North Korea GEOPOLITICAL CHANGES: NEW WORLD ORDER AND NORTH KOREAN SECURITY
Unavailable
Figure 15. Comparison of Military Expenditures, North Korea
and South Korea, Selected Years, 1979-89
Source: Based on information from United States, Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and
Arms Transfers, 1990, Washington, 1991, 69.
Observation post at Demilitarized Zone, looking from North
Korea to South Korea
Courtesy Tracy Woodward
Map at Armistice Hall, Demilitarized Zone, depicting North
Korea's view of the deployment of the "American Army and nuclear
weapons in South Korea"
Courtesy Tracy Woodward
The demise of communist systems in the Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe was a profound shock to North Korea. Although
relations with the Soviet Union had cooled in the late 1980s,
North Korea was ill prepared for the dramatic devaluation of its
strategic value to Russia and the CIS. The ramifications for
North Korea's military were unclear in mid-1993, but some aspects
are known. North Korea has lost its military alliance with the
former Soviet Union, its access to military hardware and
expertise at socialist concessionary rates, and the ability to
exploit Soviet-United States competition to its advantage.
Despite North Korea's strenuous efforts at military independence,
in the long term these events will make it increasingly difficult
for North Korea to maintain a large, modernizing military and, as
well, leave the country increasingly isolated.
Official North-South dialogue was reestablished in late 1984,
twelve years after the first series of talks in 1972 had been
suspended. It was not until December 1991, however, that any
progress was made on military confidence-building measures or
arms control. The North-South Agreement on Reconciliation,
Nonaggression, Exchanges, and Cooperation, signed in December
1991, potentially marks initial progress toward a reduction in
military tension on the peninsula. The two sides renounced the
use of force against each other and pledged to pursue as yet
undetermined military confidence-building measures. Little real
progress has been made as of mid-1993, however, other than
further institutionalizing the structure of their talks. As a
show of good faith, the Republic of Korea announced on January 7,
1992, that it was cancelling the United States-South Korea Team
Spirit military exercise for that year.
The Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean
Peninsula initialed on December 31, 1991, bans the testing,
manufacture, production, possession, storage, deployment,
receipt, and use of nuclear weapons on the peninsula. It also
stipulates that neither Korea will possess nuclear reprocessing
or uranium enrichment facilities. It requires that the JNCC be
organized within thirty days of the exchange of ratified
declarations on February 19, 1992. The JNCC has responsibility
for implementing the non-nuclear declaration, including bilateral
inspections, but in actuality exists only on paper
(see
Inter-Korean Affairs
, ch. 4).
P'yongyang is a regime under tremendous pressure, with forces
for change in the region threatening its existence. Seoul, which
has won the political and economic competition, threatens to
absorb North Korea in the same manner as West Germany has
absorbed East Germany. Only in military strength, with over 1
million men under arms, does North Korea have an edge over South
Korea. Its long-term commitment to a massive force improvement
program has crippled economic growth. Barring an unforeseen turn
of events during its inevitable political succession, North Korea
gives little sign of a willingness to abandon its painfully
acquired military capability. In fact, it might view its military
force as the only deterrent to absorption by South Korea.
Nonetheless, P'yongyang's leaders are restrained from war by
a complex set of military and political factors: the large, welltrained , and well-equipped South Korean military and the
increasing political stability in South Korea; the United States
security commitment to South Korea and the forward military
presence supporting it; and the uncertainty of China's support
for military action. As long as the North Korean leadership
remains stable, the likelihood of full-scale attack by North
Korea remains low.
However, if instability becomes a part of the succession
process, the outlook is more problematic. North Korea will be
under growing pressure, which will increase the possibility of
miscalculation. The potential for political instability in the
final stages of the leadership succession further reinforces this
concern.
Data as of June 1993
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