|
Peru The 1990 Campaign and Elections
Although Alberto Fujimori was elected by a large
popular
margin, he had no organized or institutionalized base of
support.
There were countless theories as to why Fujimori was able
to rise
from virtual anonymity to the national presidency in the
course
of three months. More than anything else, the Fujimori
tsunami,
as it was called, was a rejection of all established
political
parties: the right, despite its refurbished image; the
squabbling
and hopelessly divided far left; and certainly the
left-of-center
APRA because of its disastrous performance in government.
Fujimori was able to capture the traditional support base
of
APRA: small entrepreneurial groups and those sectors of
the
middle class for whom APRA was no longer an acceptable
alternative, but for whom the conservative Fredemo was
also
unacceptable. In addition, Fujimori's success was
attributed
largely to a great deal of support at the grassroots
level.
After serving as a UNA rector and host of a popular
television program called "Concertando," Fujimori entered
politics in 1989, running on a simple, if vague, platform
of
"Work, Honesty, and Technology." His appeal had several
dimensions. First, his experience as an engineer, rather
than a
politician, and his lack of ties to any of the established
parties clearly played into his favor. APRA's incoherent
conduct
of government had led to an economic crisis of
unprecedented
proportions; at the same time, the polarized political
debate and
the derogatory mudslinging that characterized the
electoral
campaign did not seem to offer any positive solutions. The
right
preached free-market ideology with a fervor and made
little
attempt to appeal to the poor. The left was hopelessly
divided
and unable to provide a credible alternative to the
failure of
"heterodox" economic policy. Thus, not only APRA was
discredited,
but so were all established politicians.
In addition, and key to his popular appeal, were
Fujimori's
nonelite origins as the son of Japanese immigrants. His
Japanese
ties also aroused some hopes, whether realistic or not,
that in
the event of his victory the Japanese would extend
substantial
amounts of aid to Peru. He capitalized on Vargas Llosa's
lack of
appeal to the poor by promising not to implement a painful
"shock" economic adjustment program to end inflation, and
with
slogans like "un presidente como tú" ("a president like
you").
The claim of this first-generation Japanese-Peruvian that
he was just like the majority in a predominantly
mestizo (see Glossary)
and native American nation seemed less than credible, and
his vague promises of "gradually" ending hyperinflation seemed
glibly unrealistic. Nevertheless, his message was much more
palatable to an already severely impoverished population than Vargas
Llosa's more realistic but bluntly phrased calls for a shock
austerity program to end inflation. "El shock" had become a common
term in the electoral campaign and among all sectors of society.
Fujimori's success was also enhanced by his rather
eclectic political team, Cambio '90, which was extremely active in
campaigning at the grassroots level. Cambio had an appeal
at this level precisely because it was an unknown entity, and was
not
affiliated with the traditional political system.
In the first round of elections, Vargas Llosa attained
28.2
percent of the vote; Fujimori, 24.3 percent; the APRA,
19.6
percent; IU, 7.1 percent; and ASI, 4.1 percent. Null and
blank
votes were 14.4 percent of the total
(see table 20). It
was then
clear that the left and APRA would back Fujimori, if for
no other
reason than to defeat Vargas Llosa in the second round.
Vargas
Llosa was seen as a representative of the traditional,
conservative elite, and thus was unacceptable for
ideological
reasons. In Luis Alva Castro's words to APRA:
"Compañeros
(partners), our support for Fujimori is a given, but there
is no
need to make an institutional commitment." A similar
stance was
taken by the left.
The support of the left and APRA virtually guaranteed
Fujimori's victory in the second round, but it by no means
signified an organized or institutionalized support base,
either
inside or outside Congress, which presented a formidable
obstacle
for an already uncertain future for the Fujimori
government. The
electoral campaign, meanwhile, was waged in extremely
negative
and ad hominem terms, and took on both racial and class
confrontational overtones. It became a struggle between
the "rich
whites" and the "poor Indians," exacerbating the existing
polarization in the system. The political mudslinging and
personal attacks, first by Fredemo against APRA and
President
García, and then between the Fujimori and Vargas Llosa
teams,
offended the average voter.
The conduct of the 1990 electoral campaign, in
conjunction
with the prolonged period of political polarization that
preceded
it, severely undermined faith in the established system
and the
political parties and leaders that were a part of it.
This, more
than anything else, played into the hands of Fujimori, and
was
responsible for his victory. In the second round, he
attained
56.5 percent of the vote over 33.9 percent for Vargas
Llosa on
June 10, 1990.
The Fujimori government came to power without a
coherent team
of advisers, a program for governing, or any indication of
who
would hold the key positions in the government. Fujimori's
advisers were from diverse sides of the political
spectrum, and
he made no clear choices among them, as they themselves
admitted.
At the same time, he made it clear that he would
re-establish
relations with the international financial community, and
that he
was not interested in a radical economic program. How he
would
reconcile those goals, in the context of hyperinflation,
with his
promise not to implement a shock-stabilization plan was
the cause
of a great deal of uncertainty.
The 1990 electoral results reflected a total
dissatisfaction
and lack of faith on the part of the populace in
traditional
politicians and parties. Fredemo's dogmatic and
heavy-handed
campaign was partially to blame for undermining that
faith, as
were a succession of weak or inept governments for the
past
several decades. Yet, in the short-term, the disastrous
failure
of APRA, the country's only well-institutionalized
political
party, was most directly to blame. The results of the 1990
elections merely demonstrated the exacerbation that
occurred from
1985 to 1990 of a preexisting breach between state and
society in
Peru. The rejection of traditional parties did not
necessarily
reflect a rejection of the democratic system. Instead, it
reflected an ongoing evolution of participation occurring
outside
the realm of traditional political institutions, as well
as the
increased importance of autonomous local groups and the
informal
economy (see
table 21;
table 22, Appendix).
The 1990 electoral results also indicated a crisis of
representation. Political parties play a fundamental
representative role in virtually all consolidated
democracies;
their utility in formulating and channeling demands in
both
directions--from society to state and state to society--is
an
irreplaceable one. In Peru, as in many developing
countries,
demands on the state for basic services had clearly
outpaced its
ability to respond. Thus, the role of parties in
channeling those
demands, and--through the party platform or
doctrine--indicating
their relative importance, was critical. How Fujimori
would
govern a fragmented and polarized political system without
an
institutionalized party base remained unclear at best.
Data as of September 1992
|
