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China Relations with the Third World
Next in importance to its relations with the superpowers have
been China's relations with the Third World. Chinese leaders have
tended to view the developing nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin
America as a major force in international affairs, and they have
considered China an integral part of this major Third World force.
As has been the case with China's foreign relations in general,
policy toward the countries of the developing world has fluctuated
over time. It has been affected by China's alternating involvement
in and isolation from world affairs and by the militancy or
peacefulness of Beijing's views. In addition, China's relations
with the Third World have been affected by China's ambiguous
position as a developing country that nevertheless has certain
attributes more befiting a major power. China has been variously
viewed by the Third World as a friend and ally, a competitor for
markets and loans, a source of economic and military assistance, a
regional power intent on dominating Asia, and a "candidate
superpower" with such privileges as a permanent seat on the UN
Security Council.
China's relations with the Third World have developed through
several phases: the Bandung Line of the mid-1950s (named for a 1955
conference of Asian and African nations held in Bandung,
Indonesia), support for liberation and world revolution in the
1960s, the pronouncement of the Theory of the Three Worlds and
support for a "new international economic order" in the 1970s, and
a renewed emphasis on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence
in the 1980s.
In the first years after the founding of the People's Republic,
Chinese statements echoed the Soviet view that the world was
divided into two camps, the forces of socialism and those of
imperialism, with "no third road" possible. By 1953 China began
reasserting its belief that the newly independent developing
countries could play an important intermediary role in world
affairs. In 1954 Zhou Enlai and Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of
India agreed on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence as the
underlying basis for conducting foreign relations. China's success
in promoting these principles at the 1955 Bandung Conference helped
China emerge from diplomatic isolation. By the end of the 1950s,
however, China's foreign policy stance had become more militant.
Statements promoting the Chinese revolution as a model and
Beijing's actions in the Taiwan Strait (1958) and in border
conflicts with India (1962) and Vietnam (1979), for example,
alarmed many Third World nations.
During the 1960s China cultivated ties with Third World
countries and insurgent groups in an attempt to encourage "wars of
national liberation" and revolution and to forge an international
united front against both superpowers. China offered economic,
technical, and sometimes military assistance to other countries and
liberation movements, which, although small in comparison with
Soviet and United States aid, was significant considering China's
own needs. Third World appreciation for Chinese assistance
coexisted, however, with growing suspicions of China's militancy.
Such suspicions were fed, for example, by Zhou Enlai's statement in
the early 1960s that the potential for revolution in Africa was
"excellent" and by the publication of Lin Biao's essay "Long Live
the Victory of People's War!" in 1965. Discord between China and
many Third World countries continued to grow. In some cases, as
with Indonesia's charge of Chinese complicity in the 1965 coup
attempt in Jakarta and claims by several African nations of Chinese
subversion during the Cultural Revolution, bilateral disputes led
to the breaking off of diplomatic relations. Although the Third
World was not a primary focus of the Cultural Revolution, it was
not immune to the chaos this period wrought upon Chinese foreign
relations.
In the 1970s China began to redefine its foreign policy after
the isolation and militancy of the late 1960s. China reestablished
those of its diplomatic missions that had been recalled during the
Cultural Revolution and began the process of rapprochement with the
United States. The People's Republic was admitted into the UN in
1971 and was recognized diplomatically by an increasing number of
nations. China's major foreign policy statement during this time
was Mao's Theory of the Three Worlds, which was presented publicly
by Deng Xiaoping at the UN in 1974. According to this theory, the
First World consisted of the two superpowers--the Soviet Union and
the United States--both "imperialist aggressors" whose rivalry was
the greatest cause of impending world war. The Third World was the
main force in international affairs. Its growing opposition to
superpower hegemony was exemplified by such world events as the
Arab nations' control of oil prices, Egypt's expulsion of Soviet
aid personnel in l972, and the United States withdrawal from
Vietnam. The Second World, comprising the developed countries of
Europe plus Japan, could either oppress the Third World or join in
opposing the superpowers. By the second half of the 1970s, China
perceived an increased threat from the Soviet Union, and the theory
was modified to emphasize that the Soviet Union was the more
dangerous of the two superpowers.
The other primary component of China's Third World policy in
the early 1970s was a call for radical change in the world power
structure and particularly a call for a "new international economic
order." Until the late 1970s, the Chinese principles of
sovereignty, opposition to hegemony, and self-reliance coincided
with the goals of the movement for a new international economic
order. Chinese statements in support of the new order diminished as
China began to implement the opening up policy, allow foreign
investment, and seek technical assistance and foreign loans.
China's critical opinion of international financial institutions
appeared to change abruptly as Beijing prepared to join the
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in 1980. Chinese
support for changes in the economic order stressed the role of
collective self-reliance among the countries of the Third World, or
"South-South cooperation," in the 1980s.
Also in the 1980s, China reasserted its Third World credentials
and placed a renewed emphasis on its relations with Third World
countries as part of its independent foreign policy. China stressed
that it would develop friendly relations with other nations
regardless of their social systems or ideologies and would conduct
its relations on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful
Coexistence. Beijing exchanged delegations with Third World
countries regularly, and it made diplomatic use of cultural ties,
for example, by promoting friendly links between Chinese Muslims
and Islamic countries. Officially, China denied that it sought a
leadership role in the Third World, although some foreign observers
argued to the contrary. Beijing increasingly based its foreign
economic relations with the Third World on equality and mutual
benefit, expressed by a shift toward trade and joint ventures and
away from grants and interest-free loans.
By the second half of the 1980s, China's relations with Third
World nations covered the spectrum from friendly to inimical.
Bilateral relations ranged from a formal alliance with North Korea,
to a near-alliance with Pakistan, to hostile relations with Vietnam
marked by sporadic border conflict. Many relationships have changed
dramatically over time: for example, China previously had close
relations with Vietnam; its ties with India were friendly during
the 1950s but were strained thereafter by border tensions.
Particularly in Southeast Asia, a legacy of suspicion concerning
China's ultimate intentions affected Chinese relations with many
countries.
As of 1987 only a few countries in the world lacked diplomatic
ties with Beijing; among them were Honduras, Indonesia, Israel,
Paraguay, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, the Republic of Korea, and
Uruguay. Some of these had formal ties with Taiwan instead. China's
growing interest in trade and technical exchanges, however, meant
that in some cases substantial unofficial relations existed despite
the absence of diplomatic recognition.
Data as of July 1987
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