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Libya
Conscription and the People's Militia
The concept of universal
military service is embodied in Statute 3 for 1984, approved by
the GPC in March 1984. This law declared that all Libyans coming
of age, whether male or female, were to receive regular military
training, as long as they were physically able. Military studies
were to be among the basic subjects of the educational curriculum
at all stages above the elementary level. Military studies and
training in regular military establishments of "specialized cadres
in warfare" were to be restricted for the present to males.
The statute provided for Libya to be divided into defense regions,
the responsibility for defending each region being that of its
inhabitants. Defense regions were to regard themselves as strategic
reserves for each other. The new law did not supersede the provisions
of the Compulsory Military Service Statute of 1978, which made
all males between the ages of seventeen and thirty-five subject
to a draft commitment of three years of active service in the
army or four years in the navy or air force. Students could defer
service until completion of their studies. The actual application
of conscription laws in 1987 was not entirely clear. In one case,
a young man called up for two years' service was required to serve
six years. In 1986, of 936,000 men in the 15 to 59 age category,
about 550,000 were fit for military service. About 39,000 Libyans
reach military age each year; many, however, lack the basic education
needed to absorb training in the use and servicing of modern weaponry.
The implementing regulations for the 1984 statute stipulated
that all secondary schools and equivalent institutions were to
be assigned to various military units (see Education , ch. 2).
Each student was to devote two days each month to training with
the nearest military element having a specialization approximating
that of the unit to which the student had been assigned. One month
each year was to be spent with the student's original military
unit.
Members of all government and business enterprises as well as
artisans, professionals, and farmers, were also to train for two
days a month and one month a year. At some factories, the military
commitment was more onerous. When the work day finished at 2:00
P. M., employees were obliged to spend three to four hours with
their military units five days each week. Such periods of intensive
training continued for six months or more at intervals of every
few years.
To a considerable extent, the new law merely reinforced a program
in existence for some years to mobilize the entire population
of physically fit students and working people into local militia
units centered on schools, communities, and workplaces. The number
of individuals organized into paramilitary units has been estimated
at 45,000 but may have increased with the application of the new
law. In 1987 the People's Militia was headed by Major Khuwayldi
al Hamidi, one of the original members of the RCC. The militia
units reportedly were generously equipped with arms, transport,
and uniforms. In November 1985, it was announced that the first
contingent of "armed people" trained as paratroopers had made
a demonstration drop.
In early 1986, Western reporters were shown military training
at a high school in Tripoli at which a minimum of two out of thirty-six
class hours a week were devoted to military studies. In addition,
one of three summer months was spent at a military camp. Graduates
either entered the army directly or went on to college. Those
entering college had to continue reserve training at their former
high schools. The weekly lessons included hand-grenade throwing,
signals and codes, and machine-gun maintenance. High schools concentrated
on designated specialties, which in the case of the institution
visited was the operation of the Soviet truckmounted Katyusha
rocket launcher.
The mission of the People's Militia was territorial defense,
and it was to function under the leadership of local military
commanders. Qadhafi contended that it was the People's Militia
that met the Egyptian incursions during the border clash of 1977,
although the Egyptians insisted that their successful raids had
been contested by regular army units. The militia forces are not
known to have faced any other test that would permit an appraisal
of their performance in home defense or as auxiliaries to the
regular army. There was some evidence that local commanders had
not responded energetically to their responsibility for training
and supervising militia units.
Data as of 1987
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