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Iraq
THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR
Of the many conflicts in progress around the world in early 1988,
the Iran-Iraq War was by far the bloodiest and the costliest.
The Iran-Iraq War was multifaceted and included religious schisms,
border disputes, and political differences. Conflicts contributing
to the outbreak of hostilities ranged from centuries-old Sunni-versus-Shia
(for Sunni--see Glossary) and Arab-versus-Persian religious and
ethnic disputes, to a personal animosity between Saddam Husayn
and Ayatollah Khomeini. Above all, Iraq launched the war in an
effort to consolidate its rising power in the Arab world and to
replace Iran as the dominant Persian Gulf state. Phebe Marr, a
noted analyst of Iraqi affairs, stated that "the war was more
immediately the result of poor political judgement and miscalculation
on the part of Saddam Hussein," and "the decision to invade, taken
at a moment of Iranian weakness, was Saddam's" (see The Iran-Iraq
Conflict , ch. 1).
Iraq and Iran had engaged in border clashes for many years and
had revived the dormant Shatt al Arab waterway dispute in 1979.
Iraq claimed the 200-kilometer channel up to the Iranian shore
as its territory, while Iran insisted that the thalweg--a line
running down the middle of the waterway--negotiated last in 1975,
was the official border. The Iraqis, especially the Baath leadership,
regarded the 1975 treaty as merely a truce, not a definitive settlement.
The Iraqis also perceived revolutionary Iran's Islamic agenda
as threatening to their pan-Arabism. Khomeini, bitter over his
expulsion from Iraq in 1977 after fifteen years in An Najaf, vowed
to avenge Shia victims of Baathist repression. Baghdad became
more confident, however, as it watched the once invincible Imperial
Iranian Army disintegrate, as most of its highest ranking officers
were executed. In Khuzestan (Arabistan to the Iraqis), Iraqi intelligence
officers incited riots over labor disputes, and in the Kurdish
region, a new rebellion caused the Khomeini government severe
troubles.
As the Baathists planned their military campaign, they had every
reason to be confident. Not only did the Iranians lack cohesive
leadership, but the Iranian armed forces, according to Iraqi intelligence
estimates, also lacked spare parts for their American-made equipment.
Baghdad, on the other hand, possessed fully equipped and trained
forces. Morale was running high. Against Iran's armed forces,
including the Pasdaran (Revolutionary Guard) troops, led by religious
mullahs with little or no military experience, the Iraqis could
muster twelve complete mechanized divisions, equipped with the
latest Soviet materiel. In addition, the area across the Shatt
al Arab posed no major obstacles, particularly for an army equipped
with Soviet river-crossing equipment. Iraqi commanders correctly
assumed that crossing sites on the Khardeh and Karun rivers were
lightly defended against their mechanized armor divisions; moreover,
Iraqi intelligence sources reported that Iranian forces in Khuzestan,
which had formerly included two divisions distributed among Ahvaz,
Dezful, and Abadan, now consisted of only a number of ill-equipped
battalion-sized formations. Tehran was further disadvantaged because
the area was controlled by the Regional 1st Corps headquartered
at Bakhtaran (formerly Kermanshah), whereas operational control
was directed from the capital. In the year following the shah's
overthrow, only a handful of company-sized tank units had been
operative, and the rest of the armored equipment had been poorly
maintained.
For Iraqi planners, the only uncertainty was the fighting ability
of the Iranian air force, equipped with some of the most sophisticated
American-made aircraft. Despite the execution of key air force
commanders and pilots, the Iranian air force had displayed its
might during local riots and demonstrations. The air force was
also active in the wake of the failed United States attempt to
rescue American hostages in April 1980. This show of force had
impressed Iraqi decision makers to such an extent that they decided
to launch a massive preemptive air strike on Iranian air bases
in an effort similar to the one that Israel employed during the
June 1967 Arab-Israeli War.
Data as of May 1988
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