regions with reported guerrilla activity. The navy and
air force
also became more involved in internal security and in
developing
capabilities to transport troops rapidly for combat in
remote
areas.
By 1964 as much as 70 percent of the country's military
personnel was reported to have been deployed in various
missions
related to internal security. The military's first
comprehensive
counterinsurgency operation--the Lazo Plan--successfully
employed
psychological operations in winning peasant support away
from the
insurgents. Army troops were deployed throughout the rural
areas in
an attempt to eliminate the small independent
guerrilla-led
republics that had been established during the years of
la
violencia. At the same time, to win the peasants'
confidence
and break the guerrillas' hold on their allegiance, army
personnel
participated in building roads, bridges, and public
housing as well
as in such projects as literacy instruction and health
care. After
1963 gradually increasing domestic budget
allocations--complemented
by United States financial aid, training, and
equipment--enabled
the Colombian armed forces to grow to approximately 60,000
troops
by 1969.
Strong leadership was the key to building a strong
professional
institution during the 1960s. General Alberto Ruiz Novoa,
who
served first as commander general of the military forces
and later
as minister of war, and then-Lieutenant Colonel Alvaro
Valencia
Tovar, who helped implement the army's new strategies
against the
guerrillas in Colombia's eastern plains, were instrumental
in the
military's development in the early 1960s. Both supported
the
controversial notion that the domestic insurgency could
not be
permanently eliminated without the implementation of
substantial
socioeconomic reforms in rural Colombia. In 1962 Ruiz
Novoa
directed the army to participate in the country's first
national
civic action plan.
Nevertheless, despite Ruiz Novoa's able leadership of
the
military, he became a target of attack by the country's
civilian
political leadership. Ruiz Novoa criticized the
government's
failure to address the pervasive socioeconomic problems--a
subject
outside the military's traditional domain--and his
reported
political ambitions led to his dismissal in January 1965.
Ruiz
Novoa's successor as minister of war, General Gabriel
Rebeiz
Pizarro, shifted the military away from the civic action
component
of the Lazo Plan. In its place, Rebeiz implemented the
National
Defense Law, which called for an intensified campaign to
eradicate
the pockets of guerrilla resistance.
The majority of the military's campaigns during the
latter half
of the 1960s were directed against the National Liberation
Army
(Ejército de Liberación Nacional--ELN), which was active
in the
eastern plains, and against the Revolutionary Armed Forces
of
Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de
Colombia--FARC), which
operated in the southern regions of the country. Despite
greater
official emphasis on armed action, some of the campaigns
targeting
these guerrilla groups continued to have a strong
civic-action
element. By the end of the decade, the military's role in
civic
action had become marginal; however, the combat experience
it had
gained from the antiguerrilla operations led it to be
counted as
one of Latin America's premier counterinsurgency forces.
The 1970s ushered in a different form of internal
security
threat as official concern focused on the growing disorder
in urban
areas. The military, often working in conjunction with the
National
Police, now assumed responsibility for breaking up illegal
strikes
and student demonstrations. On several occasions, members
of the
army or police were ordered onto university
campuses--including
that of the National University of Colombia in
Bogotá--either to
close the schools or to arrest student leaders. By
mid-decade,
assassinations, kidnappings, bombings, and other acts
associated
with urban terrorism began to pose a more serious threat
to
domestic order. Frequently, the newly formed urban groups
declared
that their actions were carried out in support of their
comrades in
arms in the countryside. In September 1975, the army's
inspector
general, who had been active in rural antiguerrilla
campaigns in
the 1960s, was assassinated. Prominent individuals
kidnapped in
1975 and 1976 included the consul of the Netherlands, a
United
States-born Sears executive, and a Colombian labor leader.
The
Dutch consul and the United States executive both were
released
upon payment of ransom, but the union official was
murdered.
Although the advent of urban terrorism did not lead to
a
cessation of the fighting in the country's rural areas,
the
military's continuing campaign did cause a decline in
rural
guerrilla activity that lasted through the end of the
1970s. The
decline was primarily attributed to the military's
increased
reliance upon force and firepower. The limited
availability of
foreign weaponry and training for the
guerrillas--particularly
after Cuba abandoned its policy of open and active support
for
revolutionary movements throughout the hemisphere--led to
a
decision on the part of some groups to retrench, or, as in
the case
of the Popular Liberation Army (Ejército Popular de
Liberación--
EPL), to shift their operations to urban areas. The Civil
Defense
groups, a locally based intelligence and support network
developed
by the armed forces after 1965, also helped maintain the
military's
presence in the countryside.
Data as of December 1988
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