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Peru Labor Unions
The labor movement in Peru has traditionally been weak,
and
its fate, until 1968, was inextricably linked to APRA.
Very much
affected by the enclave or anti-union enterprises and by
the
rural or community background of many of its members,
labor was
unable to articulate a coherent set of class interests.
APRA,
with its organizational capacity and popular following,
was
perhaps the only existing mobilization vehicle for
organized
labor. APRA dominated the Confederation of Peruvian
Workers
(Confederación de Trabajadores del Perú--CTP), which it
founded
in 1944 and which was officially recognized in 1964. The
major
labor dispute was traditionally between the CTP and APRA,
and
there was a direct correlation between union activity and
the
legal status of APRA, which was usually banned by military
governments. APRA was more concerned with using the labor
movement for its own ends than with enhancing the
objectives of
organized labor. APRA curtailed strike activity, for
example,
during its years of collaboration with the government of
Manuel
Prado y Ugarteche (1939-45, 1956-62).
Union activity increased dramatically during the
military
years with the introduction of a new labor code and the
Industrial Reform Law, culminating in the union-led
general
strikes of 1977 and 1978. Yet, the labor and industries
laws,
which made it more difficult to dismiss a worker in Peru
than in
any industrialized nation, acted as a major disincentive
to
formal sector employment. This, coupled with the dramatic
economic decline of the 1980s, led to a substantial
decrease in
the relative power of labor unions by 1990.
After 1968 the communist labor movement, the General
Confederation of Peruvian Workers (Confederación General
de
Trabajadores del Perú--CGTP), was legalized and began to
erode
APRA's monopoly on union support, owing in part to the
party's
relinquishing its radical stance. The Federation of
Workers of
the Peruvian Revolution (Central de Trabajadores de la
Revolución
Peruana--CTRP), which was set up by the military as an
attempt to
control the workers' movement, never really got off the
ground,
particularly in the face of the powerful CGTP. In 1991 the
CGTP
remained the most important union confederation in Peru.
The traits that were held typical of APRA union
support--
marginal, socially ambitious, and socially
frustrated--began to
characterize the Maoist left and its affiliated unions
under the
CGTP umbrella in the 1970s. These groups, such as the
powerful
teachers' union, the Trade Union of Education Workers
(Sindicato
nico de Trabajadores de la Enseñanza--SUTEP), and the
miners'
confederation, the National Federation of Syndicated
Mining and
Metallurgical Workers of Peru (Federación Nacional de
Trabajadores Mineros y Metalúrgicos Sindicalistas del
Perú--
FNTMMSP), were key actors in the general strikes that
virtually
brought down the military regime in the late 1970s. In
addition,
the expansion of state industries, each of which had its
own
affiliated union, substantially increased the number of
organized
workers.
By the early 1980s, economic decline began to erode the
power
of unions, as did the neoliberal strategy adhered to by
the
Belaúnde government. The APRA government completely
bypassed
organized labor, as it did organized industry in its
concertación strategy. García's populist tactics
left
little room for organized labor. Although there was a high
number
of strikes by state sector workers during the García
government,
particularly during the last two "crisis" years, they were
generally more defensive, in the face of economic decline,
than
political. Most of the general strikes that were called
during
the García government were largely a failure, attaining
only
minimal support.
One reason that organized labor was less able to pursue
political goals was the SL, which launched several "armed
strikes" in various cities throughout the García years.
Although
these had varying degrees of success, they rarely had
union
support, as supporting the strikes meant supporting the
SL.
Increasingly, street protest for political purposes
signified
support for armed insurrection, which the majority of
unions
rejected. Indeed, there were even violent clashes between
the SL
and the CGTP during one general strike.
The SL had its own affiliated union, the Class Movement
of
Workers and Laborers (Movimiento de Obreros y Trabajadores
Clasistas--MOTC), which operated primarily in the
industries
along Lima's Central Highway (Trans-Andean Highway), the
industrial belt of the city. Of the four major companies
along
this highway, the MOTC had made substantial inroads in
three. The
MOTC did not necessarily control unions, but was tenacious
in its
support of strikes and was able to establish a strong
presence in
these industries. Yet, it also created rifts in the labor
movement in general, because many workers did not
necessarily
want to be affiliated with the SL. Indicative of the
extent of
conflict was the SL's killing of fifty-one union leaders,
primarily mineworkers, between January and May 1989, and
its
assassination of a prominent textile leader in October
1989.
The one labor sector that was able to exert substantial
pressure during the APRA government was the miners'
federation,
the FNTMMSP, which in 1989 staged a strike involving
90,000
miners and costing the government hundreds of millions of
dollars
in lost export earnings. Meanwhile, the federation was
also
targeted by the SL. Although able to infiltrate the union
to some
extent, staging armed strikes and attacking mining
facilities,
the SL was by no means able to gain control of it.
Nevertheless,
the SL's presence caused violence from both the left
(there were
clashes between the SL and nonsympathetic miners) and the
right
(the leader of the miners' federation was assassinated by
the
APRA- and military-linked paramilitary squad, the Rodrigo
Franco
Command). Finally, some critics felt that the government
and the
National Mining and Petroleum Company (Sociedad Nacional
de
Minería y Petróleo--SNMP) found the SL infiltration of the
mines
a convenient excuse for declaring a state of emergency in
the
region.
Only 15 to 20 percent of the labor force was unionized
in
1990, making that force a rather privileged sector of the
working
class. Underemployment was as high as 75 percent; and only
9
percent of Lima's economically active population was fully
employed.
The prospects for the union movement in Peru in the
early
1990s were dismal at best. On the one hand, the economic
crisis
made access to a job a luxury. Protest by organized labor
was a
last attempt at protecting salary levels that had
deteriorated by
over 50 percent in the 1985-90 period. On the other, the
SL's
drive to establish influence among organized labor
presented a
challenge to all the unions that wished to retain their
independence.
In the event of an economic recovery and the adoption
of a
more realistic labor code that did not make access to a
job a
privilege for a small minority, organized labor might be
able to
enhance its status as the protector of workers rights
rather than
the proponent of political radicalism. Still, these
developments
also hinged on the defeat of the foremost proponent of
radicalism, the SL--an unlikely scenario in the short
term.
Data as of September 1992
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