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Libya
Military Cooperation with the Soviet Union
Because of Libya's
forcing the evacuation from Libya of British and United States
military personnel in 1970, the Libyans were rebuffed in a renewed
effort to obtain military equipment from the West, except for
limited British help with the developing navy. Therefore, Libya
turned elsewhere for aid. In December 1974, Libya disclosed a
large-scale arms purchase agreement with the Soviet Union, involving
Tu-22 bombers, MiG-23 fighters, helicopters, T-62 tanks, and antitank
and antiaircraft missiles. A second agreement in May 1975 heralded
an even greater flow of Soviet arms and military advisers to Libya
throughout the 1970s. Included in the agreement were submarines,
of which a total of six were eventually transferred. Subsequent
agreements followed in 1977, 1978, and 1980. The value of these
transactions was estimated at over US$20 billion between 1973
and 1985.
The new round of arms purchases in 1978, precipitated by the
clashes with Egypt in the preceding year, included the MiG-25
Foxbat in its fighter, reconnaissance, and training configurations.
This sale to Libya was the first recorded time the Soviet Union
furnished the MiG-25 to any country not participating the Warsaw
Pact. Deliveries of sophisticated military hardware were accompanied
by Soviet and East European technicians estimated by the United
States Department of State to have numbered 2,600 in 1984. In
late 1985, these technicians were augmented by a considerable
number of specialists to install and help operate the new SA-5
missiles. Approximately 7,600 Libyan military personnel had received
training in the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe by 1984.
Deliveries of modern Soviet armaments continued during the early
1980s, although they tapered off markedly between 1983 (US$2.9
billion) and 1985 (US$1.3 billion), according to estimates compiled
by ACDA. Libya was the first non-Warsaw Pact recipient of Haze
antisubmarine helicopters. Natya-class minesweepers and Nanuchka-class
fast-missile corvettes helped expand the navy. The three batteries
of SA-5 missile launchers, including early warning and surveillance
radar, delivered toward the close of 1985 failed in their purpose
of deterring maneuvers by United States naval elements in the
Gulf of Sidra. Nonetheless, when Jallud visited Moscow several
months later, it was officially announced that the Soviets had
agreed to a new request for aid. Included were an improved version
of the SA-5, new monitoring and early warning radar, antijamming
devices, M-24 helicopters, and additional gunboats and fighter
planes. By early 1987, major arms shipments reportedly had been
cut off, either because of Qadhafi's failure to make promised
oil deliveries or because of Soviet disillusionment over Libyan
performance against United States planes and the abandonment of
vast amounts of modern equipment in Chad.
The massive Libyan purchases brought the Soviet Union economic
gains and enabled the Soviets to extend their strategic influence
farther into the Mediterranean while appearing to reward the antiimperialist
and Arab unity stance of the Libyan regime. Nevertheless, Qadhafi's
increasingly undependable behavior, his estrangement from other
Arab and African nations, and his setbacks in employing modern
Soviet weaponry apparently made the Soviets skeptical of Qadhafi
and reluctant to be closely identified with him. Although in 1984
the two countries issued a joint declaration in principle to enter
into a treaty of friendship and cooperation and confirmed their
intention in 1986, such an agreement, which would obligate the
Soviet Union to come to Qadhafi's aid if attacked, had not been
concluded by early 1987.
As of early 1987, Qadhafi had refrained from granting the Soviets
permanent shore facilities or air bases on Libyan territory; Soviet
combatant ships had paid frequent port calls, and antisubmarine
planes of the Soviet naval aviation branch had occasionally been
rotated to Libyan airfields.
Data as of 1987
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