Peru Regional Governments
The constitution of 1979 mandated the establishment of
regional governments in Peru. Regionalization was part of
the
original APRA program of the 1920s. In 1988 the APRA
government
finally imitated the process with a law providing for the
creation, administration, and modification of regions,
which
would replace the former departments. Between 1987 and
1990, the
APRA government also issued corresponding laws creating
eleven of
the twelve regions called for under law, with the
Lima/Callao
region remaining under negotiation
(see
fig. 13). In 1991
debates
in Congress continued on the Lima/Callao and San Martín
regions,
with the latter voting to separate from La Libertad
Department.
The highly politicized debates centered on whether
senators
should be elected by region or by national district, and
on the
method that regional assemblies are elected. Five of the
regions
held their first elections for regional assemblies on
November
12, 1989, in conjunction with the municipal elections, and
the
other six regions held elections in conjunction with the
April
presidential elections.
By law each regional assembly consisted of provincial
mayors
(30 percent), directly elected representatives (40
percent), and
delegates from institutions representative of the social,
economic, and cultural activities of the region (30
percent). In
1990 APRA and the United Left (Izquierda Unida--IU)
dominated the
regions, with APRA controlling six, IU three, and the
Democratic
Front (Frente Democrático--Fredemo) only one.
The process of regionalization was more one of
administrative
shuffling than of substance. However, the regional
governments
faced the same resource constraints that substantially
limited
the ability of municipal governments to implement
independent
activities. The central government is in theory supposed
to
transfer funds and assets, such as state sector
enterprises, to
the regions, but in practice this has only happened
piecemeal.
This tendency had been exacerbated by the severity of the
economic crisis and the poor fiscal situation inherited by
the
Fujimori government. The dynamic was made more conflictive
as the
regional governments were controlled by parties in
opposition to
the central government. The cutting of resources allocated
to
regional governments in the 1991 budget was a good
indication of
the constraints that regional governments would face for
the
foreseeable future. Moreover, the executive had taken back
some
powers that were originally given to the regions, such as
control
over the national tourist hotels. The regional
governments,
meanwhile, had heightened the debate with actions such as
the
refusal to pay the executive what was owed for electricity
tariffs.
Data as of September 1992
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