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Libya
Organization of the Armed Forces
The Army
In 1987 the army--by far the largest and most developed branch
of the military forces--was still organized tactically in battalion
formations. These included twenty tank battalions, thirty mechanized
infantry battalions, ten artillery battalions, and two special
forces groups comprising ten paratroop battalions. Air defense
was organized into two antiaircraft battalions and six surface-to-air
missile battalions. Two surface-to-surface missile brigades were
equipped with free rocket over ground (FROG) and Scud missiles
acquired from the Soviet Union.
Although the pattern of equipment purchases and the creation
of divisional headquarters units suggested that a transition to
a more integrated structure of mobile armored and mechanized infantry
was contemplated, by early 1987 the shift to such an organizational
form had not yet occurred. During specific deployments, as in
Chad, units were brought together on an ad hoc basis. If the tank
and mechanized battalions were to be consolidated into a more
unified command structure, this would most likely be designed
for planning territorial defense rather than for desert combat
operations; the system existing in 1987 of independent battalions
afforded more flexibility for desert combat.
In early 1987, the Libyan army was well outfitted with modern
armaments, including rocket systems, armored vehicles for its
infantry and artillery, engineering equipment, up-to-date Soviet
infantry weapons, sophisticated fire-control systems, flame throwers
and chemical munitions, and antitank guided missiles. Libya's
more than 3,000 tanks gave it the tenth largest tank force in
the world. Its range of tracked and wheeled armor, tank transporters,
and air transport ensured it the necessary mobility to bring its
forces to bear rapidly against any threat to its territorial integrity
and enabled it to intervene in ventures far beyond its borders
(see table 10, Appendix).
The army was nevertheless confronted by grave deficiencies. The
high technological level of its equipment demanded a corresponding
level of technical competence in operation and maintenance that
the army lacked. Maintenance and repair problems were exacerbated
by the diversity of arms sources--British, American, French, Soviet,
Italian, and Brazilian. The numerous foreign advisers and technicians
were insufficient to overcome low standards of support and logistics.
To judge from the ability the Libyans demonstrated in Chad to
sustain modern combat operations over extended supply lines, some
progress was being made in correcting these problems.
The pattern of troop concentrations could not be determined precisely
from published sources. Some troops were at the operational sites,
including Tripoli, Misratah, Az Zawiyah, Surt, Benghazi, Darnah,
and Tobruk, that were established at strategic points along the
Mediterranean coast during World War II. Others were at inland
sites at desert oases, such as Sabha, and farther south, at Al
Kufrah, which became the main base for operations in Chad. Areas
adjacent to the Egyptian border, particularly along lines of movement,
were also well defended. Many army units were scattered throughout
populated areas, owing in part to their responsibility for training
People's Militia units.
Few details were available on army training. The military academy
at Benghazi, established before independence with British assistance,
offered its cadets courses in higher education and military subjects
to prepare them for active duty as junior officers. Qadhafi and
other members of the RCC attended the institution, but it was
closed after the coup. Later a military academy opened at Tripoli.
In 1985 a military engineering college (at an unspecified location)
to provide training in all technical military specialities was
proposed. The college was to have a four-year program leading
to a bachelor's degree. At about the same time, the establishment
of a reserves college with a one-year program leading to the rank
of second lieutenant in the reserves was announced. Admission
would be contingent on the attainment of a university degree or
its equivalent and a demonstration of "adherence to the great
Fatah revolution." Because Libya is not known to have an active
reserve program, it remained unclear how the graduates of this
institution would be used.
Data as of 1987
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