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Iraq
THE REGULAR ARMED FORCES
Size, Equipment, and Organization
During the late 1970s and the mid-1980s, the Iraqi armed forces
underwent many changes in size, structure, arms supplies, hierarchy,
deployment, and political character. Headquartered in Baghdad,
the army--of an estimated 1.7 million or more Iraqis, including
reserves (actual numbers not available) and paramilitary--in 1987
had seven corps, five armored divisions (each with one armored
brigade and one mechanized brigade), and three mechanized divisions
(each with one armored brigade and two or more mechanized brigades).
An expanded Presidential Guard Force was composed of three armored
brigades, one infantry brigade, and one commando brigade. There
were also thirty infantry divisions, composed of the People's
Army (Al Jaysh ash Shaabi--also cited as the Popular Army or People's
Militia) brigades and the reserve brigades, as well as six Special
Forces brigades.
This growth in the manpower and equipment inventories of the
Iraqi armed forces was facilitated by Iraq's capacity to pay for
a large standing army and was occasioned by Iraq's need to fight
a war with Iran, a determined and much larger neighbor. Whereas
in 1978 active-duty military personnel numbered less than 200,000,
and the military was equipped with some of the most sophisticated
weaponry of the Soviet military arsenal, by 1987 the quality of
offensive weapons had improved dramatically, and the number of
new under arms had increased almost fourfold (see table 10, Appendix).
Army equipment inventories increased significantly during the
mid-1980s. Whereas in 1977 the army possessed approximately 2,400
tanks, including several hundred T-62 models, in 1987 the International
Institute for Strategic Studies estimated that Iraq deployed about
4,500 tanks, including advanced versions of the T72 . Other army
equipment included about 4,000 armored vehicles, more than 3,000
towed and self-propelled artillery pieces, a number of FROG-7
and Scud-B surface-to-surface missiles with a range of up to 300
kilometers, and an array of approximately 4,000 (some self-propelled)
antiaircraft guns. The vast majority of the army's equipment inventory
was of Soviet manufacture, although French and Brazilian equipment
in particular continued to be acquired in Iraq's ongoing attempt
to diversify its sources of armaments (see table 11, Appendix).
This mammoth arsenal gave Iraq a clear-cut advantage over Iran
in 1987. Iraq had an advantage of more than four to one in tanks
(4,500 to 1,000); four to one in armored vehicles (4,000 to 1,000);
and two to one in artillery and antiaircraft pieces (7,330 to
3,000). Despite this quantitative and qualitative superiority,
the Iraqi army by the end of 1987 had not risked its strength
in a final and decisive battle to win the war.
Headquartered in Basra, the 5,000-man navy was the smallest branch
of the armed forces in early 1988, and, in contrast to the Iranian
navy, had played virtually no role in the war. Iraq's second naval
facility at Umm Qasr took on added importance after 1980, in particular
because the Shatt al Arab waterway, which leads into Basra, was
the scene of extensive fighting. It was at Umm Qasr that most
of the Iraqi navy's active vessels were based in early 1988. Between
1977 and 1987, Iraq purchased from the Soviet Union eight fast-attack
OSA-class patrol boats--each equipped with Styx surface-to-surface
missiles (SSMs). In late 1986, from Italy, Iraq obtained four
Lupo class frigates, and six Wadi Assad class corvettes equipped
with Otomat-2 SSMs. Although the four frigates and the six corvettes
was held in Italy under an embargo imposed by the Italian government,
these purchases signaled Iraq's intention to upgrade its naval
power. Observers speculated that the end of the war with Iran
could be followed by a rapid expansion of the Iraqi navy, which
could exercise its influence in northern Persian Gulf waters (see
table 12, Appendix).
In 1987 the Iraqi air force consisted of 40,000 men, of whom
about 10,000 were attached to its subordinate Air Defense Command.
The air force was headquartered in Baghdad, and major bases were
located at Basra, H-3 (site of a pump station on the oil pipeline
in western Iraq), Kirkuk, Mosul, Rashid, and Ash Shuaybah. Iraq's
more than 500 combat aircraft were formed into two bomber squadrons,
eleven fighter-ground attack squadrons, five interceptor squadrons,
and one counterinsurgency squadron of 10 to 30 aircraft each.
Support aircraft included two transport squadrons. As many as
ten helicopter squadrons were also operational, although these
formed the Army Air Corps. The Air Defense Command piloted the
MiG-25, MiG-21, and various Mirage interceptors and manned Iraq's
considerable inventory of surfaceto -air missiles (SAMs).
The equipment of the air force and the army's air corps, like
that of the other services, was primarily of Soviet manufacture.
After 1980, however, in an effort to diversify its sources of
advanced armaments, Iraq turned to France for Mirage fighters
and for attack helicopters. Between 1982 and 1987, Iraq received
or ordered a variety of equipment from France, including more
than 100 Mirage F-1s, about 100 Gazelle, Super-Frelon, and Alouette
helicopters, and a variety of air-to-surface and air-to-air missiles,
including Exocets. Other attack helicopters purchased included
the Soviet Hind equipped with AT-2 Swatter, and BO-105s equipped
with AS-11 antitank guided weapons. In addition, Iraq bought seventy
F-7 (Chinese version of the MiG-21) fighters, assembled in Egypt.
Thus Iraq's overall airpower was considerable (see table 13, Appendix).
Although Iraq expanded its arms inventory, its war efforts may
have been hindered by poor military judgment and by lack of resolve.
Saddam Husayn was the country's head of state and premier as well
as the chairman of both the RCC and the Baath Party; moreover,
in 1984 he assumed the rank of field marshal and appointed himself
commander in chief of the Iraqi armed forces. Iraqi propaganda
statements claimed that Saddam Husayn had "developed new military
ideas and theories of global importance," but few Western military
analysts gave credence to such claims. Since 1980 General Adnan
Khairallah, who served as both deputy commander in chief of the
armed forces and minister of defense, was the highest officer
in the military chain of command. In 1987 he also assumed the
position of deputy prime minister. His multiple roles reflected
the predominance of the army in the organizational structure of
the armed forces. Sattar Ahmad Jassin was appointed secretary
general of defense and adjutant of the armed forces in 1985. General
Abd al Jabar Shanshal assumed the position of chief of the armed
forces general staff in 1984. Frequent changes at the general
staff level indicated to foreign observers that Iraq's military
failures were primarily the result of poor leadership and an overly
rigid command structure. Defective leadership was evident in the
lack of clear orders and in the poor responses by the army in
the occupation of Susangerd. In October 1980, armored units twice
advanced and withdrew from the city, and later in the same operation,
the army abandoned strategic positions near Dezful. Rigid control
of junior officers and of noncommissioned officers (NCOs) frustrated
their initiative and may have been the reason for the high casualty
figures in the infantry, where initiative and spontaneity in decision
making can be of paramount importance. The command structure reportedly
was even more inflexible and slow in the People's Army detachments,
where political commanders routinely made military decisions.
Data as of May 1988
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