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Peru Nonparty Organizations
The rapid rise of Cambio reflected a more far-reaching
phenomenon in Peru: the growth of extrasystem democratic
political activity. In conjunction with the rise in
economic
importance of the informal sector was a rise in activity
and
importance of a host of "informal" political groups:
neighborhood
organizations, communal kitchens, popular economic
organizations,
and nongovernment organizations. Although originating
largely
outside the realm of traditional parties and politics,
these
groups became critical actors in local-level democratic
politics.
Usually autonomous and democratic in origin and structure,
they
were often wary of political parties, which attempted to
co-opt
them, or at least to elicit their support for
wider-reaching
political goals. These organizations were primarily
concerned
with micro-level survival issues, such as obtaining basic
services like water and electricity. They tended to
support
political parties as a convenient way to attain their
goals, but
just as easily withdrew that support when it did not
provide
tangible ends. They had a tendency, but by no means a
constant
one, to vote for parties of the left. This could be
explained in
part by the Peruvian left's approach to grassroots
movements,
which was usually--but not always--less sectarian and
hierarchical than that of traditional parties, such as
APRA.
Thus, the relations that informal groups had with
political
parties were by no means simple or clear-cut. As the
varied
results from the 1980-90 elections demonstrate, the urban
poor
had a tendency, which was not without shifts, to vote for
the
left. They had few binding ties to political parties, and
were
quite willing to vote for nonparty actors, from Manuel A.
Odría
(president, 1948-50, 1950-56) in the 1950s to Ricardo
Belmont (as
mayor of Lima in 1989) and Fujimori in 1990. Because the
urban
poor's need for basic services was so grave, their vote
was most
often determined by the most credible promise for
basic-service
delivery. Broader political goals of the parties were only
a
concern once basic needs had been met. Still, the gap
between
these groups and parties was significant. Parties play a
role in
virtually all consolidated democracies, and the
difficulties of
governing a fragmented society and polity such as Peru's
became
increasingly evident as the Fujimori government was forced
to
implement unpopular economic policies in the absence of an
organized political base.
Electoral defeats usually trigger internal party
changes and
democratization. In 1990 all Peruvian parties faced
electoral
losses. The parties were well aware of the need to reform
in
order to remain politically viable entities. In early
1991, the
Christian Democrats, for example, launched a process of
internal
party reform and an evaluation of their relations with
groups
where their support base was weak, such as the
shantytowns. The
left underwent a process of ideological and strategic
reflection
at approximately the same time. Most of the other
political
parties likely would have followed suit. To the extent
that
parties failed to reform to adapt to new political
realities and
to the needs and strategies of the plethora of grassroots
groups
and local organizations in Peru, a crisis of
representation in
Peruvian democracy, if and when it was restored, appeared
more
likely for the foreseeable future, threatening its
viability.
Data as of September 1992
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