Libya
THE MILITARY LEADERSHIP
The group of junior officers who seized power in 1969 wanted
to introduce a radical form of Arab and Islamic socialism. The
Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) of Qadhafi and eleven other
officers assumed formal responsibility for drawing up general
policies. The initial civilian cabinet was frustrated by the RCC's
insistence on reviewing all of its decisions. After its resignation,
a new cabinet in January 1970 had Qadhafi as prime minister, Major
Abdul Salam Jallud as deputy prime minister, and other RCC members
in key ministerial positions.
Although the RCC always spoke with one voice and Qadhafi and
his associates generally succeeded in instilling a spirit of unity
and discipline among the military, there was internal dissent.
Differences came into the open in 1975 because of disagreement
over the priority being given to armament purchases over domestic
social needs in the use of oil revenues. As a result, the minister
of planning was dismissed, and others left their posts. By late
1975, only five of the original twelve members were still serving
on the RCC.
Officially phased out in 1977, the RCC was succeeded by the General
Secretariat of the General People's Congress (GPC). At first this
new policy-setting body was little more than the RCC under a new
name. In the reorganization of 1979, however, when Qadhafi relinquished
his position as secretary general, Jallud was replaced by a civilian
as deputy secretary general and the other three military members
of the General Secretariat were likewise replaced by civilians.
They continued to serve as senior policy advisers to Qadhafi,
although their public role was curtailed. In 1987, the most senior
positions of the military hierarchy were held by members of the
original RCC. Qadhafi retained the title of supreme commander
of the armed forces. General Abu Bakr Yunis Jabir was commander
in chief of the armed forces. Major Khuwayldi al Hamidi was chief
of the general staff and headed the People's Militia or People's
Army (formerly the Popular Resistance Force.) Colonel (formerly
General) Mustafa al Kharrubi was inspector general of the armed
forces and commandant of the navy and air force. Major Jallud
held no military position, but he headed the revolutionary committees
and was acknowledged to be Qadhafi's second in command.
In the course of the post-coup reorganization of the military
into a single unified command, the RCC retired or fired--for political
reasons--the entire leadership of generals and colonels along
with a number of officers of lesser rank identified with the Idris
regime. Qadhafi and the other RCC members maintained that the
former military leaders had been involved extensively in various
forms of corruption, particularly in arms-procurement contracts.
In addition, the former high command had been largely in agreement
with the monarchy's position on such issues as the continued presence
of British and United States military bases on Libyan territory
and the country's rather limited involvement in the ArabIsraeli
disputes.
The former military leadership was also believed to have tolerated
and in many instances to have profited personally from a recruitment
and promotion system that awarded high posts to individual tribal
leaders and members of influential families. Senior officers were
chosen not on the basis of military qualities or experience, but
rather because of personal loyalty or political favors provided
to King Idris or in recognition of their political and religious
conservatism. These factors, which had brought the senior officers
their initial commissions and subsequent promotions, caused much
of the low morale among junior officers and contributed to the
eventual overthrow of the monarchy.
Unlike the former military leaders, many of whom were from the
middle and upper classes, and by virtue of their social status
could just as easily have chosen higher education or the bureaucracy
as routes to advancement, most of the RCC officers were from the
lower strata of society. For them, the most logical source of
upward mobility under the monarchy had been the military. Of the
original RCC members, most of whom were in their mid-twenties
at the time of the 1969 uprising, approximately half were from
tribal or peasant backgrounds. They reflected the country's three
traditional geographic divisions, with roughly one-third coming
from each of the major regions--Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and Fezzan.
In political outlook, the military leadership that rose to power
after 1969 has been described as both soldier-revolutionary and
ardent pan-Arabist. In published interviews, the senior officers,
particularly Qadhafi, recalled that their identification with
the goal of regional Arab unity and the adoption of a more militant
posture toward Israel dated from their secondary school years,
when their hero was Egypt's President Gamal Abdul Nasser.
The new military leaders frequently emphasized their passionate
commitment to the moral tenets of Islam and to their own concept
of Islamic socialism. Qadhafi and the other senior military figures
became the dominant influence group in the country, representing
both the modernizing and the traditional aspects of national life.
On the one hand, they have been committed to modernization, reflected
in their acquiring technical military equipment and sophisticated
weaponry and training personnel to operate and maintain it. Commitment
to modernization also was demonstrated by their continuing emphasis
on improving the literacy rate and on the development of technical
skills and training. On the other hand, many of the top officers,
including Qadhafi, have remained proud of their desert backgrounds,
their religious convictions, their social relationships, and their
traditional belief in the overall primacy of Arab and Islamic
attitudes and values. One important exception to emphasis on traditional
values has been Qadhafi's desire for a role for women in the armed
forces, a proposal that was rejected by the normally obedient
GPC.
Data as of 1987
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