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Iraq
The War of Attrition, 1984-87
Most foreign military analysts feel that neither Iraq nor Iran
has used its modern equipment efficiently. Frequently, sophisticated
materiel had been left unused, when a massive modern assault could
have won the battle for either side. Tanks and armored vehicles
were dug in and used as artillery pieces, instead of being maneuvered
to lead or to support an assault. William O. Staudenmaeir, a seasoned
military analyst, reported that "the land-computing sights on
the Iraqi tanks [were] seldom used. This lower[ed] the accuracy
of the T-62 tanks to World War II standards." In addition, both
sides frequently abandoned heavy equipment in the battle zone
because they lacked the skilled technical personnel needed to
carry out minor repairs.
Analysts also assert that the two states' armies have shown little
coordination and that some units in the field have been left to
fight largely on their own. In this protracted war of attrition,
soldiers and officers alike have failed to display initiative
or professional expertise in combat. Difficult decisions, which
should have had immediate attention, were referred by section
commanders to the capitals for action. Except for the predictable
bursts on important anniversaries, by the mid-1980s the war was
stalemated.
In early 1984, Iran had begun Operation Dawn V, which was meant
to split the Iraqi 3rd Army Corps and 4th Army Corps near Basra.
In early 1984, an estimated 500,000 Pasdaran and Basij forces,
using shallow boats or on foot, moved to within a few kilometers
of the strategic Basra-Baghdad waterway. Between February 29 and
March 1, in one of the largest battles of the war, the two armies
clashed and inflicted more than 25,000 fatalities on each other.
Without armored and air support of their own, the Iranians faced
Iraqi tanks, mortars, and helicopter gunships. Within a few weeks,
Tehran opened another front in the shallow lakes of the Hawizah
Marshes, just east of Al Qurnah, in Iraq, near the confluence
of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. Iraqi forces, using Soviet-
and French-made helicopter gunships, inflicted heavy casualties
on the five Iranian brigades (15,000 men) in this Battle of Majnun.
Lacking the equipment to open secure passages through Iraqi minefields,
and having too few tanks, the Iranian command again resorted to
the human-wave tactic. In March 1984, an East European journalist
claimed that he "saw tens of thousands of children, roped together
in groups of about twenty to prevent the faint-hearted from deserting,
make such an attack." The Iranians made little, if any, progress
despite these sacrifices. Perhaps as a result of this performance,
Tehran, for the first time, used a regular army unit, the 92nd
Armored Division, at the Battle of the Marshes a few weeks later.
Within a four-week period between February and March 1984, the
Iraqis reportedly killed 40,000 Iranians and lost 9,000 of their
own men, but even this was deemed an unacceptable ratio, and in
February the Iraqi command ordered the use of chemical weapons.
Despite repeated Iraqi denials, between May 1981 and March 1984,
Iran charged Iraq with forty uses of chemical weapons. The year
1984 closed with part of the Majnun Islands and a few pockets
of Iraqi territory in Iranian hands. Casualties notwithstanding,
Tehran had maintained its military posture, while Baghdad was
reevaluating its overall strategy.
The major development in 1985 was the increased targeting of
population centers and industrial facilities by both combatants.
In May Iraq began aircraft attacks, long-range artillery attacks,
and surface-to-surface missile attacks on Tehran and on other
major Iranian cities. Between August and November, Iraq raided
Khark Island forty-four times in a futile attempt to destroy its
installations. Iran responded with its own air raids and missile
attacks on Baghdad and other Iraqi towns. In addition, Tehran
systematized its periodic stop-and-search operations, which were
conducted to verify the cargo contents of ships in the Persian
Gulf and to seize war materiel destined for Iraq.
The only major ground offensive, involving an estimated 60,000
Iranian troops, occurred in March 1985, near Basra; once again,
the assault proved inconclusive except for heavy casualties. In
1986, however, Iraq suffered a major loss in the southern region.
On February 9, Iran launched a successful surprise amphibious
assault across the Shatt al Arab and captured the abandoned Iraqi
oil port of Al Faw. The occupation of Al Faw, a logistical feat,
involved 30,000 regular Iranian soldiers who rapidly entrenched
themselves. Saddam Husayn vowed to eliminate the bridgehead "at
all costs," and in April 1988 the Iraqis succeeded in regaining
the Al Faw peninsula.
Late, in March 1986, the UN secretary general, Javier Perez de
Cuellar, formally accused Iraq of using chemical weapons against
Iran. Citing the report of four chemical warfare experts whom
the UN had sent to Iran in February and March 1986, the secretary
general called on Baghdad to end its violation of the 1925 Geneva
Protocol on the use of chemical weapons. The UN report concluded
that "Iraqi forces have used chemical warfare against Iranian
forces"; the weapons used included both mustard gas and nerve
gas. The report further stated that "the use of chemical weapons
appear[ed] to be more extensive [in 1981] than in 1984." Iraq
attempted to deny using chemicals, but the evidence, in the form
of many badly burned casualties flown to European hospitals for
treatment, was overwhelming. According to a British representative
at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva in July 1986, "Iraqi
chemical warfare was responsible for about 10,000 casualties."
In March 1988, Iraq was again charged with a major use of chemical
warfare while retaking Halabjah, a Kurdish town in northeastern
Iraq, near the Iranian border.
Unable in 1986, however, to dislodge the Iranians from Al Faw,
the Iraqis went on the offensive; they captured the city of Mehran
in May, only to lose it in July 1986. The rest of 1986 witnessed
small hit-and-run attacks by both sides, while the Iranians massed
almost 500,000 troops for another promised "final offensive,"
which did not occur. But the Iraqis, perhaps for the first time
since the outbreak of hostilities, began a concerted air-strike
campaign in July. Heavy attacks on Khark Island forced Iran to
rely on makeshift installations farther south in the Gulf at Sirri
Island and Larak Island. Thereupon, Iraqi jets, refueling in midair
or using a Saudi military base, hit Sirri and Larak. The two belligerents
also attacked 111 neutral ships in the Gulf in 1986.
Meanwhile, to help defend itself, Iraq had built impressive fortifications
along the 1,200-kilometer war front. Iraq devoted particular attention
to the southern city of Basra, where concrete-roofed bunkers,
tank- and artillery-firing positions, minefields, and stretches
of barbed wire, all shielded by an artificially flooded lake 30
kilometers long and 1,800 meters wide, were constructed. Most
visitors to the area acknowledged Iraq's effective use of combat
engineering to erect these barriers.
On December 24, 1986, Iran began another assault on the Basra
region. This annual "final offensive" resulted in more than 40,000
dead by mid-January 1987. Although the Iranian push came close
to breaking Iraq's last line of defense east of Basra, Tehran
was unable to score the decisive breakthrough required to win
outright victory, or even to secure relative gains over Iraq.
Data as of May 1988
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