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China Chapter 11. The Political Process
CHINA'S "SECOND REVOLUTION," a far-reaching program of reform
designed by Deng Xiaoping, was initiated at the Third Plenum of the
Eleventh Central Committee (December 18-22, 1978). It marked a
major turning point in China's modern political history, as it was
intended to make China's institutions and political process
supportive of the Four Modernizations, a national program of social
and economic development. The first step was to recruit
intellectuals and mobilize the population on a course of
modernization. Ultimately, it was hoped, these efforts would
produce what became identified as "socialism with Chinese
characteristics."
To realize this lofty goal, several obstacles had to be
overcome. The Cultural Revolution, under Mao Zedong's direction,
between 1966 and 1976 had divided Chinese society into competing
factions. The deaths of Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong in 1976 left the
country without strong leadership and contributed further to social
and political divisiveness. The need became obvious to replace
Mao's premise of "class struggle as the key link"--which emphasized
class conflict and disruptive mass campaigns--with a pragmatic
style that stressed stability and a problem-solving approach to
difficulties encountered in carrying out developmental programs.
The overly centralized political system, patterned after the Soviet
Union's Stalinist model, had to be revised to decentralize
decision-making authority.
Probably the greatest impediment to the success of
modernization was the unwieldy Chinese bureaucracy. Steeped in
revolutionary tradition but advanced in age and largely untrained
in modern administrative procedures, party and government cadres
operated through personal connections and patriarchal attitudes.
For the party and government to exercise effective control over
modernization programs, these cadres would have to be replaced by
younger and better trained administrators, a development that not
surprisingly would provoke considerable resistance from within the
bureaucracy. Finally, the means had to be found to engage urban
workers, peasants, and intellectuals in China's modernization
process by separating them from their traditional and often
backward viewpoints and providing them with a more practical and
scientific basis for their actions.
The substantial revisions to China's social, political, and
ideological system, required for the success of the "second
revolution," caused serious tensions within the political system.
The introduction of major economic reforms also caused considerable
strains. But the economic reform measures, first introduced in
China's rural areas, provoked an enthusiastic response and a
substantial following. With this success as a base, additional
reform measures were prepared in October 1984 for introduction into
China's more diverse and complicated urban sector. Concomitant with
measures to promote rural and urban development, plans were made
for substantial revision and reorganization of the political and
administrative structure in China, particularly the party and
government cadre system.
Because of the innovative nature of the political and economic
reform programs, each wave of reform stimulated a constituency
supporting its development. Beneficiaries of the new measures
carried them out with enthusiasm, sometimes even taking them beyond
their originally intended scope. At the same time, a substantial
segment of the affected population found itself undercut and showed
varying degrees of opposition to the reform initiatives. The reform
measures, initially designed by China's top party leaders, took on
a dimension of spontaneity as they were implemented. The dynamics
of the reform process, generating degrees of support and
opposition, played a substantial role in shaping the political
process in China after 1978.
Operating within this context, China's top party leaders had a
twofold task. First, they had to preserve a consensus among the
senior party leadership (the Political Bureau) concerning the
nature and content of reform measures and the pace at which they
would be introduced. Second, that consensus had to survive the
continual dislocations and permutations that accompanied the
implementation process. Some reforms provoked instability by being
zealously pursued; others bogged down in resistance. By 1987 it
appeared that the resolution of these emerging issues and problems
was accomplished mainly by internal bargaining among key leaders,
who often represented major institutional interests, and by
disciplinary measures. The latter case was exemplified by the
forced resignation of party general secretary Hu Yaobang early in
that year. In a more general sense, the major function of reform
leadership was to maintain stability in the political system while
preserving the momentum necessary for perpetuating the overall
reform program. In short, as in other developing societies, China's
leaders have had to manage the tensions inherent in a society
undergoing rapid and thoroughgoing change.
Finally, Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought--the official
state ideology--needed continual substantive revision and changes
in emphasis by China's political leadership. Under Mao Zedong's
leadership, China's recognized ideal had been to create the true
"socialist man." In the 1980s Deng Xiaoping set for his government
the perhaps equally idealistic goal of leading the enormous
population of this developing country, still imbued with
"feudalistic" traditions, toward the achievement of a modern,
developed state by the year 2000. It was a goal that seemed to
require frequent revision if it were ever to be achieved.
Data as of July 1987
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