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China Nuclear Forces
In the late 1980s, China was the world's third-largest nuclear
power, possessing a small but credible nuclear deterrent force of
225 to 300 nuclear weapons. Beginning in the late 1970s, China
deployed a full range of nuclear forces and acquired an incipient
nuclear second-strike capability. The nuclear forces were operated
by the 100,000-person Strategic Missile Force, which was controlled
directly by the General Staff Department.
China began developing nuclear weapons in the late 1950s with
substantial Soviet assistance. When Sino-Soviet relations cooled in
the late 1950s and early 1960s, the Soviet Union withheld plans and
data for an atomic bomb, abrogated the agreement on transferring
defense technology, and began the withdrawal of Soviet advisers in
1960. Despite the termination of Soviet assistance, China committed
itself to continue nuclear weapons development to break "the
superpowers' monopoly on nuclear weapons," to ensure Chinese
security against the Soviet and United States threats, and to
increase Chinese prestige and power internationally.
China made remarkable progress in the 1960s in developing
nuclear weapons. In a thirty-two-month period, China successfully
exploded its first atomic bomb (October 16, 1964), launched its
first nuclear missile (October 25, 1966), and detonated its first
hydrogen bomb (June 14, 1967). Deployment of the Dongfeng-1
conventionally armed short-range ballistic missile and the
Dongfeng-2 (CSS-1) medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) occurred
in the 1960s. The Dongfeng-3 (CCS-2) intermediate-range ballistic
missile (IRBM) was successfully tested in 1969. Although the
Cultural Revolution disrupted the strategic weapons program less
than other scientific and educational sectors in China, there was
a slowdown in succeeding years.
In the 1970s the nuclear weapons program saw the development of
MRBM, IRBM, and ICBM capabilities and marked the beginning of a
minimum deterrent force. China continued MRBM deployment, began
deploying the Dongfeng-3 IRBM, and successfully tested and
commenced deployment of the Dongfeng-4 (CSS-4) limited-range ICBM.
By 1980 China had overcome the slowdown in nuclear development
caused by the Cultural Revolution and had some spectacular
successes in its strategic weapons program. In 1980 China
successfully test launched its full-range ICBM, the Dongfeng-5
(CCS-4); the missile flew from central China to the Western
Pacific, where it was recovered by a naval task force. The
Dongfeng-5 possessed the capability to hit targets in the western
Soviet Union and the United States. In 1981 China launched three
satellites into space orbit from a single booster, indicating that
China might possess the technology to develop multiple,
independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs). China also
launched the Xia-class SSBN in 1981, and the next year it conducted
its first successful test launch of the CSS-NX-4 submarine-launched
ballistic missile. In addition to the development of a sea-based
nuclear force, China began considering the development of tactical
nuclear weapons. PLA exercises featured the simulated use of
tactical nuclear weapons in offensive and defensive situations
beginning in 1982. Reports of Chinese possession of tactical
nuclear weapons remained unconfirmed in 1987.
In 1986 China possessed a credible minimum deterrent force with
land, sea, and air elements. Land-based forces included ICBMs,
IRBMs, and MRBMs. The sea-based strategic force consisted of SSBNs.
The Air Force's bombers were capable of delivering nuclear bombs
but would be unlikely to penetrate the sophisticated air defenses
of modern military powers such as the Soviet Union.
China's nuclear forces, in combination with the PLA's
conventional forces, served to deter both nuclear and conventional
attack. Chinese leaders repeatedly have pledged never to be the
first to use nuclear weapons, and they have accompanied the nofirst -use pledge with a promise of certain nuclear counterattack if
nuclear weapons are used against China. China envisioned
retaliation against strategic and tactical attacks and would
probably strike countervalue rather than counterforce targets. The
combination of China's few nuclear weapons and technological
factors such as range, accuracy, and response time might further
limit the effectiveness of nuclear strikes against counterforce
targets. China is seeking to increase the credibility of its
nuclear retaliatory capability by dispersing and concealing its
nuclear forces in difficult terrain, improving their mobility, and
hardening its missile silos.
Data as of July 1987
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