Peru Government and Politics
Figure on an Incan wool and cotton tapestry
PERU, IN 1980, was one of the first countries in South
America to
undergo the transition from long-term institutionalized
military
rule to democratic government. By 1990, however, Peru was
in the
midst of a social, economic, and political crisis of
unprecedented proportions that threatened not only the
viability
of the democratic system but also civil society in
general.
More than a decade of steep economic decline had
resulted in
a dramatic deterioration in living standards for all
sectors of
society and a vast increase in the large proportion of
society
that was underemployed and below the poverty line. Per
capita
incomes were below their 1960 levels. Accompanying the
economic
decline in the 1980s was a rise in insurgent violence and
criminal activity. There was also a marked deterioration
in the
human rights situation--over 20,000 people died in
political
violence during the decade.
The crisis had partial roots in the failure of
successive
governments to implement effective economic policy and to
fully
incorporate the marginalized (informal) sector of the
population
into the formal economic and political systems. Politics
were
dominated by personalities rather than programs and by
policy
swings from populist policies to neoliberal stabilization
strategies.
The concentration of decision-making power in the
persona of
the president and the major swings in policy took an
enormous
toll on the nation's political system and state
institutions. The
judicial and legislative branches, already inadequately
funded
and understaffed, were constantly bypassed by the
executive.
State institutions, meanwhile, already burdened by
excessive
bureaucracy, were virtually inoperative because government
resources had all but disappeared. Political parties had
been
increasingly discredited, having failed to provide
credible
alternatives to the malfunctioning state system with which
they
were associated. Both extrasystem movements, such as
neighborhood
organizations and grassroots groups, and antisystem
movements,
such as guerrilla forces, particularly the Shining Path
(Sendero
Luminoso--SL), had increased in size and importance. The
breach
between the Peruvian state and civil society had widened.
The
political system was fragmented and polarized to an
unprecedented
degree, and society, which was immersed in a virtual civil
war,
had become increasingly
praetorian (see Glossary)
in nature.
Despite the desperate nature of the socioeconomic
situation
and the extent of political polarization, Peru
successfully held
its third consecutive elections in April and June 1990.
Agronomist Alberto K. Fujimori, a virtual unknown,
defeated novelist Mario Vargas Llosa by a wide margin. The victory
of Fujimori and his Cambio '90 (Change '90) front was seen as
a rejection of traditional politicians and parties, as well
as of Vargas Llosa's proposed orthodox economic "shock" program.
Despite his wide popular margin, Fujimori faced
substantial constraints early on. One was his lack of an organized
party base or a working majority in either of the two houses of
Congress. Another was that, as a result of hyperinflation, the lack
of government resources, and the clear preferences of
international lending agencies, such as the International Monetary Fund
(IMF-- see Glossary) and
World Bank (see Glossary),
he had little choice
but to implement the orthodox shock program that he had
campaigned against.
Although Fujimori made impressive strides during his
first
year in the implementation of structural economic reforms,
there
was substantial popular disaffection owing to the high
social
costs of the "Fujishock" program and to the government's
failure
to follow through on promises of a social emergency
program to
alleviate those shocks. Resource constraints inherited
from the
previous government severely limited the Fujimori
administration's ability to act on the social welfare
front.
Fujimori lost the support of much of his Cambio '90 front
when he
turned to orthodox economics. In addition, he was forced
to rely
on a series of "marriages of convenience" with various
political
forces in Congress in order to pass legislation. He also
had to
rely on a sector of the army for institutional support.
On April 5, 1992, Fujimori suspended the constitution,
dissolved the Congress and the judiciary, and placed
several
congressional leaders and members of the opposition under
house
arrest. The measures, which were fully supported by all
three
branches of the armed forces, were announced in the name
of
fighting drug traffic. They amounted to an
autogolpe
(self-coup): a military coup against the government led by
the
president himself. The government held elections for the
Democratic Constituent Congress (Congreso Constituyente
Democrático) on November 22, 1992, and municipal elections
on
January 29, 1993.
Data as of September 1992
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