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China Competing Bureaucratic Interests
The implementation of these components of political reform
contributed to internal tensions and competition among the major
bureaucracies--the party, government, and military. The party's
status remained paramount within the system, but the delineation of
its role became increasingly vague. Theoretically, the party was to
act as the unifying force that would guide the society on the
difficult path to modernization. In practice, especially at the
middle levels of the structure, it appeared in the mid-1980s that
implementation of the reform program was greatly diluting the power
of party cadres. Many party members were retired to advisory
capacities, increased emphasis was placed on separating the
functions of the party and government, and much of the decisionmaking authority in the economic sphere was transferred to
enterprise managers. All these factors eroded the party's once
pervasive authority. Although the party continued to articulate the
central policy for all levels of society, it offered fewer
opportunities for members to achieve recognition and rewards after
1978, when concrete results became more important. All this brought
widespread bureaucratic resistance to reform policies and their
implementation.
Retirements, elevated entrance qualifications, and power
sharing with enterprise managers also brought traumatic changes in
government bureaucracy. Direct elections to people's congresses
added a new element of uncertainty about the cadre selection
process for government service. Wider public discussion of issues
and more extensive press coverage subjected state cadres to
additional demands and criticisms and sometimes to abuse. The new
accountability offered opportunities for government cadres, but
often they perceived it as a threat or a burden. It soon became
another major source of the complaints conveyed to top leadership
circles.
In the late 1980s, the People's Liberation Army continued as a
major player in political circles and had representatives on the
Political Bureau
(see Civil-Military Relations
, ch. 14). Its
presence within senior party bodies significantly declined in the
1980s, however, as was apparent from the percentage of party
Central Committee memberships held by military personnel. Military
influence had reached a high point in 1969, when its
representatives gained roughly half the seats on the party's Ninth
Central Committee, but declined at the Tenth Central Committee
(1973) and Eleventh Central Committee (1978). In 1982 full
membership on the Twelfth Central Committee held by People's
Liberation Army personnel dropped to around 20 percent. At the
National Conference of Party Delegates held in September 1985,
about half of those retired from the Central Committee were from
the armed forces, and civilians replaced seven members of the
Political Bureau who had military connections.
These trends reflected Deng Xiaoping's military reform goals of
placing the People's Liberation Army under firm civilian leadership
and transforming its ranks and organization into a modern,
professional military establishment. Owing partly to its size and
largely to its heavily Maoist revolutionary traditions, the
military was essentially conservative and in 1987 continued to
resist many of the reformers' policies. It seemed possible that
Deng's successors might experience strong pressure from a
revitalized People's Liberation Army to restore some of its lost
political influence.
Data as of July 1987
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