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Iraq
Government and Politics
THE POLITICAL SYSTEM in 1988 was in what was officially characterized
as a "transitional" phase. This description meant that the current
method of rule by decree, which had been in effect since 1968,
would continue until the goal of a socialist, democratic republic
with Islam as the state religion was attained. The end of the
transition period was to be marked by the formal enactment of
a permanent constitution. The timing and the specific circumstances
that would terminate the transitional stage had not been specified
as of early 1988.
The country remained under the regime of the Baath (Arab Socialist
Resurrection) Party, which had seized power through a coup d'etat
in July 1968. The legality of government institutions and actions
was based on the Provisional Constitution of July 16, 1970, which
embodied the basic principles of the Baath Party-- Arab unity,
freedom, and socialism. These principles were in turn rooted in
the pan-Arab aspirations of the party, aspirations sanctified
through identification with the historic right and destiny of
all Arabs to unite under the single leadership of "the Arab Nation."
The most powerful decision-making body in Iraq, the tenmember
Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), which functioned as the top
executive and legislative organ of the state, was for all practical
purposes an arm of the Baath Party. All members of the RCC were
also members of the party's Regional Command, or state apparatus.
President Saddam Husayn was both the chairman of the RCC and the
secretary general of the Baath's Regional Command. He was generally
recognized as the most powerful political figure in the country.
From its earliest days, the Baath Party was beset by personality
clashes and by factional infighting. These problems were a primary
cause of the failure of the first Baath attempt to govern Iraq
in 1963. After the Baath returned to power in 1968, intraparty
fissures were generally held in check, albeit not eliminated,
by President Ahmad Hasan al Bakr. When Saddam Husayn succeeded
to the presidency in 1979, he also commanded the loyalty of the
major elements of the Baath.
Saddam Husayn and other Baath leaders have always regarded the
ability to balance endemic intraparty tensions--such as those
between military and civilian elements and among personalities
across boundaries of specialization--as the key to success in
Baghdad. Above all, they perceived harmony in the militarycivilian
coalition as pivotal. Although the Baath had begun recruiting
within the Iraqi military as early as 1958, and within ten years
military members constituted the backbone of the party's power,
civilian Baath leaders maintained overall control of the party.
Iraqi politics under the Baath regime were generally geared toward
mobilizing support for the regime. Loyal opposition had no place,
and it was not recognized as legitimate. The party leaders believed
competitive politics ill-suited to Iraq, at least during the indefinite
transitional period. They condemned partisan political activity,
which they insisted had had damaging consequences on national
unity and integration. The Baath also invoked Iraq's unhappy legacy
of ethnic and regional cleavages as justification for harsh curbs
on political rights.
In 1988, twenty years after the Baath had come to power, it still
was not possible to assess popular attitudes toward Saddam Husayn,
toward the Baath Party, toward political institutions, or toward
political issues because there had been insufficient field research
in the country. Even though elections for a National Assembly
had been held in 1980 and again in 1984, these had been carefully
controlled by the government, and genuinely free elections had
not been held for more than thirty years. Politicians or groups
opposed to the principles of the 1968 Baath Revolution of July
17 to 30 were not permitted to operate openly. Those who aspired
to be politically active had few choices: they could join the
highly selective Baath Party, remain dormant, go underground or
into exile, or join the Baath-sponsored Progressive National Front
(PNF).
The PNF, which came into existence in 1974, was based on a national
action charter that called for collaboration between the Baath
and each of the other parties considered to be both progressive
and nationalist. The PNF served as the only riskfree , non-Baath
forum for political participation, although even this channel
was denied to those whose loyalties to the regime were suspect.
The Baath Party's objectives in establishing the front were to
provide the semblance of broad popular support for the government
as well as to provide the facade of alliance among the Baath and
other parties. The Baath, however, held a dominant position within
the front and therefore assumed sole responsibility for carrying
out the decisions of the front's executive commission, which was
composed of the Baath's most important members and sympathizers.
In early 1988, the war with Iran continued to preoccupy Saddam
Husayn and his associates. Approximately 75,000 Iraqis had been
killed in the war, and about 250,000 had been wounded; more than
50,000 Iraqis were being held as prisoners of war in Iran. Property
damage was estimated in the tens of billions of dollars; destruction
was especially severe in the southern part of the country (see
Introduction).
Data as of May 1988
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