North Korea Operational Practice in the 1980s and 1990s
Observation post at Kukhwa-ri, not far from Kaesng
Courtesy Tracy Woodward
The Korean People's Army (KPA) is structured and deployed on
the primacy of the offense. Doctrine stresses that decisive
results can be obtained only through offensive operations. The
offense has three objectives: the destruction of enemy forces,
the seizure and control of territory, and the destruction of the
enemy's will to fight.
Strategy and tactics are built on the key concepts of
combined-arms offensive operations, battlefield mobility,
flexibility, and the integration of conventional and
unconventional warfare. Mass, mobility, and firepower are the
three reinforcing elements of a strategy that, when combined with
speed and security at a critical point, will produce a decisive
offensive strike.
Changes in force development reflect changes in doctrine and
strategy. The military problem facing P'yongyang is encountering
difficult terrain crossed by the multiple defensive lines,
extensive barrier systems, and hardened defensive positions of a
determined defender. A heavy emphasis on special forces is the
first solution.
After the mid-1970s, the emphasis shifted to firepower. The
artillery force, both active and reserve, grew steadily, and
self-propelled artillery was deployed. Most North Korean
artillery has a greater standoff range than comparable South
Korea-United States systems. Hardened artillery positions and a
forward-based logistics system of underground facilities for
ammunition stockpiles, petroleum, oil, lubricants, and other war
supplies appeared to be designed to sustain an initial offensive
despite a lack of air superiority. These initiatives only
partially addressed the problem, however, because North Korean
artillery cannot fire from its hardened artillery sites.
In the 1980s, the emphasis shifted to firepower and mobility
as a solution. Some experts believe that maneuver received new
emphasis when larger-scale mobile units were created beginning in
the early 1980s. Force deployment suggests that P'yongyang
intends to employ both second-echelon and strategic/exploitation
forces.
Data as of June 1993
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