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North Korea Special Operations Forces
In the early 1990s, the army was made up of a mixture of
conventional and unconventional warfare forces. By any
consideration, however, North Korea has one of the world's
largest special operations forces. Estimates of the size of the
army's special operations forces ranged from 60,000 persons to
over 100,000 persons. The uncertainty over the number derives
from both the lack of information and the varying definitions of
special operations forces. Organized into twenty-two brigades and
at least seven independent battalions, the special operations
forces are believed to be the best trained and to have the
highest morale of all North Korean ground forces.
Special operations forces were developed to meet three basic
requirements: to breach the flankless fixed defense of South
Korea; to create a "second front" in the enemy's rear area,
disrupting in-depth South Korean or United States reinforcements
and logistical support during a conflict; and to conduct
battlefield and strategic reconnaissance. The ultimate goal was
to create strategic dislocation. The additional missions of
countering opposing forces and internal security were added over
time.
The Ministry of the People's Armed Forces controls the bulk
of the special operations forces through one of two commands, the
Reconnaissance Bureau and the Light Infantry Training Guidance
Bureau. The Reconnaissance Bureau is the primary organization
within the Ministry of People's Armed Forces for the collection
of strategic and tactical intelligence. It also exercises
operational control over agents engaged in collecting military
intelligence and in the training and dispatch of unconventional
warfare teams. The Light Infantry Training Guidance Bureau is
directly subordinate to the General Staff Department. The party
directly controls approximately 1,500 agents.
Operations are categorized on the basis of the echelon
supported. Strategic special operations forces support national
or Ministry of People's Armed Forces objectives, operationalsupported corps operations, and tactical-supported maneuver
divisions and brigades. Strategic missions of special operations
forces in support of national and Ministry of People's Armed
Forces objectives involve reconnaissance, sniper, and agent
operations, but not light infantry operations, which primarily
are tactical operations. The main objectives of these units are
to secure information that cannot be achieved by other means,
neutralize targets, and disrupt rear areas. In executing these
operations, special operations troops may be disguised either as
South Korean military personnel or as civilians.
Strategic missions require deep insertions either in advance
of hostilities or in the initial stages by naval or air
platforms. Based on available insertion platforms, North Korea
has a one-time lift capability of 12,000 persons by sea and 6,000
persons by air. Most North Korea special operations forces
infiltrate overland and are dedicated to operational and tactical
missions, that is, reconnaissance and combat operations in
concert with conventional operations in the forward corps.
Although it is unknown how forces will be allocated, limits on
North Korea's insertion capabilities constrain operational
flexibility and determine the allocation of strategic,
operational, and tactical missions.
North Korean army special operations forces units are broken
down into three categories based on mission and mode of
operation: agent operations, reconnaissance, and light infantry
and sniper. The Reconnaissance Bureau has four sniper brigades
and at least seven independent reconnaissance battalions. The
Light Infantry Training Guidance Bureau controls fourteen light
infantry/sniper brigades: six "straight-leg" brigades, six
airborne brigades, and two amphibious brigades. Four light
infantry brigades of unknown subordination are under the
operational control of the forward corps. In addition, each
regular infantry division and mechanized brigade has an special
operations forces battalion.
Reconnaissance units are employed in rear area, strategic
intelligence collection, and target information acquisition.
Light infantry units operate in company- or battalion-sized units
against military, political, or economic targets. Sniper units
are distinguished from light infantry units in that their basic
operational unit is the team, rather than the larger company or
battalion of the light infantry unit.
A reconnaissance brigade consists of between 3,600 and 4,200
personnel. It is organized into a headquarters, rear support
units, a communications company, and ten reconnaissance
battalions. The basic unit of operation is the reconnaissance
team, which has from two to ten men. A light infantry brigade has
between 3,300 and 3,600 personnel organized into between five and
ten battalions. The brigade can fight as a unit or disperse its
battalions for independent operations. A sniper brigade's
organization parallels that of the light infantry brigade.
The unique special operations forces dedicated to strategic
operations are the two amphibious light infantry/sniper brigades
subordinate to the Light Infantry Guidance Bureau. These brigades
are believed deployed to Wnsan on the east coast and Namp'o and
Tasa-ri on the west coast. In organization and manpower, they are
reduced versions of the regular light infantry brigades. The two
brigades have a total strength of approximately 5,000 men in ten
battalions. Each battalion has about 400 men organized into five
companies each. Some amphibious brigade personnel are trained as
frogmen.
In the 1970s, in support of overland insertion, North Korea
began clandestine tunneling operations along the entire DMZ, with
two tunnels per forward division. By 1990 four tunnels dug on
historical invasion routes from the north had been discovered by
South Korean and United States tunnel neutralization teams: three
in the mid-1970s and the fourth in March 1990. The South Koreans
suspect there were as many as twenty-five tunnels in the early
1990s, but the level of ongoing tunneling is unknown.
At the operational and tactical level, infiltration tactics
are designed for the leading special operations forces brigades
to probe and penetrate the weak points of the defense; disrupt
the command, control, and communications nodes; and threaten
lines of communication and supply. To achieve its goal of nearterm distraction and dislocation of the defender, at least one
special operations forces brigade is assigned to each of the four
regular army corps deployed along the DMZ./
Data as of June 1993
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