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Libya
National Security
BEFORE THE COUP that brought Colonel Muammar al Qadhafi to power
in 1969, Libyan national security clearly meant protection of
the reign of King Idris and of the national development goals
his regime had adopted. Insurance against potential external threats
was sought through various compacts with Western powers-- principally
the Libyan-United Kingdom Treaty of Friendship of 1953, which
granted the British continued use of their World War II Al Adem
(Al Adam) Air Base near Tobruk (Tubruq). A similar treaty in 1954
perpetuated use of Wheelus Air Base, near Tripoli, by the United
States Air Force. Meanwhile, the monarchy devoted its own resources
to the business of warding off domestic threats--largely arising
from its faction-ridden army.
After Idris was deposed, Qadhafi insisted on the early termination
of the treaties that gave Britain and the United States permission
to maintain forces on Libyan soil. The country's energies were
turned to the cause of pan-Arabism and to supporting fellow Arab
countries in their conflict with Israel. The armed forces were
doubled in size but, until 1973, the expansion was grounded on
a reasonable balance that took into account the country's available
resources and the fact that its neighbors were neither aggressive
nor naturally hostile. Qadhafi became frustrated over Egypt's
failure to consult with Libya in prosecuting the 1973 war against
Israel and the fading of his pan-Arabist ambitions in the failure
of the unions concluded with Egypt and Syria and later Tunisia.
New revenues derived from the escalating price of oil were now
available, and the Soviet Union was prepared to supply arms that
Western powers had vetoed. For Moscow, the appeal was, first,
the commercial one of a cash customer and, second, the potential
of Libya as a new client state in the Mediterranean area, following
the Soviet 1972 expulsion from Egypt.
Only gradually did the extent of Qadhafi's arms appetite become
apparent. To Libya's existing fleet of Mirage aircraft from France,
large numbers of Soviet fighters were added, including the up-to-
date MiG-25. Although Libya had only 7 percent of the population
of France, Libya's inventory of over 500 combat aircraft was roughly
equivalent to that of France. A force of 3,000 tanks was purchased,
although only one-third could be deployed with active units. Its
hitherto inconsequential navy was outfitted with submarines and
high-speed missile boats. Because voluntary enlistments were wholly
inadequate to man the new equipment, conscription was introduced
in 1978.
Because the inflated arsenal could not be justified by any perceived
threat to the nation's borders, there was initial speculation
that Libya was becoming a Soviet surrogate in Africa, stockpiling
modern weapons for future adventures on that continent. This notion,
however, was contradicted by Libya's evident determination to
employ its newly purchased arms as it saw fit. Its alignment with
Moscow, although based on parallel interests, was a limited one
that did not extend to Soviet bases on Libyan soil.
In the decade between 1973 and 1983, arms acquisitions amounted
to US$28 billion, of which US$20 billion worth had originated
with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. But the quantity and
sophistication of the new weaponry outstripped the ability of
the limited skilled personnel to employ it. In spite of a multitude
of foreign technical advisers and trainers, a shortage of qualified
personnel needed to operate and maintain the military hardware
persisted. Moreover, the wide range of models and countries of
manufacture has created logistics and maintenance problems.
The Libyan armed forces have not, in fact, thus far played a
significant role in Qadhafi's declared objective of the destruction
of Israel by united Arab might because Libya's direct involvement
in the Arab-Israeli wars has been negligible. Nonetheless, Qadhafi
often has been a divisive element in the Middle East.
Libya's acknowledged sponsorship of terrorism for the purpose
of "liquidating" exiled opponents of the regime and of punishing
moderate Arabs and others regarded as opposing the primary purpose
of defeating Israel has brought it into conflict with the West
and particularly the United States. Hostile encounters with United
States military, especially the American retaliatory bombing attack
of 1986, demonstrated serious weaknesses in Libya's threat perception
and defense posture. The incidents, however, caused many African
and Middle Eastern countries briefly to band together in public
support of Libya and in condemnation of the United States.
By early 1987, some observers believed that Qadhafi's hold on
the Libyan public had waned, owing to his radical and sometimes
bizarre policies in the name of the Libyan revolution. Yet opposition
groups, consisting mostly of Libyan exiles, have been ineffective.
The main threat to Qadhafi's continued rule came from the army
itself. Numerous plots and coup attempts have been uncovered,
most of which have not seriously threatened Qadhafi's authority.
Distrustful of the professional military, Qadhafi often shifted
senior officers from one post to another to prevent the officer
corps from closing ranks. In addition, he entrusted his personal
security to a handpicked detachment from his own region. A comprehensive
internal security system involving police, secret service, and
local revolutionary committees was alert to any indications of
disloyalty or conspiracies. Any form of dissent from the policies
of the government was deemed contrary to the revolution and subject
to severe punitive measures.
Data as of 1987
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