|
China Chapter 10. Party and Government
THE THIRD PLENUM of the Central Committee of the Eleventh
National Party Congress, held in December 1978, marked a major
turning point in China's development. The course was laid for the
party to move the world's most populous nation toward the ambitious
targets of the Four Modernizations. After a decade of turmoil
brought about by the Cultural Revolution (1966-76), the new
direction set at this meeting was toward economic development and
away from class struggle. The plenum endorsed major changes in the
political, economic, and social system. It also instituted sweeping
personnel changes, culminating in the elevation of two key
supporters of Deng Xiaoping and the reform program, Hu Yaobang and
Zhao Ziyang, to the posts of general secretary of the party
(September 1982) and premier of the State Council (September 1980),
respectively. In January 1987 Hu Yaobang lost the position of
general secretary when he failed to control violent student
demonstrations. Zhao Ziyang became acting general secretary, in
addition to serving as premier, pending confirmation by the
Thirteenth National Party Congress, scheduled for October 1987.
Under the new and pragmatic leadership, the modernization
program, slated to be well established by the year 2000, was to
engage the energies and talents of the entire population in
reaching the reform goals. But unlike in the past, acceptable class
background was not to play a role in selecting and promoting
participants for the national program. Intellectuals or those with
advanced education were no longer negatively categorized. Class
consciousness was being replaced by one that fostered initiative
and encouraged each person to contribute according to his or her
ability.
An initial challenge facing the reform leadership was to
provide for a rational and efficient governing system to support
economic development. In pursuit of that goal, the cult of
personality surrounding Mao Zedong was unequivocally condemned and
replaced by a strong emphasis on collective leadership. An example
of this new emphasis was the party's restoration in February 1980
of its Secretariat, which had been suspended since 1966. The new
party and state constitutions, both adopted in 1982, provided the
institutional framework for the Four Modernizations program. These
documents abolished the post of party chairman and restored the
post of president of the People's Republic of China, thereby giving
additional weight to government functions and providing a degree of
balance to the authoritative party structure. Also, the
government's role was broadened by the addition of standing
committees and direct elections at subnational levels of the
government's presiding body, the National People's Congress.
The political structure in 1987 seemed to represent consensus
and continuity, but it continued to undergo the test of
accommodation and a process of trial and error. The experimental
approach was rooted in official recognition that the party and the
government had to remain self-critical and responsive if they were
to fulfill the expectations that the reform leaders had raised
since 1978 of solving old problems and meeting new challenges. Some
of the most sweeping changes concerned the party and government
cadre system that was essential to the implementation and
performance of the reform program. Manned by about 14 million
cadres, the system was acknowledged officially to be overstaffed
and sluggish. The drive to weed out tens of thousands of aged,
inactive, and incompetent cadres was intensified. Even more
revolutionary, the life tenure system for state and party cadres
was abolished, and age limits for various offices were established.
While removing superfluous personnel, the reform leaders stressed
the importance of creating a "third echelon" of younger leadership
to enter responsible positions and be trained for future authority.
Between 1978 and 1987, some 470,000 younger officials reportedly
were promoted to responsible positions.
The theoretical basis of the political system continued to be
Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought (which combined borrowings from
Soviet ideology with Mao's theoretical writings), but with an
unmistakable emphasis on the application of this doctrine to
achieve desired results. The test of a reform was no longer how
closely it reflected hallowed quotations or ideas--although reforms
continued to be couched in proper doctrinal arguments--but whether
or not it produced demonstrable benefits to the reform program. The
banner slogan of the reform agenda was "socialism with Chinese
characteristics." This slogan implied that considerable leeway
would be allowed in doctrinal matters in order to achieve the
overriding goal of rapid modernization. But reform leaders realized
that successful implementation of the broad-ranging reform program
required a stable, professional bureaucracy to direct the course of
events. The course chosen included a more rational division of
powers and functions for the party and government, and it provided
a body of regulations and procedures to support the separation.
Institutions were set up to maintain discipline and to audit
bureaucratic records. In December 1986 the Standing Committee of
the National People's Congress established the Ministry of
Supervision to oversee the work of the government cadre. Of course,
the primacy of the party over all other sociopolitical institutions
was an unchanging fact of political life.
Another recognized requirement for a successful reform program
was the decentralization of authority, including a greater voice
and degree of accountability for local bodies in the formulation
and implementation of programs and policies. In the 1980s
government leaders instituted experimental programs at all levels
to achieve this end. The party, wielding political power and having
close access to reform leaders, appeared to act increasingly in an
advisory role, guiding events in accordance with its own general
policy and serving as an intermediary between government officials
and front-line producers, for example, departmental administrators
and enterprise managers. The role of the party was still being
defined, but it appeared less focused on dictating the specific
course of events.
Data as of July 1987
|
