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Libya
The Air Force
Last of the military services to be established, the air force
has been obliged to struggle to develop trained air and ground
crews to match the rapid acquisition of modern planes and weaponry
(see table 12, Appendix). As a result, in spite of the significant
inventory of combat aircraft, amounting to more than 500 as of
early 1987, Libyan air units have been committed only reluctantly
and have not acquitted themselves impressively in air-to-air engagements.
However, the considerable air transport fleet, has apparently
been employed capably in Chad and elsewhere. Although the air
force has been extensively used in support of Libyan ground units
in the fighting in Chad, it does not seem to have played a decisive
role.
At the time of the overthrow of the monarchy in 1969, the roster
of personnel was only about 400 officers and enlisted men. A recruitment
drive undertaken in 1970 eventually brought a tenfold increase
in the force by 1978. As of 1986, its strength was estimated at
10,000.
The country's burgeoning inventory of air force weapons accounted
for a considerable share of Libya's procurement efforts. The hundreds
of aircraft acquired since 1969 included American helicopters
and transports (although deliveries of United States planes were
blocked in 1975), later-model French close-air-support fighters,
and up-to-date fighter interceptors from the Soviet Union. Of
the combat aircraft, the United States Department of State estimated
in 1983 that 50 percent remained in storage, including most of
the MiG fighters and Tu-22 bombers. According to another report,
the Mirage aircraft were so neglected that only half were in flying
condition, the others being cannibalized for spare parts. Pilots
from Syria and other countries reportedly helped fly the Libyan
planes, and instructors, technical personnel, and maintenance
teams included Soviets, Pakistanis, and Yugoslavs.
With Soviet assistance, the air force was organized into one
medium bomber squadron, three fighter interceptor squadrons, five
forward ground attack squadrons, one counterinsurgency squadron,
nine helicopter squadrons, and three air defense brigades deploying
SA-2, SA-3, and Crotale missiles. (The three SA-5 launch sites
were operated by army units.)
The air force's primary installation was the huge Uqba ben Nafi
Air Base (the former Wheelus Air Base) near Tripoli. It had excellent
operational features and contained the service's headquarters
and a large share of its major training facilities. Both MiG fighters
and Tu-22 bombers were located there. A large air base at a site
near Benghazi shared with the civil airport also had some MiG
squadrons. Most of the Mirages were located at Gamal Abdul Nasser
Air Base. Two airfields not far from the Egyptian border, at Al
Kufrah Oasis and at Jabal al Uwaynat in the far south, were among
the Libyan installations attacked by Egyptian air crews during
the 1977 border clash. The Soviets have constructed another base
in central Libya at the new army headquarters site of Al Jufrah
near Hun with a runway of over 4,000 meters.
An air force academy established at Az Zawiyah near Misratah
in 1975 was reportedly staffed mainly by Yugoslavs. Institutions
referred to as "secondary colleges," possibly technical training
schools, were opened at Sabha and at Uqba ben Nafi Air Base in
1978. Basic pilot training was conducted on Italian-manufactured
SF-260 planes before the students moved on to the Soko G-2AE Galebs
(Yugoslav) and the Aero L-39 Albatros (Czechoslovak) at Az Zawiyah.
Additional training took place outside Libya. Several hundred
Libyan students were reportedly undergoing instruction with the
Dassault firm in France in 1983 as part of the Mirage contract.
This was at a time of confrontation between French and Libyan
forces in Chad.
Information on training programs conducted by the Soviet Union
was scanty but in light of the sophisticated weapons in the air
force inventory, it could be assumed that much time and effort
were invested in producing even a limited number of combat-ready
crews, backed up by ground support personnel. Soviet specialists
reportedly accompanied the Libyans during the 1980 incursion into
Chad and possibly were directly involved in missions of the Tu-22
bombers.
The performance of the Libyan air force in emergency conditions
cannot have been reassuring to Qadhafi. Libyan pilots have reportedly
experienced difficulty in finding and identifying aircraft they
have been ordered to intercept. They have been reluctant to fly
at night for fear of being unable to locate their bases. To some
extent, these problems may reflect outdated navigation and radar
aids in their combat aircraft, which are mostly older, stripped-down
versions of Soviet designs. The two Su22 fighters were handicapped
in their engagement with carrier-based American F-14s in 1981
because the equipment, instruments, and airto -air missiles were
outmoded in comparison with those of their adversaries. In spite
of Qadhafi's express warning that his air force would repel the
United States fleet in the Gulf of Sidra in 1986, his planes did
not seriously challenge the American naval units. In addition,
Libyan planes did not take off to meet the American fighter-bombers
that attacked targets at Benghazi and Tripoli in April 1986; consequently
many planes were destroyed or damaged on the ground. In Chad it
was reported that many Libyan bombing raids were carried out at
excessively high altitudes when met with antiaircraft fire.
Data as of 1987
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